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ABSTRACT 
Dynamic risk assessments (DRA) are the next generation of risk estimation approaches 
that help to enable safer operations of complex process systems in changing environments. 
By incorporating new evidences from systems in the risk assessment process, the DRA 
techniques ensure estimation of current risk. This thesis investigates the existing 
knowledge and technological challenges associated with dynamic risk assessment and 
proposes new methods to improve effective implementation of DRA techniques.  
Risk is defined as the combination of three attributes: what can go wrong, how bad could 
it be, and how often might it happen. This research evaluates the limitations of the 
methodologies that have been developed to answer the latter two questions. Loss functions 
are used in this work to estimate and model operational loss in process facilities. The 
application of loss functions provides the following advantages: (i) the stochastic nature of 
losses is taken into account; and (ii) the estimation of the operational loss in process 
facilities due to the deviation of key process characteristics (KPC) is conducted. Models to 
estimate reputational loss and significant elements of business interruption loss, which are 
usually ignored in the literature, are also provided. This research also presents a 
methodology to develop multivariate loss functions to measure the operational loss of 
multivariate process systems. For this purpose, copula functions are used to link the 
univariate loss functions and develop the multivariate loss functions. Copula functions are 
also used to address the existing challenge of loss aggregation for multiple-loss scenarios.  
Regarding the dynamic estimation of the probability of abnormal events, the Bayesian 
Network (BN) has usually been used in the literature. However, integrated safety analysis 
iv 
of hazardous process facilities calls for an understanding of both stochastic and topological 
dependencies, going beyond traditional BN analysis to study cause-effect relationships 
among major risk factors. This work presents a novel model based on the Copula Bayesian 
Network (CBN) for multivariate safety analysis of process systems, which addresses the 
main shortcomings of traditional BNs. The proposed CBN model offers great flexibility in 
probabilistic analysis of individual risk factors while considering their uncertainty and 
complex stochastic dependence. 
The research outcomes provide advanced methods for critical operations, such as the 
offshore operations in harsh environments, to be used in continuous improvement of 
processes and real-time risk estimation. Application of the proposed dynamic risk 
assessment framework, along with a proper safety culture, enhances the day-to-day risk-
informed decision making process by constantly monitoring, evaluating and improving the 
process safety performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview 
Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems 
and processes handling hazardous substances [1]. Unlike the occupational safety approach, 
which focuses on hazards that could result in health issues (e.g. slips, trips, and falls), 
process safety focuses on the prevention and mitigation of process hazards that may result 
in the release of chemicals or energy [2]. Such hazards could ultimately result in serious 
impacts including human health loss, environmental damage, asset loss and loss of 
production. 
As industrialization progressed in the 20th century and more complex technologies 
developed over time, a series of intermittent catastrophes began to occure in different parts 
of the world [3]. However, it was mostly after highly publicized international disasters such 
as those in Flixborough (United Kingdom, 1974), Seveso (Italy, 1976), and Bhopal (India, 
1984) [4] that governments and regulatory agencies began to establish what is now called 
Process Safety Management (PSM). Continued occurrence of major losses, with recent 
examples such as the Texas City refinery accident in 2005 [5] and the Gulf of Mexico’s 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 [6], has had a significant impact on the industry’s 
approaches to modern process safety. Publications by Andrew Hopkins [7], Trevor Kletz 
[8], and Atherton & Gil [9] have served to raise process safety awareness and to publicize 
the lessons from these and other incidents [1].  
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The result of this increased awareness has been a global recognition of PSM as the primary 
approach for establishing the level of safety in operations required to manage high-hazard 
processes [1]. With this in mind, and also due to the evolution in regulatory thinking that 
integrated traditional occupational safety with process safety [10], several PSM standards 
and guidelines were developed by industry associations around the world. Some examples 
are the OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 [11] and API RP 750 [12] in the United States, and the 
PSM Standard [13] published by CSChE in Canada. In Europe, since 1982, such 
approaches were integrated in the EU legislation, with the so-called “Seveso” Directives 
(Directive 82/501/EEC [14], Directive 96/82/EC [15], Directive 2012/18/EU [16]). All of 
these PSM programs cover the same basic requirements, although the number of program 
elements may vary depending on the criteria used [1]. 
Risk-based approaches were introduced to support the next generation of PSM programs. 
Some example of the projects conducted in Europe can be found in references [17–20], 
which are considered as the precursors of such approaches in chemical industries. In the 
United Kingdom and in The Netherlands, these methods are now required to support the 
implementation of Seveso Directives [2,21]. In the United States, risk-based approaches to 
PSM were introduced in 2007 by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) [10]. The 
evolution of traditional PSM programs to risk-based approaches is described in the next 
section.    
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1.2. Risk-Based Process Safety 
Although regulatory agencies around the globe have mandated a formal implementation of 
PSM, incident investigations continue to identify inadequate management system 
performance as a key contributor to incidents [22]. The disastrous Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 has raised questions about the likelihood of such 
an event occurring again. There is a collective need for the chemical and major hazard 
sectors to demonstrate that risks are being adequately controlled, as the industry and 
regulators are often judged using the latest major incident to gain public attention [23]. 
Moreover, evolution of traditional PSM approaches is essential to avoid degradation of 
organizations’ process safety performance.  
Achieving process safety excellence requires identification of abnormal process situations 
and implementation of corrective actions before a serious incident occurs [10]. Built on 
analysis of the frequency and consequences of potential accidents, risk analysis is now an 
accepted tool by the oil and gas industry for evaluation of a PSM program performance 
[17,18]. “A risk-based approach reduces the potential for assigning an undue amount of 
resources to manage lower-risk events, thereby freeing up resources for tasks that address 
higher-risk events” [10]. Using risk-based process safety (RBPS), deficiencies of a PSM 
system can be identified and resources can be assigned accordingly to improve PSM 
practices. CCPS’s RBPS guidelines [10] is perhaps the most important risk-based PSM 
program, which recognizes that all hazards and risks are not equal and that more resources 
should be focused on higher risks. 
4 
Several risk assessment techniques have been developed in recent years by different 
industries and regulatory agencies; some examples and reviews of conventional risk 
assessment can  be found in [10,24,26,27]. Although conventional risk assessment methods 
have played an important role in identifying major risks and maintaining safety in process 
facilities, as disucussed in the following, they have the disadvantages of being static and 
using generic failure data [28].  
Complex oil and gas facilities have hundreds of dynamic variables, deviations in which 
can affect the overall process risk [26]. Conditions in process facilities are dynamic, with 
changes in operating parameters often being reflected in changed operating procedures and 
equipment [29]. Feed variability, mechanical and operational integrity degradation, wrong 
settings, improper methods and human error can cause abnormal situations that can 
eventually result in severe consequences [30]. However, due to their static structures, 
conventional risk assessment approaches fail to capture the variation of risks as deviations 
or changes in the process and plant take place [28]. The following section identifies 
fundamental steps for conducting a dynamic risk assessment and reviews the major 
contributions in this area.  
 
1.3. Dynamic Risk Assessment 
Any process is subject to deterioration with time due to natural and assignable causes. A 
dynamic risk assessment (DRA) is defined in this work as a method that updates the 
estimated risk of a deteriorating process according to the new evidence from the 
performance of the control system, safety barriers, inspection and maintenance activities, 
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the human factor and procedures. Dynamic risk is usually measured as either a function of 
time or a function of one or more key process characteristics.  
Figure 1.1 shows the flowchart of a typical DRA method. Almost all qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis methods involve the first three steps identified in Figure 1.1 [29]. 
However, a DRA method includes an additional phase of monitoring and assessing 
abnormal process conditions to revise the estimated risk.     
 
Identify hazards and accident 
scenarios
Assess consequences and 
likelihood for each scenario
Conduct initial risk 
assessment
Collect new evidence 
from system
Identify and recognize 
new potential hazards 
and accident scenarios
Update estimated risks
Activate safety devices;
Apply changes in control measures 
and process safety strategies 
Is risk acceptable?
Yes
No
 
Figure 1.1. Typical dynamic risk analysis flowchart 
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There have been several contributions in recent years which propose and promote DRA 
methods [27,28,31–35]. A comprehensive review of these contributions shows that while 
all the presented approaches share the main steps identified in Figure 1.1, they can be 
distinguished based on the following three criteria: 
i. Type of information used  
ii. Risk updating mechanism 
iii. Probability of failure (POF) updating vs. consequences of failure (COF) updating 
Table 1.1 highlights the major contributions in dynamic risk analysis of process facilities 
and compares them based on the three criteria above. Table 1.1 also presents the advantages 
and disadvantages of each method.  As can be seen from Table 1.1, Bayesian updating 
using process and failure histories and the bow-tie technique to incorporate newly 
identified potential hazards are two main approaches used in most DRA applications. 
However, due to the inherent limitations of each of the methods in Table 1.1, there still 
exist several knowledge and technological gaps in dynamic risk assessment. The current 
PhD research has been conducted to address these challenges, as will be discussed in the 
next section. 
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Table 1.1. Major contributions in dynamic risk analysis of process facilities 
Method Description Related works 
Bayesian Information used: Process history, accident precursor data, 
alarm databases 
Updating Mechanism: The Bayesian updating mechanism is 
used to update the prior beliefs about the accidents by 
incorporating new information from the system 
Advantages:  
 Ability to handle uncertainty, multi-state variables, complex 
causal relationships, and sequentially dependent failures  
Disadvantages:  
 High computational burden to construct conditional 
probability tables 
 Inability to model complex dependencies among variables 
 Application of deterministic and/or normally distributed 
probabilities  
 
Meel and Seider 
[34,35] 
Pariyani et al. 
[32,36] 
Vinnem et al. [37] 
Kalantarnia et al. 
[28] 
Khakzad et al. [33] 
 
Bow-tie Information used: Accident precursor data; newly identified 
scenarios 
Updating Mechanism: Continuous safety-related information 
retrieval is integrated with conventional bow-tie analysis to 
dynamically estimate the risk 
Advantages:  
 Simple practical implementation  
Disadvantages:  
 Limited ability to handle uncertainty, multi-state variables 
and dependent failures due to application of simple Boolean 
functions in bow-tie analysis 
 Application of deterministic probability values 
 Inability to model complex dependencies among variables 
 
Paltrinieri et al. 
[38] 
Pasman and Rogers 
[39] 
CCPS [40] 
Khakzad et al. [41] 
 
Principal 
component 
analysis (PCA) 
Information used: Process history 
Updating Mechanism: Probability of a fault is calculated based 
on the PCA filtered score, and the severity of the fault is a 
weighted average of the consequences of each variable in the 
score 
Advantages:  
 Multivariate technique 
 Takes advantage of the correlation between process input 
and output 
 Extracts latent features from high dimensional data 
Disadvantages:  
 Relies on linear models and assumes Gaussian noise 
 Unable to model complex dependencies among variables 
 Most applications require the process model 
 
Jiang and Yang 
[42] 
Ge and Song [43] 
Zadakbar et al. [44] 
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Table 1.1. Major contributions in dynamic risk analysis of process facilities (cont.) 
Method Description Related works 
Risk 
barometer 
Information used: Technical, operational and organizational 
indicators assessing deviation from optimal condition 
Updating mechanism: Indicators are used to assess safety 
barrier performance on a regular basis, which in turn allows for 
continuous assessment of overall risk variation  
Advantages:  
 Technical indicators are integrated with proactive 
operational/organizational indicators in order to assess early 
deviations potentially leading to unwanted events 
 Degrading safety barriers leading to critical risk increase 
may be identified and their improvement may be prioritized 
Disadvantages:  
 Case-specific and partially based on expert judgment from 
operators 
 Relies on linear models 
 Based on relevant indicators whose collection may be 
irregular. Such irregularities may compromise the overall 
risk assessment 
 
Paltrinieri et al. 
[31,45–47] 
Loss functions Information used: Deviation of key process characteristics 
from target values 
Updating Mechanism: Loss functions are used to relate process 
deviations to economic losses  
Advantages:  
 Provides a mechanism for real-time loss modelling 
 Promotes continuous improvement of process safety through 
proactive loss minimization 
Disadvantages:  
 Selection of a proper loss function could be difficult for 
data-scarce processes 
 
Hashemi et al. [30]† 
Zadakbar et al. [48] 
Ali [49] 
Pan and Chen [50] 
† Reference [30] is based on the results of this thesis and is included in this table for completeness. 
 
1.4. Motivations 
The motivation of this thesis has been to bridge the main technological gaps between the 
existing methods and the requirements of an effective DRA method according to the 
definition provided in the previous section. Having evaluated the DRA methods in Table 
1.1, these technological gaps are identified as follows: 
9 
i. The stochastic nature of losses is not taken into account. However, the uncertainty 
in loss model predictions can significantly affect the decision-making.   
ii. The estimation of the operational loss of process facilities due to the deviation of 
key process characteristics (KPC) is usually ignored. 
iii. The effect of reputational loss is ignored in almost all existing models and studies. 
iv. Except for the loss function approach that can be used to revise estimated 
economical loss of a deviated process, all other methods may be considered 
dynamic only in estimating the probabilities of potential events. 
v. In most approaches, it is assumed that a univariate key process characteristic can 
be assigned to a system. 
vi. Deterministic point-based probability values are used in most applications, ignoring 
the uncertainty associated with probability estimations. In some recent 
developments in Bayesian Network (BN) and PCA-based approaches, normal 
distribution has been used as the marginal distribution. However, there is no doubt 
that the assumption of joint normality fails to yield suitable models in many 
applications. 
vii. Either independent or linearly dependent variables are considered in all applications 
highlighted in Table 1.1. In other words, existing models fail to model complex 
non-linear dependencies among variables influencing system overall risk.   
Although BN has been used as a general framework for analyzing causal influences among 
variables to analyze multivariate systems, the latter two challenges in the list above still 
exist. The inherent structural limitations of the BN and bow-tie approaches do not allow 
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consideration of multivariate systems with different marginal distributions with complex 
non-linear dependencies. From this discussion, it can be concluded that a combination of 
different mathematical tools would be required to enable incorporation of different types 
of process and failure information with different types of potentially complex and 
correlated marginal distributions. 
This thesis uses an alternate and markedly different approach for constructing multivariate 
distributions using copulas to model operational losses using multivariate loss functions. 
The application of copula functions provides a flexible tool to capture stochastic 
dependency of complex systems by breaking down the dependency challenge into the 
estimation of marginal probability distributions and the estimation of dependency 
structure. Moreover, with copula modelling, the marginal distributions from different types 
can be combined, which is a significant improvement compared with alternative methods 
such as the use of multivariate distributions. However, copulas alone are unable to capture 
cause-effect relationships among random variables. Therefore, this research proposes the 
combination of BN analysis and copulas for dynamic probability estimation. The resulting 
Copula Bayesian Network (CBN) model provides an intuitively compelling framework for 
modeling causal relationships among (potentially) highly correlated variables with any 
level of dependence complexity.  
The copula-based multivariate loss modelling proposed in Chapter 7 of this thesis and the 
CBN model for dynamic probability updating presented in Chapter 8 provide multivariate 
techniques that can dynamically update both the COF and POF of complex systems with 
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different types of discrete and continuous data and new information from the system, while 
addressing the technological gaps identified in the list above. 
 
1.5. Scope and Objectives 
The scope of this research covers both dynamic loss modelling and dynamic probabilistic 
analysis of process hazards in process facilities which may result in the release of chemicals 
or energy and loss of productivity. However, the development of a dynamic risk 
management framework is not within the scope of this thesis. The scope of the loss 
modelling parts of this thesis includes operational loss, reputational loss, and business 
interruption loss. This research also addresses the issue of loss aggregation to estimate 
overall loss. Detailed estimations of human health, environmental, and asset losses are not 
included in the scope of this work as they are extensively studied in the litarture. However, 
it is shown that the loss function approach and the proposed loss aggregation methodology 
are applicable for any type of loss. The models developed in this work are best suited for 
detailed quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of critical operations, such as offshore oil and 
gas development in harsh environments, where an accurate and precise risk estimation is 
required to ensure overall safety.  
The proposed models perform the required analysis by answering these questions:  
i. Is the system under control?  
ii. What is the overall probability for an out-of-control state of the system?  
iii. If the process is out-of-control, what will the consequences be?  
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iv. How to take the potential dependency among process and operational variables into 
consideration while estimating the process risk? 
v. How should estimated loss and probability values be revised as new information 
from the system becomes available?  
Having these research questions in mind, this work aims to fulfill the objectives identified 
in Figure 1.2 and described as follows: 
i. Deveopment of dynamic risk-based methods for continuously improving the safety 
of operations. 
ii. Improvement of existing loss modelling methods by considering losses as 
stochastic factors. Models are also provided to quantify operational loss, 
reputational loss and detailed business interruption loss, which are usually ignored 
in the existing loss modelling approaches.  
iii. Determination of how process and operational deviations propagate through a 
deteriorating process and cause loss, where loss is defined as the discrepancy 
between the current situation and the ideal situation. The ultimate objective is to 
dynamically quantify the loss due to process deviations. Loss functions are used as 
a tool to achieve this objective. 
iv. Development of a dynamic real-time probabilistic approach that can be used to 
estimate, revise and adapt the probability of operational losses of a deteriorating 
process according to the performance of the control system and safety barriers, 
considering complex non-linear dependencies among contributing factors. 
Integration of copula functions with the Bayesian Network is proposed to achieve 
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two main sub-objectives: (i) flexibility to assign different probability distributions 
to marginal risk factors; and (ii) incorporation of a potential complex, non-linear 
dependence structure among risk factors. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Research objectives 
 
1.6. Contribution and Novelty 
This section highlights the methodological and applicative contributions of this work and 
its significance by improving the existing methods in the area of dynamic risk assessment. 
One of the important methodological objectives of this research has been to 
comprehensively investigate risk assessment literature (not only in the area of the process 
industry, but also in other fields such as finance, economics, quality management, and 
actuarial literature) in order to identify potential methods and mathematical tools that can 
Development of 
Dynamic Risk-Based 
Tools for Continuous 
Safety Improvement 
Improvement of 
Existing Loss 
Modelling 
Methods
Real-Time 
Probability 
Assessment of 
Complex 
Correlated 
Losses
Dynamic 
Quantification 
of Operational 
Losses
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be used to address identified challenges. The following is a brief description of the 
contributions and novelties of this research. The details of each identified contribution are 
provided in relevant chapters of the thesis.      
 
1.6.1. Application of Loss Functions 
The continued occurrence of major losses in the oil and gas industries highlights the fact 
that existing process safety management approaches are still far from what is necessary to 
avoid major losses. Therefore, there is a need for a renewed risk management approach for 
critical operations, focusing on the monitoring of process and operational deviations rather 
than reacting to accidents after they happen. Using the concept of loss function, this work 
provides a continuous improvement tool for complex operations by considering zero loss 
only for on-target operations to foster a zero-loss safety and quality culture. More details 
are provided in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. 
Moreover, using loss functions, this research provides an integrated risk-based safety and 
quality assessment and operational performance analysis tool for process operations; more 
details are provided in Chapter 3. Several static consequence analysis and loss modeling 
techniques for chemical processes have been proposed in the literature [24,51–53], none of 
which provide a dynamic consequence analysis approach. One of the main innovations of 
this research is the application of loss functions to monitor the real-time operational loss 
of process systems, which addresses the existing challenge in assigning monetary value to 
process deviations. More details are provided in Chapters 2, 3 and 7. Existing dynamic risk 
assessment models such as [28,32,35,54] use only the number of recorded incidents over 
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time to update risk. In addition to the observed incidents, the impact of process deviations 
as the root cause of the majority of process-related incidents is also incorporated in the 
proposed models in Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of the thesis by using the concept of loss functions. 
 
1.6.2. Incorporating Complex Dependencies in Risk Assessment 
Process safety and risk assessment are often multidimensional and hence require the joint 
modelling of several potentially correlated random variables. This research recognizes the 
importance of considering correlated variables used in risk assessment to avoid over-
estimation or, in the worst case, underestimation of risk. A copula-based technique is used 
to model dependency among variables to improve the uncertainty analysis.  
From modelling perspective, the main advantage of copulas compared with alternative 
methods, such as the use of multivariate distributions, is that the estimation of marginal 
distributions and the estimation of dependence structure can be performed separately. 
Moreover, with copula modelling, the marginal distributions from different families can be 
combined [55]. In practice, copula constructions often lead to a significant improvement 
in analyzing a system of correlated variables. Accordingly, there has been a growing 
interest in the application of copulas in the process industry, with its application mainly in 
the area of the risk analysis of safety systems [26,32,34–36].  
The contributions of this research in terms of using copula functions are twofold. First, a 
new application of copula functions is provided to aggregate loss categories, considering 
the potential dependencies among them; details of this contribution are provided in Chapter 
5. Second, methodologies are provided to estimate copula parameters and choose the best 
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copula for a specific application; details are provided in Chapter 7. The main objective of 
this part of the research is to present the successive steps required to use copulas for 
modelling the dependent losses and constructing multivariate distributions for specific 
purposes, including operational loss modelling.   
  
1.6.3. Development of Multivariate Loss Modelling Techniques  
Integrated operational loss modeling of process industries requires understanding the joint 
distribution of all key process characteristics and their correlations. Choosing and 
estimating a useful form for the marginal loss distribution of each variable in its domain is 
often a straightforward task. In contrast, as described in Chapter 7, other than the quadratic 
and inverted normal loss functions, univariate loss functions usually do not have a 
convenient multivariate generalization [55]. According to a review of the existing literature 
in the area of multivariate loss functions conducted by [56], it can be concluded that the 
existing research challenge is to develop a flexible framework to assign appropriate 
marginal loss functions to key process characteristics. The novelty of this research is to 
propose a methodology to construct the multivariate loss functions using copulas, which 
allows selection of any type of inverted probability loss function for the marginal losses, 
irrespective of their dependence structure. More details are provided in Chapter 7. 
 
1.6.4. Development of Copula Bayesian Networks   
Bayesian Network (BN) analysis has been used widely in process safety analysis for 
analyzing causal influences in multivariate systems and constructing joint distributions; 
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some recent examples are [36,57,58]. However, despite the broad scope of applicability, 
the following main shortcomings are identified for BN applications: 
i. Deterministic point-based probability values are used in most BN applications, 
ignoring the uncertainty associated with probability estimations [33,59,60].  
ii. Constructing the conditional probability tables (CPTs) to describe the strength of 
relationships quickly becomes very complex and difficult to compute as the number 
of parents and states increases [61]. 
This research proposes a model based on the Copula Bayesian Network (CBN) for 
multivariate safety analysis of process systems. The innovation of the proposed CBN 
model is in integrating the advantage of copula functions in modelling complex 
dependence structures with the cause-effect relationship reasoning of process variables 
using BNs. More discussion on the restrictions of traditional BN analysis and the 
advantages and novelty of the proposed CBN model are provided in Chapter 8. 
 
1.7. Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is written in manuscript format (paper-based), including six journal papers and 
one peer-reviewed conference paper. Table 1.2 shows the papers published during the 
course of this research and the case study problem used to demonstrate the practical 
application of each part of the research.   
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Table 1.2. Organization of the thesis 
Chapter Title Supporting Paper Title 
Case Study 
Problem 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
Not applicable (NA) NA 
Chapter 2: 
Loss Functions 
 
Loss functions and their applications in process safety 
assessment. Process Safety Progress, 33(3), 285–291 
(2014) 
 
Reactor process 
(early warning 
design) 
Chapter 3: 
Applications of Loss 
Functions in Risk 
Assessment 
 
Risk-based operational performance analysis using loss 
functions. Chemical Engineering Science, 116, 99–108 
(2014) 
Continuous Stirred 
Tank Reactor 
(CSTR)  
Chapter 4: 
Dependency in Multivariate 
Process Risk Assessment 
 
Correlation and dependency in multivariate process risk 
assessment. In 9th IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, 
Supervision and Safety for Technical Processes, Paris 
(2015) 
 
Distillation process 
Chapter 5: 
Loss Aggregation 
 
Loss scenario analysis and loss aggregation for process 
facilities. Chemical Engineering Science, 128(May 2015), 
119–129 (2015) 
 
Distillation column 
Chapter 6: 
Business Loss Modelling 
 
Probabilistic modelling of business interruption and 
reputational losses for process facilities. Process Safety 
Progress, 34(4), 373–382 (2015) 
 
Distillation column 
Chapter 7: 
Multivariate Loss Functions 
 
Operational loss modelling for process facilities using 
multivariate loss functions. Chemical Engineering 
Research and Design, 104, 333–345 (2015) 
 
Simulation study; 
De-ethanizer column 
Chapter 8: 
Multivariate Probabilistic 
Safety Analysis 
 
Multivariate probabilistic safety analysis of process 
facilities using the Copula Bayesian Network model. 
Computers and Chemical Engineering, 93 (2016) 128–142 
 
Offshore managed 
pressure drilling 
(MPD)  
Chapter 9: 
Summary, Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
NA NA 
 
The outline of each chapter is explained below: 
Chapter 2 reviews the potential applications of loss functions in process industries. Loss 
functions are used to define the relationship between process deviations and system loss. 
As an example application, consequence assessment using loss functions is incorporated 
into a risk-based warning system design model to analyze warnings associated with process 
deviations. 
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Chapter 3 proposes a risk-based process performance assessment methodology using loss 
functions. The demand rate adjustment factor is used to model the effect of process 
deviations on the failure probability of safety systems. This chapter highlights the use of 
the loss function approach to continuously update the system loss based on the current 
value of the characteristic variables.  
Chapter 4 discusses the problems with correlated variables used in risk assessment and 
presents a copula-based technique to model dependency among variables and improve the 
uncertainty analysis. Using the copula approach, capturing the dependence structure among 
different risk factors and estimating the univariate risk marginals can be separated. 
Chapter 5 presents an application of the copula functions, and their integration with the 
Monte Carlo (MC) approach, to address the existing challenge of loss aggregation for 
multiple-loss scenarios. The proposed loss aggregation provides a flexible and realistic 
approach to constructing a joint multivariate distribution of the losses by considering their 
interdependence. 
Chapter 6 presents probabilistic models to estimate business losses due to abnormal 
situations in process facilities. The main elements of business loss are identified as business 
interruption loss and reputational loss and models are presented for each of these two 
elements. Copula functions are then used to develop the distribution of the aggregate loss, 
considering the correlation between business interruption and reputational losses.  
Chapter 7 presents another application of copula functions to develop multivariate loss 
functions in order to measure the operational loss of process facilities. Methods are also 
presented to address two main challenges of the application of copula approaches, which 
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are parameter estimation and copula selection. The maximum likelihood evaluation 
method is used to estimate the copula parameters. Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) is 
then applied to rank the copula models and choose the best fitting copula. 
Chapter 8 presents a novel model based on the Copula Bayesian Network (CBN) for 
multivariate safety analysis of process systems. This offers a great flexibility in 
probabilistic analysis of individual risk factors while considering their uncertainty and 
stochastic dependence. Chapter 9 reports the summary of the thesis and the main 
conclusions drawn through this work. Recommendations for future work are presented at 
the end of Chapter 9.  
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2. LOSS FUNCTIONS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN PROCESS 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT1 
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preparing, reviewing and revising the manuscript. The co-author Salim Ahmed contributed 
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Abstract 
Process deviations, along with failure of control systems and protection layers, result in 
safety and quality loss in plant operations. This paper proposes an operational risk-based 
warning system design methodology based on overall system loss. Loss functions are used 
to define the relationship between process deviations and system loss. For this purpose, 
                                                          
1 Hashemi et al. Process Safety Progress 2014;33:285–91. 
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properties associated with quadratic loss function and a set of inverted probability loss 
functions are investigated and compared. The results suggest that loss functions can be 
used in a novel way to assess operational stability and system safety. The proposed 
consequence assessment methodology using loss functions is then incorporated into a risk-
based warning system design model to analyze warnings associated with process 
deviations. A simulated case study is presented to demonstrate potential application of the 
proposed methodology; the study examines the response to a temperature surge for a 
reactor system.  
Keywords: process safety management; alarm warning; alarm management; risk 
assessment 
 
2.1. Introduction 
An important aspect of any industrial operation is conformance to standards. It relates to 
how closely the operational performance and process safety, as well as quality of the 
operation and final products, match the design specifications. In particular to the process 
industry, meeting the target performance is of great importance due to increasing demands 
for higher efficiency and strict environmental regulations. Achieving conformance requires 
investment on appraisal, prevention, and improvement techniques. Evaluating the loss 
incurred due to deviation from the expected level of conformance provides a new process 
performance indicator to justify both the cost of investment on continuous improvement of 
operations and a renewed commitment to run a safer and greener process. 
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Taguchi [1] proposed a quadratic loss function to illustrate losses to society associated with 
deviations of quality characteristics from their operational targets in industrial applications. 
Taguchi’s quality philosophy states that there is a cost for any finite deviation. Commonly 
referred to as Taguchi’s loss function, this loss imposes maintenance and repair costs to 
consumers, warranty and scrap costs to manufacturers, and pollution and environmental 
costs to the society [2]. 
The loss function (LF) approach is widely used to quantify losses associated with deviation 
from target value for various purposes such as economic design of specification region [3], 
obtaining optimal inventory and investment policies [4], business decision-making [5], 
quality assurance [6], risk assessment [7], marine and offshore safety [8], supplier selection 
[9] and reliability settings [10]. There are many other reported applications of LFs to 
quantify unobservable variability costs. These are mostly in the area of quality engineering; 
interested readers are referred to [4,7,9,11,12]. 
Despite successful application of the LFs, an obvious difficulty regarding their use is to 
determine their exact form. Various LFs have been discussed in the literature and in some 
applications different types of LFs are used for similar purposes. While many researchers 
agree in principle with the premise of using LFs in the context of managing continuous 
improvement, there is no general agreement on the specific form of the LF to be used for 
this purpose [13]. As a result, one of the most critical issues encountered in any application 
of LFs is the selection of a proper LF to relate a key characteristic of a system to its 
performance. Using inappropriate LFs may lead to inaccurate results that either 
underestimate or overestimate the loss [14]. 
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The fundamental objective of this work is to study the advantageous application of LFs in 
process safety management. In this paper, the general basis of LFs and a review of relevant 
literature on LFs are discussed in Section 2.2. Use of LFs in different industrial applications 
is analyzed in Section 2.3. The potential applications in the context of operational risk-
based process safety management and associated challenges are discussed in Section 2.4. 
A methodology for warning system design by integrating the loss functions in risk 
determination is proposed in Section 2.5. Numerical comparisons of the LFs by examining 
the response to a temperature surge for a reactor system and a sensitivity analysis to study 
the impact of changing the shape of loss functions on the results are provided in Section 
2.6. Conclusions and recommendations are drawn in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2. Loss Functions 
2.2.1. Univariate Loss Functions 
Taguchi [1] defined the quadratic loss function (QLF) as    
2
L y B y T   where y 
denotes the quality characteristic, L(y) is the actual loss at y, T is the target value, and B is 
a constant. With its infinite maximum loss and symmetric shape, QLF is inadequate for 
some applications in describing the loss [15]. Joseph [16] proposed a set of LFs based on 
Taguchi’s loss concept to address problems requiring asymmetric shapes . In practice, the 
maximum loss is generally finite. Truncating the QLF at the points where the function 
intersects the maximum loss addresses this concern [6]. To implement this idea, the concept 
of inverted normal loss function (INLF) was proposed by Spiring [6] which has a bounded 
value from above and its supremum can be specified by the user. Sun et al. [17] refined the 
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INLF further and developed the modified INLF (MINLF). This LF has a shape parameter 
γ that is specified by the user and its value determines the slope of the function in the 
neighborhood of the target value. Later, Spiring and Leung [5] extended the concept of 
INLF further to other inverted probability density functions including inverted beta loss 
functions (IBLF) which not only provide the traditional properties of LFs but also include 
the asymmetrical loss cases [5,11,18].  
Table 2.1 provides the formulations for the most widely used univariate LFs in the 
literature. In Table 2.1, y denotes the quality characteristic, L(y) is the actual loss at y, T is 
the target value, EML is the estimated maximum loss, Δ is the distance from the target to 
the point where the maximum loss EML first occurs, and α and γ are shape parameters and 
need to be determined from additional information for MINLF and IBLF.   
Table 2.1. Listing of univariate loss function formulations 
Type of LF Reference Formulation of Loss Function 
QLF [1] 2( ) ( )BL y y T   where 
2/B EML   
INLF [6] 
2 2( ) {1 ( ( ) / 2 )}L y EML exp y T      where / 4    
MINLF [17] 
2 2
2
( ) {1 ( ( ) / 2 )}
1 { 0.5( / ) }
EML
L y exp y T
exp


   
  
 
IBLF [11] 
(1 )/ ( 1)( ) {1 [ (1 ) ] }T TLL y EML C y y
     where 1 / 1[ (1 ) ]T TLC T T
    
 
2.2.2. Multivariate Loss Functions  
While the existing literature widely covers the univariate LFs, there are some attempts, 
mainly in the area of quality engineering, to extend the LF concept to multivariate 
problems. A review of some multivariate LFs can be found in [19–21]. Traditionally, 
assigning a weight for each response has been considered to be an effective way to a 
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multivariate loss function [20]. The main drawback of these approaches is that in real-life 
industrial applications, quality characteristics are often not independent or additive [19]. 
Pignatiello [22] and Artiles-Leon [23] are among the early researchers reporting the 
application of multivariate LFs and their works are the bases for many later research [21]. 
Pignatiello [22] presented a quadratic LF for multi-response problems and established a 
predictive regression model by using controllable variables. As argued in [20], in 
Pignatiello’s approach, it is difficult to determine the cost matrix and additional 
experimental observations may be required. Artiles-Leon [23] included specification limits 
in the LF itself. Later, Ma [24] improved the Artiles-Leon’s work by applying principal 
component analysis (PCA) to consider correlation structures among the various responses. 
Hsu [20] and Su and Tong [25] have also used PCA to use Taguchi’s method for multiple 
system characteristics.   
Spiring [6] extended the univariate INLF to the case where two characteristics are of 
interest in assessing loss. However, the dependency between the parameters is not 
considered in [6]. Extensions of the concept of QLF for considering three main categories 
of multiple quality characteristics including nominal-the-best, smaller-the-better, and 
larger-the-better cases are reported in [14,19,26] where it is assumed that the quality 
characteristics follow multivariate distributions. To consider the dependency among 
quality characteristics, the Bessel function and a correlation coefficient were used to obtain 
the joint probability distribution of multiple quality characteristics when calculating the 
expected loss. 
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2.3. Use of Loss Functions 
In the past two decades the use of loss functions for measuring quality costs for the purpose 
of process quality improvement has rekindled interest for researchers and practitioners 
alike [4]. One of the active areas of research has been the application of LFs for process 
improvement and production planning. For a review of the literature on application of LFs 
in production planning, economic lot-sizing, and inspection planning interested readers are 
referred to [4] and [27]. 
LFs have also been used to optimize the expected loss to the customer as well as to the 
manufacturer. Abdul-Kader [27] presented a review of the literature on product and process 
optimization and loss minimization models and proposed an integrated cost model 
composed of a tolerance model and an investment model using Taguchi’s QLF. However, 
only the single variable optimization problems are considered in [27]. Raiman [28] 
emphasized the importance of the multivariate quality characteristic case and concluded 
that the total loss for a given process can be obtained by adding the losses resulting from 
each quality characteristic with each loss based on an independent quality characteristic 
and its associated loss. References [3,15,29,30] have also studied and proposed process 
optimization methods and loss minimization models for multiple quality characteristics 
problems. To relax the assumption of independency, references [20] and [25] presented an 
approach based on PCA to optimize the multi-response problems. 
Pan [31] proposed a LF-based risk assessment method by linking the process capability 
indices and LFs. In [31] the univariate capability indices of processes and LFs describe the 
likelihood and consequences of non-conformities in the system, respectively. More 
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recently, Pan and Chen [7] extended the methodology in [31] to multivariate cases and 
developed a correlated risk assessment technique for manufacturing and environmental 
systems. This approach is based on Pignatiello’s quadratic multivariate LF, where in 
addition to restrictions of QLF in modeling loss, it requires to determine the cost matrix 
which could be difficult to obtain. However, this work is among the early efforts to apply 
LFs in quantitative risk assessment. 
 
2.4. Application of Loss Functions in Process Safety Assessment  
The work by Sii et al. [8] to apply the Taguchi concept in maritime safety engineering 
systems is a prime effort to use LF for improvement of system safety. More recently, a 
work by Pan and Chen [7] to find the relationship between process capability indices and 
LFs to develop a LF based risk assessment approach has been reported. However, there 
appears to be virtually no study that uses LFs for risk-based safety assessment and 
management for process industries.  
The limited application of LFs in process systems can be related, in part, to the original 
intention of their application to optimize engineering processes [1]. Compared with 
manufacturing industries, deviation of the key process characteristic from the target 
markedly increases the probability of process safety loss. This is mainly due to hazardous 
operations under high pressure and temperature in process industries and involvement of 
dangerous substances. In addition to the original intention of LFs to optimize 
manufacturing settings, when comparing process industries with its manufacturing 
counterparts, there are some reasons why the LF approach have not been employed in 
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process safety studies. The main reasons include the difficulty in measuring the safety of a 
system precisely and relating it to monetary values. In addition, process systems comprise 
of more unknown, or imprecisely known, parameters [8]. 
In traditional process safety assessment, no loss with respect to product quality and system 
safety is assumed until the key process characteristic deviates from the operational 
boundaries. However, in the LF approach a process imparts “no loss” only if the process 
characteristic of interest equals its target. In terms of system safety, as the deviation from 
the target increases there is a larger possible demand for activation and functionality of 
control and safety systems. Due to inevitable uncertainty in the successful operation of 
control and safety systems, the deviation of the process characteristic increases the failure 
possibility of safety systems. Application of the LF approach in process safety assessment 
and consideration of zero loss only for on-target operation can lead to the direction of 
continuous safety improvement of process operations. 
Process safety management is widely recognized and credited for accident risk reduction 
and improved operational performance. However, process safety management appear to 
have stagnated within many organizations due to application of inadequate management 
system performance indicators such as incident investigation [32]. Key to achieving a safe 
and economic process operation is the application of leading indicators that focus on the 
process safety and quality elements that matter, thereby providing a true measure of how 
an asset is performing.  
With the purpose of developing a process safety performance leading indicator, a LF 
approach is proposed in this work to quantify loss due to deviation of process 
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characteristics from their target operation. Current loss modelling and consequence 
analysis methodologies are focused only on obvious losses due to production downtime 
and release of material and energy. Using a loss function approach, other aspects of system 
loss such as the loss of product quality due to process deviations and their potential impacts 
on increasing the chance of experiencing more severe safety related consequences can be 
quantified. The measured loss is then integrated in a risk estimation model which provides 
a leading indicator of process safety performance based on the current process state. The 
estimated risk is finally used as a criterion to annunciate, prioritize, and analyze warnings 
which are generated as a result of process deviations.   
 
2.5. Risk-Based Warning System Design 
Integration of loss function based consequence analysis into an operational risk assessment 
model is proposed to be used in alarm system design. An alarm system is one of the critical 
layers of protection in a process safety system. Alarms prevent the escalation of abnormal 
situations and minimize the demand for activation of safety instrumented systems (SIS) 
such as a trip or an emergency shutdown device (ESD) [33]. However, the appearance of 
too many alarms, also known as alarm flooding, when the process approaches an abnormal 
situation has been reported as a contributor to abnormal events [34]. The discussion on the 
shortcoming of the current alarm management systems can be found in [35,36]. 
To address the alarm flooding problem in process facilities, Chang et al. [33] proposed a 
quantitative risk-based alarm design approach for annunciation and prioritization of 
alarms. An integrated model consisting of the probability and the impact of the potential 
34 
hazards, and the process safety time is used to estimate the risk according to Equation 2.1 
[33].  
 
 1 60100
t
Risk Pr L

            (2.1) 
where Risk is the ﬁnal risk of an alert, Pr is the probability of the potential hazard, L is the 
severity or impact of the consequences, and t is the process safety time between the 
initiating event and the occurrence of a hazardous event in the unit of minutes [33,34]. 
Scaling factors based on expert’s judgment and process knowledge to determine the Pr×L 
score for each hazard is used in [34]. Although this approach to assign Pr×L score has the 
advantage of simplicity and consistency when analyzing multiple hazards, it adds 
uncertainty to the calculated risk.  
We propose to integrate the loss function approach to estimate system loss as a function of 
process deviation into risk equation. The formulation of the proposed model is in 
accordance with Equation 2.2: 
    
1
60100
t
Risk Pr L x,T

           (2.2) 
where x is the key process characteristic, T is the target operating value of the process 
characteristic of interest, Pr is the probability of the potential hazard, t is the process safety 
time, and L(x,T) is the overall loss calculated by using loss functions (listed in Table 2.1). 
The method continuously evaluates the risk associated with the current state of a process 
and issues warnings based on the estimated risk. By comparing the estimated risk with a 
predefined threshold risk, warnings are issued and categorized into alerts and alarms which 
will be annunciated on different displays. In addition to affecting the system loss, process 
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deviations affect the probabilities of failure of safety systems which is the subject for 
another ongoing research. 
The proposed approach determines risk in dollar value instead of a risk ranking based on 
the Pr×L score, thereby providing a more sensible criterion to make operational risk-based 
decisions. Choosing the threshold risk can be based on the tolerable risk limit of the system 
which is a challenging task in industrial applications. Wrong assignment of the threshold 
risk may have adverse effect on process safety. It may result in too many alarms or, on the 
other hand, may downgrade an alarm to an alert. Another advantage of the proposed 
method in representing the risk in dollar values is to provide a convenient tool for business 
managers to assign a threshold risk for a particular process system.  
Despite several advantages of using the LF approach in risk-based warning system design, 
as discussed above, the choice of the LF could be a practical difficulty. The effect of 
changing the shape of the LFs on the estimated risk and a comparison of different LFs are 
discussed in the next section. The procedure is demonstrated by application of the 
methodology to a reactor system to examine the response to a temperature surge. This 
comparison will help industrial practitioners in choosing the appropriate LF for their 
applications. 
 
2.6. Application and Analysis of Results 
2.6.1. Application of Loss Functions to a Reactor System 
To compare the performance of different loss functions, namely QLF, INLF, MINLF, and 
IBLF (see Table 2.1), system loss associated with temperature deviations in a reactor 
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system is calculated using the above mentioned LFs. This example is taken from [33]. The 
first step is to identify the potential hazards where the hazards related to the temperature 
surge in the reactor are identified as overheating and under-heating of the reactor liquid. 
The nomenclature of different parameters used in the calculations and the user-defined 
values are listed in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2. Reactor process information used to develop LFs 
Symbol Description Value 
TT Target reaction temperature of the reactor 120 oC 
THA Temperature set point for high temperature alarm 130 oC 
USL 
Upper specified limit for liquid temperature associated with high-high 
temperature alarm (set point for ESD system) 
150 oC 
LSL 
Lower specified limit for liquid temperature associated with low 
temperature alarm 
100 oC 
Tmax 
Maximum tolerable liquid temperature; it is assumed that at this 
temperature the reactor fails catastrophically  
200 oC 
Tmin 
Minimum tolerable liquid temperature; it is assumed that at this 
temperature ESD system will be activated 
80 oC 
EMLUSL Loss associated with liquid temperature at USL 2,000,000 US$ 
EMLLSL Loss associated with liquid temperature at LSL 1,000,000 US$ 
EML1 
Estimated maximum loss due to high temperature scenario in the reactor 
including the production, asset, environment clean-up, and human health 
losses. 
10,000,000 US$ 
EML2 
Estimated maximum loss due to low temperature scenario in the reactor 
due to process downtime 
2,000,000 US$ 
 
As the reactor temperature deviates more from the desired target reaction temperature 
(120oC) and upon failure of the control system and other protection layers, the system 
experiences more loss. The identification and estimation of the applicable losses are based 
on the generated accident scenarios associated with the potential hazard. Two general types 
of loss are expected due to the deviation of the reactor temperature: 
1. Quality loss: the loss due to deviation of the temperature from the target due to the 
occurrence of process near misses. It is assumed that the deviation of the reactor 
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temperature within the safe operating window only causes the loss of quality of 
final product.  
2. Accident loss: loss due to occurrence of process incidents and accidents ranging 
from the production loss due to process shutdown to a combination of production, 
asset, injury and fatality, and environmental losses due to reactor fire and explosion.  
The event tree analysis is used to generate different accident scenarios due to reactor 
temperature deviations including process near-misses, incidents, and accidents. Then, 
above mentioned loss categories are assigned to each process end state. For example, 
process near-misses are assumed to only cause loss of product quality and the process 
accidents due to loss of material, and energy are assumed to cause all types of loss. The 
prior monetary evaluation and estimation of these loss categories can be performed using 
available information from expert knowledge, incident investigation reports, and similar 
processes. However, when process near misses and incidents do occur, the user perceives 
new information about the system true loss by analyzing the evident consequences which 
can be used to revise the basic loss information.  
As shown in Table 2.2, the amount of loss associated with overheating of the liquid 
(temperature above the target) is considered to be more compared to the loss encountered 
when reactor temperature decreases (temperature below the target). Therefore, a combined 
function is used for each of the LFs allowing the LFs to have asymmetric shapes. For 
example, for QLF, the piecewise function is used as L(Treactor,TT) = B1 (Treactor – TT)2  for TT 
≤ Treactor < Tmax and L(Treactor,TT) = B2 (Treactor – TT)2 for Tmin < Treactor < TT, respectively. 
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TT, Tmin, and Tmax are defined in Table 2.2. Similar piecewise functions are used for the 
other three LFs.  
To apply each of the four LFs, the parameters of the LFs (estimated maximum loss and 
shape parameter) should be determined first. Based on the formulations given in Table 2.1, 
the QLF and the INLF require only the primary information which is the target reaction 
temperature and estimated maximum loss values; i.e. TT, EML1, and EML2 in Table 2.2. 
For the MINLF and IBLF, auxiliary information given in Table 2.2 for the loss values at 
upper and lower specified reactor temperature limits are used to obtain the shape 
parameters. The least-squares estimation method is used for this purpose in accordance 
with Equation 2.3: 
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LF  is the value of any of MINLF or IBLF at a given Treactor, Li is the assumed 
loss values mentioned in Table 2.2, and SP is the shape parameter γ for MINLF and the 
shape parameter α for IBLF.  
All four loss functions are plotted in Figure 2.1, along with the two auxiliary data points 
which are the assumed amount of system loss at upper specified reactor temperature (set 
point for high temperature alarm) and lower specified reactor temperature (set point for 
low temperature alarm); see Table 2.2 for the description and the value of the defined 
process information. Figure 2.1 shows the flexibility of MINLF and IBLF as it is possible 
to estimate their shape parameters using the available process information. If more 
information is available, more accurate shape parameters can be estimated. As shown in 
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Figure 2.1, QLF and INLF are not flexible as it is not possible to change the shapes of the 
functions. For this case, QLF underestimates and the INLF overestimates the reactor 
system loss due to temperature deviations.    
 
 
Figure 2.1. Reactor loss using different loss functions 
 
2.6.2. Risk-Based Warning Analysis of the Reactor System 
The calculated system loss using LFs is then used in Equation 2.1 to determine the 
operational risk of the reactor. The proposed operational risk-based method is then used to 
design the alarm system. To make the case simple, it is assumed that there is only one alert 
generated from the temperature control system. The probability of occurrence of both high 
temperature and low temperature scenarios is assumed as 0.01 per year. The process safety 
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response time for both temperature deviation scenarios is considered as three minutes. 
These values are obtained from process history and expert knowledge. Figure 2.2 shows 
the final risk of the alert determined by application of the four LFs in Equation 2.2.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Reactor operational risk for different loss functions 
 
When the reactor temperature deviation exceeds the set point for the high alarm (120oC) a 
warning will be issued. Based on the deviation, the proposed model calculates the real-time 
risk for the current reactor temperature. Then the estimated risk is compared with the risk 
target. The operational risk target for the reactor system is considered as 1 million dollars 
per year; see Figure 2.2. If the estimated risk is less than the target risk, the warning will 
be classified as alert. If the estimated risk exceeds the target risk, the warning will be 
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upgraded to alarm and will be annunciated on a different display. The target risk may need 
to be adjusted for the alarm management system to satisfy the plant safety goals [33]. 
 
2.6.3. Sensitivity Analysis  
As discussed in Section 2.6.1, the application of the LFs requires determination of the 
parameters, i.e. the estimated maximum loss (EML) and the shape factor. To study the 
effect of utilizing different LFs and the effect of uncertainty in the parameters of the LFs 
on the estimated risk values, a sensitivity analysis is conducted on four LFs. These are: 
IBLF with α = 1.59, INLF with γ = 20, MINLF with γ = 59.80, and QLF with B = 0.0016. 
See Table 2.1 and Section 2.2.1 for the list of formulations of each LF and the definition 
of the parameters, respectively. The selected shape parameters are associated with the LFs 
shown in Figure 2.1.  
The sensitivity analysis results are presented in Figure 2.3. For the case study conducted in 
this work, it is evident from Figure 2.3(a) that the maximum effect on the estimated risk 
occurs when the INLF is used followed by QLF. A small deviation in the shape of these 
two LFs results in a significant change in the estimated risk. The sensitivity of the estimated 
risk is less for both the MINLF and IBLF. However, the estimated risk is more sensitive 
for the shape parameter when using IBLF as compared to MINLF. A positive error of about 
20% in the shape parameter of MINLF may underestimate the risk by 9.6%, whereas an 
error of the same magnitude in the shape parameter for the IBLF will overestimate the risk 
by 45%.  
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Figure 2.3. Sensitivity analysis: (a) for different EML values, (b) for different shape parameter 
 
 
MINLF and IBLF have different behavior regarding their impact on the estimated risk as 
a result of an error in the shape parameter. When using IBLF, positive errors in the shape 
parameter (higher than the base value) causes positive error in the estimated risk and 
negative errors (lower than the base value) causes negative error of the same magnitude in 
the estimated risk. However, as can be seen in Figure 2.3(a), MINLF has opposite behavior 
as compared to IBLF. Also, when comparing MINLF with IBLF, the estimated risk is more 
sensitive when there is a negative change in the shape factor as compared to a positive 
change. A negative error of 20% in the shape factor may overestimate the risk by 18.5%, 
whereas a positive error of the same magnitude may underestimate the risk by just 9.6%.  
Figure 2.3(b) shows the sensitivity analysis results related to estimated maximum loss 
change when using MINLF and IBLF. It is evident from Figure 2.3(b) that the sensitivity 
of the estimated risk is the same for both IBLF and MINLF. An error of 20% results in an 
error of the same magnitude in the estimated risk, i.e. a linear dependence.   
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Overall, it can be concluded from this study that the proper selection of the LF is very 
important. From the four LFs studied, the MINLF shows comparatively more robust results 
followed by IBLF. The results of the sensitivity analysis show that a conservative value of 
the estimated maximum loss should be avoided for both MINLF and IBLF. Considering 
the results of the sensitivity analysis for the shape factor, it is evident that a conservative 
value of the shape factor for IBLF should also be avoided. However, it is advisable to use 
a conservative value of the shape factor for the MINLF. 
 
2.6.4. Comparison of Loss Functions 
MINLF and IBLF are found to demonstrate better performance than QLF and INLF. 
Compared to MINLF, IBLF has an additional advantage of covering asymmetrical cases, 
i.e. when the target is not at the middle of upper and lower specification limits. However, 
for the cases when the loss functions should approach different maximum loss values at 
both sides of the target, like the case study conducted in this work, a piecewise function 
should be used. Therefore, for asymmetric maximum losses at both sides of the target, 
which is the applicable case when analyzing most process systems, IBLF and MINLF have 
the same restriction.  
By considering the overall performance of the LFs studied in this work, the MINLF and 
IBLF could be the optimum choice for depicting the system loss associated with process 
variations. Choice of LF should be based on the process behavior and availability of loss 
data. The shape of both MINLF and IBLF can be modified to suit the practitioner’s needs 
for both symmetric and asymmetric problems. However, construction of the MINLF is 
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easier when compared to IBLF due to simplicity of the formulation and also there is no 
need for transformation of the scales. Considering the sensitivity analysis results, it is also 
shown that the MINLF has comparatively more robust performance. 
These results are based on the loss data associated with considered reactor in this work. 
However, it cannot be concluded that a specific loss function is uniformly better than the 
others in all applications. They are presented as alternative choices for a safety practitioner 
and they should be used depending on the problem on hand. Choice of LF should be based 
on the process behavior and availability of loss data. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
Loss functions are used to design an operational risk-based warning system in this work. 
This is a paradigm shift that will benefit the process industry in terms of continuously 
improving process safety through proactive loss minimization. Instead of relying on the 
safety level which has been designed during the system design, the utilization of the 
proposed approach integrates the safety improvement into the daily activities through loss 
minimization. By applying the operational risk-based warning system design, the warnings 
will be differentiated into alerts and alarms. This helps in significant reduction of the 
generated alarms to meet the recommended alarm regulations. Using the proposed 
approach, operators can prioritize the alarms and will have more time to make informed 
decisions. This prevents unnecessary activation of the safety-instrumented systems and 
minimizes the system loss due to reduced operational and maintenance costs. 
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The effect of using different loss functions such as QLF, IBLF, INLF, and MINLF are 
compared and it is concluded that the proper selection of the LF is very important. For the 
case of the reactor studied here, the MINLF and IBLF are found to demonstrate better 
performance than QLF and INLF as their profile can be changed to fit the available loss 
data. 
Use of loss functions help to continuously updates the operational risk as per current state 
of the process. The updated risk could be used as informed decision making variable. The 
proposed approach helps to foster a zero-loss safety culture and provides the infrastructure 
for continuous safety improvement. Extending the proposed methodology into multivariate 
problems is a topic of future research.  
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3. RISK-BASED OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
USING LOSS FUNCTIONS2 
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Abstract 
This paper proposes a risk-based process performance assessment methodology using loss 
functions. The proposed method helps to overcome the existing challenges in assessing 
impacts of deviations of process variables on safety and economy of a process operation. 
                                                          
2 Hashemi et al. Chemical Engineering Science 2014;116:99–108. 
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The inverted Beta loss function is used to incorporate the effects of process deviations on 
the safety and quality losses. The demand rate adjustment factor is used to model the effect 
of process deviations on the failure probability of safety systems. The probability of a failed 
process state due to abnormal events is continuously updated based on the current value of 
the characteristic variables. The use of the loss function approach in combination with 
probability updating provides a continuously revised risk estimation. Such a real-time risk 
profile provides a leading performance indicator for decision-making at an operational 
level. As an example, a temperature surge in a continuous stirred tank reactor is used to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology. 
Keywords: Loss function; Safety loss; Quality loss; Performance analysis; Risk. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Meeting the financial targets of stakeholders, as well as the quality requirements of 
consumers without compromising operational safety is critical for the economical and safe 
operation of a process facility. Achieving this goal requires the proper management of the 
process facility’s operational performance along with management of process safety. An 
efficient management of an operation demands a leading performance indicator [1] that 
focuses on both safety and quality elements. As mentioned by the United States Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), “facilities should monitor the real-time performance of 
management system activities rather than wait for accidents to happen. Such performance 
monitoring allows problems to be identified and corrective actions to be taken before a 
serious incident occurs”  [2].  
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A shortcoming of traditional process safety management (PSM) systems is that the safety 
program is not well integrated with other functions of an organization [3]. Here, an 
organization is defined as a multidisciplinary entity having a collective goal of economical 
and safe operations of a process facility. This paper focuses on the integration of safety 
analysis with operational performance analysis, and proposes a method to assess quality 
and safety losses simultaneously. Through such integration, quality management strategies 
can be adopted to improve process safety, and vice versa. In order to achieve the highest 
levels of safety and quality, with the ultimate goal to foster a zero-incident and zero-defect 
culture, the aim should be to eliminate the main sources of the losses, i.e. process 
deviations. For process facilities the causes of deviations may include feed variability, 
mechanical and operational integrity degradation, wrong setting, and improper methods.  
To analyze the impact of process deviations on safety, Hashemi et al. [4] proposed the 
application of loss functions and compared their properties. The first contribution of this 
paper is to expand the earlier work of Hashemi et al. [4] by integrating both safety and 
quality losses associated with process deviations. Secondly, the concept of operational risk 
is introduced. The operational risk is estimated by combining the loss function-based 
consequence assessment method with a probabilistic approach to define the probability of 
undesired process states. These two contributions enable a novel risk-based process 
performance assessment methodology that continuously revises the risk based on the 
current process state. The developed risk profile is a leading indicator of process 
performance that can be used for day-to-day operational decision-making.  
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The motivations behind the development of an integrated framework to combine safety 
and quality losses, and the use of risk as a performance indicator, are illustrated in Section 
3.2. The developed methodology is outlined in Section 3.3 followed by a case study in 
Section 3.4. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2. An Overview and Motivations 
3.2.1. Integration of Safety and Quality Management  
Continuous improvement is the key to quality management. Taguchi [5] suggested the 
application of a quadratic loss function for quality loss modeling to promote the concept 
of continuous improvement. According to Taguchi’s philosophy [5], a process imparts zero 
quality loss only if the quality characteristic of interest is at its target. Even a small 
deviation from the target imposes loss to society [5]. Here, society is the combination of 
the producer, the consumer, and the environment. As reviewed by [4], after Taguchi [5], 
several researchers proposed different types of loss functions to overcome the limitations 
and inflexibility of the quadratic loss function.  
Deviations of characteristic variables also affect operational safety. Process deviations, 
along with failures of the control systems and the layers of protection, result in safety 
losses. The more the process safety characteristic deviates from its target operating 
conditions, the larger the demand for the activation of corresponding control and safety 
systems. Due to inevitable uncertainty in the activation and successful operation of these 
systems, any deviation of the process characteristic increases the possibility of incurring 
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loss. Thus, there is inherent similarity between safety loss and Taguchi’s quality loss 
model. Therefore, loss functions can also be used to model safety losses of a process.  
Hashemi et al. [4] compared the properties of different loss functions in modeling system 
loss and reviewed their applications in process safety analysis. The modified inverted 
normal loss function (MINLF) and the inverted Beta loss function (IBLF) were found to 
be more adaptable to depict system safety losses associated with process variations [4]. 
This work aims to further expand the application of loss functions for integrated modeling 
of both safety and quality losses due to the variability of process operations.  
The benefits of integrating safety and quality management systems have been discussed in 
the literature [3,6]. While quality improvement methods strive to minimize the variability 
inherent in product quality, safety management strives to minimize the chance of 
occurrence and the severity of incidents that can cause loss [7,8]. The IBLF is used in this 
work for integrated modeling of safety and quality losses due to process deviations.  
 
3.2.2. Risk-Based Process Performance Assessment 
Combining loss models with the probability of process deviations provides a framework to 
develop a risk-based approach to process safety and quality performance assessment. As 
risk includes both the probability of an end process state and its consequences, a risk-based 
approach reduces the potential for assigning an undue amount of resources to manage 
lower-risk events, thereby freeing up resources for tasks that address higher-risks [2,9].  
To be useful for operational decision-making, risk estimation has to be updated with 
variations in a process. As reviewed by [10] and [11], there have been efforts to make risk 
53 
assessment methods dynamically adaptable with real-time changes occurring in a process. 
Generally, risk is updated based on the number of events recorded over time [12]. Existing 
literature on this topic focuses mainly on probability updating. However, the effect of 
process deviations on the real-time value of system loss is not taken into account. By 
utilizing a loss function approach to model both safety and quality losses associated with 
undesired process end states, this work proposes an integrated risk-based performance 
analysis methodology. The effects of process deviations on both system loss and on the 
probability of failure of safety barriers are considered.  
 
3.3. Methodology  
3.3.1. Identification of the Key Process Characteristics  
The first step in the development of a process performance assessment methodology is the 
identification of the key process characteristics. A key characteristic is a feature that, if non 
conforming, missing, or degraded, may cause unsafe conditions and/or a loss of product 
quality. For example, operating temperature is the key process characteristic of a 
polymerization reactor. Different approaches, such as check lists, preliminary hazard 
analysis (PHA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), 
hazard and operability study (HAZOP), and master logic diagrams [13], are often used to 
identify key characteristics. This work assumes that a univariate key process characteristic 
can be assigned to a system. The consideration of systems with multiple characteristics is 
considered in Chapter 7.  
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3.3.2. Scenario Analysis  
Once the key process characteristic is identification of potential scenarios associated with 
possible deviations. The outcome scenario, for example an accident, may result from a 
single event or combinations of events [13]. Based on the type of process upset and the 
performance of control and safety barriers, the scenario could involve quality loss, safety 
loss, or both. The maximum credible accident scenario analysis method developed by Khan 
and Abbasi [13] can be used as a criterion to identify credible scenarios among a large 
number of possibilities.  
When analyzing accident scenarios, the first step is the identification of abnormal 
situations, which are process deviations in the current context. Deviations result from 
external factors or the ineffectiveness of the control systems in rejecting disturbances. The 
deviation of a key process characteristic, along with the failure of protection systems, will 
cause undesirable process end states. Table 3.1 represents the generic categorizations of 
process end states and gives examples from both safety [14] and quality points of view. 
The next step involves identification of the sequence of events which transforms an 
abnormal situation into its process end state. Event tree analysis is used to analyze the 
influence of the failure or success of different control and/or safety systems when 
deviations occur. Having envisaged the accident scenarios, as discussed in the next section, 
event consequences should be identified and quantified.  
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Table 3.1. Categorization and deﬁnition of event outcomes, adapted from [14] 
 
 
3.3.3. Consequence Assessment  
3.3.3.1. Loss Modeling  
In traditional process loss modeling methods, no loss with respect to product quality and 
system safety is assumed until the key process characteristic deviates from the operational 
boundary. Using the loss functions, consequences can be assessed by any deviation of the 
process characteristics from its target; zero loss is only considered for on-target operation. 
This work uses the IBLF to model system loss, as it is easy to construct and its shape can 
Outcome Deﬁnition Process safety examples                                            Process quality examples 
Near-
miss    
An event stemming from 
process deviation that does 
not result in an actual safety 
loss but has the potential to 
do so 
 
Unnecessary activation of 
the trip system; release with 
no impact on people and 
property 
Minor quality loss due to 
deviation of the key process 
characteristic from the target 
Mishap An event or sequence of 
events that causes minor to 
moderate impact on people, 
property, the environment 
the environment, or the ﬁnal 
product 
 
Minor health effects; minor 
impact on property and the 
environment 
Minor health effects; minor 
impact on property and 
speciﬁcations and material 
wastage 
 
Incident      An event that causes 
considerable harm or loss   
to people, property, the 
environment, or the 
ﬁnal product 
 
Temporary disability or 
permanent minor disability; 
localized damage to assets 
and the environment 
Considerable internal losses 
due to rework and scrapped 
material as well as external 
losses such as warranties and 
returned products 
Accident      An event that causes serious 
impact to people and assets. 
An event like this has heavy 
ﬁnancial loss and receives 
national media attention 
 
One or more fatalities or 
permanent major disabilities. 
Process shutdown and heavy 
ﬁnancial losses 
Heavy internal and external 
losses 
 
Disaster       An event that causes 
multiple serious losses. 
Such an event receives 
international media attention 
 
Multiple fatalities and 
extensive damage to assets 
and production. It may cause 
a shutdown of the plant for a 
signiﬁcant time period, 
possibly forever 
Heavy internal and external 
losses. It may cause a loss of 
market share for a signiﬁcant 
time period. This condition 
is referred to as a quality 
meltdown (QM) 
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be modified to suit the practitioner's needs for both symmetric and asymmetric losses [4]. 
Modeling the system loss using loss functions requires identification of the maximum loss 
and determination of the shape parameters. In this study, the following two steps are 
proposed to model the system loss:  
 Estimation of maximum loss: According to Marsh Risk Consulting, the estimated 
maximum loss (EML) is defined as “the loss that could be sustained under abnormal 
conditions with the failure of all protective systems”  [15].  
 Identification of shape parameter: A non-linear search approach based on the least-
squares method is proposed to determine the shape parameter for attaining a 
suitable fit to the actual loss.  
 
3.3.3.2. Identification and Estimation of Losses  
There is a general agreement in the literature about four major categories of the potential 
losses for any given scenario. These losses are production loss (PL), asset loss (AL), human 
health loss (HHL), and environmental cleanup cost (ECC) [16,17]. In addition to these loss 
categories, the deviation of key process characteristics could result in considerable quality 
loss. There have been some efforts toward the integration of quality and safety aspects due 
to process upsets, mainly in the manufacturing industry [3,18]. Pariyani et al. [19] 
considered quality loss in their proposed risk analysis methodology for process industries. 
In this work, quality loss is considered as one of the major loss categories resulting from 
process variations. Loss categories with their cost indicators are shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Loss categories with their loss indicators (adapted from [16] and [20]) 
 
To estimate maximum PL, AL, HHL, and ECC, the process downtime and affected areas 
should be calculated using dispersion models discussed in CCPS [21], Khan and Amyotte 
[16], and American Petroleum Institute [17]. The estimation of maximum quality loss 
requires a different approach. Traditionally, quality costs are classified into four categories 
[22]:  
 Appraisal costs: Typical examples are inspection, quality audits and acceptance 
tests   
 Prevention costs: Maintenance of equipment, training operators and improving 
procedures, etc.  
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 Internal costs: Scrap, replacement, rework repair, etc. 
 External costs: Examples are warranties, loss of market share, and loss of reputation  
Internal and external failure costs arise when the failure is detected inside of the 
organization or by the customer [23]. The possibility of experiencing internal and external 
failure costs prompts companies to incur appraisal and prevention costs. Therefore, the 
maximum quality loss can be considered as the summation of the maximum internal and 
external failure costs. Margavio et al. [23] discussed quality costs using a modern 
accounting approach, which can be used as a guideline when estimating the maximum 
quality loss. Quantification of these loss categories is based on the worst case conditions 
to obtain the estimated maximum loss for each category in Figure 3.1. Finally, the total 
estimated maximum loss, EML, for each abnormal event can be obtained from 
5
,
=1
=j i j
i
EML EML          (3.1) 
where j denotes the number of undesired event scenarios and i counts the number of 
different losses. Having determined the estimated maximum losses, the next step is the 
development of the loss function. 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.3.3. Loss Function Development 
Among the five main loss categories shown in Figure 3.1, the asset loss, environmental 
cleanup cost, and human health loss usually occur instantaneously in the case of an 
accident. Therefore, the associated loss function has an almost step-like shape and the 
system incurs these losses after the key process characteristic deviates beyond a safe 
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operating boundary. However, for the case of production loss and quality loss, the system 
might experience these losses as soon as the key characteristic deviates from the target 
operating value. This work uses IBLF to model these loss categories, as its shape is flexible 
enough to change from a step-like loss function to a smoothly increasing loss function. 
However, from a practical point of view, different types of loss functions may be required 
to model each loss category. The review of the properties of different loss functions and 
the sensitivity analysis approach in Hashemi et al. [4] can be used to select a suitable loss 
function for specific applications. 
As mentioned above, this study uses the IBLF developed by Leung and Spiring [24] to 
quantify losses. Let 
1 1
( ) =1/ ( , ) (1 )b bb bf x B x x
      be the standard Beta probability 
density function (PDF), with unique maximum at = ( 1) / ( 2)b b bx       for αb > 0 and 
βb > 0, and let the target be = ( 1) / ( 2)b b bT      . Using the unique maximum 
conditions associated with the Beta distribution, a linear relationship can be established 
between αb and βb through T. This relationship can be written as 1= ( 1) / (1 )b bT T   
. The loss function formulation associated with inverting the Beta PDF is: 
( 1)
(1 )/( , ) = {1 (1 ) }
bT TIBLF x T EML C x x
 
         (3.2) 
where 
11 /= [ (1 ) ] bT TC T T
 , x is the process characteristic, and T is the process target. 
EML is the estimated maximum loss determined from Section 3.3.3.2. In Equation (3.2), 
αb is the shape parameter which adjusts the penalty for deviation from the target. A large 
αb indicates that the process can tolerate relatively small deviation. The derivation of the 
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above relationships and the discussion of the properties of IBLF compared to other types 
of loss functions can be found in [24] and [4] respectively. 
Determining the shape parameter of the IBLF is the next step. Loss functions are chosen 
to reflect the loss associated with process deviations. In many cases only partial 
information regarding the actual loss associated with a deviation from target, T, is known. 
The most frequent case is when the maximum loss (and its first occurrence) is known and 
the loss at target is assumed to be zero. This is referred to as the primary loss information. 
If additional information is available, it can be used to provide a better representation of 
the loss function, keeping in mind that the goal is to accurately depict the losses associated 
with deviations from the target [25].  
The primary loss information is denoted by [ ,0]TKPC  and [ , ]T j jKPC EML  where 
KPCT is the key process characteristic at its target value, EMLj is the estimated maximum 
loss as discussed in Section 3.3.3.2, Δj is the distance from the target to the point where 
EMLj occurs, and j denotes the number of undesired event scenarios. For example, for the 
case where internal pressure is the key process characteristic for an undamaged piece of 
equipment, API 581 standard assumes that the probability of loss of containment will equal 
1.0 when the overpressure is equal to 4 times the maximum allowable working pressure  
[17]. Similarly, when enough information is not available, Δ can be considered as being 4 
times larger than the maximum operating value of the process characteristic.  
Having defined the primary loss information, and losses at a set of n additional points, i.e. 
{[x1, L1], [x2, L2], …, [xn, Ln]}, one can determine the shape parameter αb by applying a 
non-linear search procedure, such as the least squares method 
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
        (3.3) 
where i counts the number of data points, Li is the loss at each data point, and IBLFxi is the 
value of IBLF at xi. Lacking secondary information, a pragmatic choice is to set αb to 1.03. 
This value is determined from back calculation of Equation (3.2). In this case the loss is 
about 50% of the estimated maximum loss when a process characteristic is at distance Δ 
from the target. The resulting loss function corresponds to the step loss function in the same 
situation.  
 
3.3.4. Analysis of Scenario Probability 
 A major concern with safety barriers is their failure during an emergency situation. This 
can ultimately cause failure of the concerned equipment. Conventional probability analysis 
methods are widely used in risk-based process safety management. These methods use 
generic failure data and are static in nature [12]. Dynamic probability analysis methods 
have been used to update risk as new evidence becomes available. However, most of the 
existing dynamic risk assessment approaches consider the effects of accident precursor 
data on the probability of safety barriers failure.  
This work proposes an approach, which considers the effects of process deviations on the 
failure probabilities of safety barriers. The basic principle is to adjust the abnormal event 
(process deviation) frequency using the demand rate adjustment factor (DRAF). The 
adjusted demand rate is then multiplied by the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of 
safety barriers to calculate the failure rate. Finally, the calculated failure rate is used in 
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event tree analysis to determine the probability of process end states. The approach 
proposed in this work and the probability adapting method proposed by Khakzad et al. [12] 
can be integrated to consider the parallel effects of accident precursor data and process 
deviations on the failure probability of safety barriers. 
 
3.3.4.1. Estimation of the Failure Probability of a Safety Barrier  
The failure rate of safety systems refers to their failure to operate during emergencies. The 
demand rate placed on a safety barrier and the probability of failure on demand are 
considered in the estimation of failure rate, FR:  
  ( , ) = ( , )SB SB
i i
FR x T DR x T PFD       (3.4) 
where x is the process characteristic, T is the process target, DR is the demand rate 
(demands or events/year) placed on the device, and 
	
PFD
SB
i
is the probability of failure on 
demand of safety barrier i (failure/demand). 
 There are some industry-specific data that provide generic values of PFD. For example, 
API 581 includes PFD values for pressure relief devices expressed as Weibull curves  [17]. 
Regarding the safety instrumented systems (SIS), ISA-TR84.00.02 [26] includes simplified 
equations to calculate total PFD by calculating and adding the PFD of individual 
components in each safety instrumented function (SIF). The user may obtain the PFD of 
SIS components from the vendor for the actual functional test interval. Considering the 
operator intervention as a safety barrier, the PFD of the operator can be determined using 
human error probability (HEP) assessment technique developed recently by Musharraf et 
al. [27] which uses a Bayesian approach integrated with evidence theory. The present work 
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assumed that the PFD is invariant with time to simplify the analysis, and a constant PFD 
for each safety barrier is used in failure rate calculations.  
 
3.3.4.2. Demand Rate Estimation  
The demand rate placed on safety devices is dependent on the abnormal event frequency. 
However, the actual demand rate on a specific safety device is not necessarily equal to the 
abnormal event frequency. API 581 uses a constant demand rate reduction factor to take 
credit for additional safety barriers in reducing the actual demand rate on pressure relief 
devices [17]. This work recognizes that the higher process deviation results in higher 
demand for the activation of safety barriers. The concept of a demand rate adjustment factor 
(DRAF) is introduced to account for the difference between the process deviation 
frequency and the demand rate placed on safety barriers. Accordingly, the demand rate is 
calculated as the product of process deviation frequency (DF), and DRAF: 
( , ) = ( , ).DR x T DF DRAF x T       (3.5) 
Process DF is a non-negative integer-value and is modelled using the Poisson distribution  
[14]. DRAF is considered as a function of the process characteristic and is represented by 
the inverted Beta probability density function in accordance with 
( 1)(1 )/( , ) =1 [ (1 ) ]T T DRAFDRAF x T C x x
        (3.6) 
where 
11 /= [ (1 ) ]T T DRAFC T T
  and T is the process target. In Equation (3.6), DRAF  is the 
shape parameter and can be obtained using the procedure described in Section 3.3.3.3, 
given available information on the performance of safety barriers. The required 
information may be obtained through a layer of protection analysis (LOPA) [28]. 
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According to Equation (3.6), the DRAF varies between 0 and 1 to recognize the fact that 
the demand rate on the safety devices is often less than the abnormal event frequency. As 
an example, trip systems rarely activate during an overpressure demand case. This is due 
to the operation of other layers of protection, such as control systems and operator 
intervention, that reduce the likelihood of reaching the trip system’s set point. However, 
upon increasing deviation of the process characteristic and failure of the layers of 
protection, the actual demand rate placed on safety barriers reaches the process deviation 
frequency. 
 
3.3.4.3. Estimation of the Frequency of End States  
Knowing the failure rate of different safety barriers, the frequency of each process end state 
can be calculated. Based on the event tree analysis, the frequency of severity level k, 
denoted by F(Ck), can be obtained using  
1
, ,( ) = (1 )i k i kk SB SB
i i
m SB
i
F C DR PFD PFD
  
  
  
      (3.7) 
where DR is the demand rate as a function of the process characteristic calculated using 
Equation (3.5), m represents the number of pathways into sub-events of each end event, 
and SBk denotes the safety barrier associated with the level k. θi,k  = 1 if the level k failure 
passes the down-branch of the event tree (failure) associated with safety barrier i, and θi,k 
= 0 if the level k failure passes the up-branch (success) of safety barrier i. The summation 
sign in Equation (3.7) is used because P(Ck) is the summation of frequencies of all different 
scenarios (pathways in the event tree) that result in the occurrence of end state Ck.  
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3.3.5. Risk Estimation  
The calculation of risk for a severity level k as a function of process deviation is obtained 
by combining the frequency and the consequence of each process end state:  
= ( , ) ( , )k k C
k
Risk Loss x T F x T .      (3.8) 
Note that the risk in Equation (3.8) is the operational risk of process deviation outcomes, 
and has a value of “zero” when the process characteristic is at its target. To determine the 
overall risk of a system, risk sources other than operational risk should also be evaluated.  
The overall methodology for operational risk-based process safety and quality performance 
analysis is summarized in Figure 3.2. The application of the developed procedure is 
demonstrated in the next section.  
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Figure 3.2. Operational risk-based process safety and quality performance analysis methodology 
 
3.4. Case Study: Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor  
A temperature deviation event in a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) is taken as a 
case study to illustrate the proposed procedure. Figure 3.3 shows a schematic of the CSTR 
with associated protection layers. A description of the control and safety systems of the 
CSTR can be found in Willis [29] and Meel and Seider [30], respectively. The reactor is 
fed by a stream rich in reactant A of concentration CA(in) and flow rate F(in). Within the 
system, the following irreversible exothermic reaction takes place A B C  . The target 
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reaction temperature is 150 ºC, at which reactant A is converted to product B. However, at 
high temperatures B undergoes a further reaction and is transformed into undesired by- 
product C, imposing loss on the system. On the other hand, at low temperatures, the 
reaction cannot take place and product B cannot be produced, which results in a loss of 
product. Moreover, high temperatures may lead to a runaway condition for the reactor. 
Therefore, the reactor temperature, Treact, is identified as the key process characteristic, as 
it has a direct effect on process safety as well as on the reaction rate.  
A coolant stream and a heat exchanger are used to cool the reactor, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
The objective is to maintain the temperature inside the reactor at the desired value when 
subjected to changes in inlet concentration (Cin) and temperature (Tin). When the CSTR is 
in operation, the conversion and the temperature may undergo large variations in response 
to disturbances in one or more input parameters. Temperature deviation above the target 
reaction temperature results in highly exothermic conditions and this situation might be 
characterised as runaway. The reactor might be uncontrolled at this condition due to 
autocatalytic decomposition of the reaction and this could result in an explosion. The 
released material would be toxic, corrosive, and flammable. If the temperature drops below 
the target reaction temperature, the system experiences quality loss due to off-specification 
of the final product. This situation can eventually result in reactor shutdown if the 
temperature drops below the onset temperature of the reaction.  
The event-tree model associated with the high-temperature event in the CSTR is shown in 
Figure 3.4, where Pi, =1,2,...,6i , represent the probability of individual barrier failure. 
The disturbances in inlet composition and temperature are measured and passed to a feed 
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forward controller that calculates the necessary coolant flow rate to compensate for any 
temperature change. If the control system is successful, the system returns to normal 
operation, denoted by C1-SAFE. When the control system fails to keep the reactor 
temperature within the safe operating window, the abnormal event propagates through 
different branches of the event tree based on success or failure of the safety systems. As 
shown in Figure 3.4, depending on different pathways in the event tree, any of the following 
outcomes could happen: near- miss (C2-NM), process shutdown (C3-SD), or runaway 
reaction/quality meltdown (C4-RA/QM). Table 3.2 shows different process end states 
associated with the high-temperature event in the CSTR.  
The control and safety systems for the low temperature event have the same logic as the 
high temperature event, and can ultimately result in process shutdown and loss of 
production. 
 
Figure 3.3. Exothermic CSTR and associated protection layers 
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Figure 3.4. Event tree for high temperature event in CSTR 
 
Table 3.2. Process end states associated with the high-temperature event in the CSTR 
Process end state Symbol 
Normal operation C1-SAFE 
Near-miss (continued operation) C2-NM 
Process shutdown C3-SD 
Runaway reaction/quality meltdown C4-RA/QM 
 
3.4.1. Identification of Losses for the CSTR  
Table 3.3 represents the estimated maximum values for different loss categories in the high 
temperature event and the low temperature event in the CSTR. The numbers in Table 3.3 
are for illustrative purposes only. In the case of the high temperature event, as shown in 
Figure 3.4, there are four different process end states due to the high temperature event 
scenario.  
 
Table 3.3. Estimated maximum losses for different losses for HTE and LTE in the CSTR  
Identified EML EMLQL EMLPL EMLAL EMLHHL EMLECC EMLTotal 
Scenario HTE LTE HTE LTE HTE LTE HTE LTE HTE LTE HTE LTE 
Loss (106 USD)  0.4 0.4 3.6 3.6 20 0 20 0 6 0 50 4 
Note: HTE: high temperature event; LTE: low temperature event. 
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Zero loss is assumed for normal operation (C1-SAFE). For the case of a process near-miss 
(C2-NM), as shown in Table 3.3, the maximum associated quality loss is estimated as 0.4 
million US dollars. The maximum loss associated with process shutdown (C3-SD) is 
considered as the summation of maximum quality loss (0.4 million dollars) and maximum 
production loss (3.6 million dollars). The worst case scenario for the high temperature 
event is the runaway reaction, with the summation of human health loss (20 million 
dollars), environmental cleanup cost (6 million dollars), asset loss (20 million dollars), 
production loss (3.6 million dollars) as well as quality loss (0.4 million dollars). It is 
assumed that the low temperature event will result in a process shutdown and production 
loss with associated quality loss. No asset loss, human health loss, or environmental 
cleanup costs are considered for the low temperature event. The estimated maximum losses 
for all loss categories are obtained in accordance with Section 3.3.3.2. The total estimated 
maximum loss for each temperature deviation scenario (i.e. low temperature event and high 
temperature event) is shown in Table 3.3.  
 
3.4.2. Loss Modelling  
The IBLF is used to model the CSTR loss due to temperature deviations. The amount of 
loss associated with a runaway scenario is considered to be greater than the loss 
encountered when reactor temperature decreases. Therefore, Equation (3.2) is modified to 
have an asymmetric shape:  
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where ( , )react TIBLF T T  is the overall loss function, 
11 /
= [ (1 ) ]
T T jT T
j T TC T T

 , EMLj is 
calculated according to Section 3.3.3.3 with the values shown in Table 3.3, αj is the shape 
parameter to be determined using Equation (3.3), TT is the reactor target (normal) operating 
temperature, and j is either the high temperature event or the low temperature event 
scenario.  
The next step involves determining the shape parameters for each of the two functions in 
Equation (3.9). For the high temperature event scenario, the primary loss information 
includes [150,0]  and [220,500] where the first numbers in each dataset are the reactor 
temperature in degrees centigrade and the second numbers are the associated loss in million 
dollars (see Table 3.3). Two secondary information datasets are assumed for the high 
temperature event scenario. The first dataset is [160,0.4]  where 160 ºC is the set-point for 
the high temperature alarm, and it is assumed that, at this temperature, 0.4 millions of US 
dollars in quality loss occurs. The second dataset, [180,4] , is associated with the set point 
for the high–high temperature alarm where the emergency shutdown system (ESD) is 
expected to operate. These primary and secondary datasets are used to calculate the shape 
parameter using Equation (3.3). The shape parameter for the high temperature event loss 
function is obtained as = 2.62HTE . Similarly, considering [150,0]  and [100,4]  as the 
primary information, and [140,0.4]  as the secondary information (associated with the set 
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point for a low alarm), the shape parameter for the low temperature event loss function is 
obtained as = 3.91LTE . 
Figure 3.5 shows the overall loss function for the CSTR determined using Equation (3.9). 
The curve to the left of the target is the loss function for the low temperature event, and the 
curve on the right side of the target is the loss function for the high temperature event. As 
the reactor temperature deviates more from the target operating temperature (150 ºC) to 
either side and upon failure of successive layers of protection, the system experiences 
increasing losses.  
If enough information were available, the actual system loss might have a shape like the 
dashed line in Figure 3.5. However, as it is not practical to obtain the actual loss behaviour, 
IBLF can be used as a tool to model the estimated system loss due to process deviations. 
The table next to Figure 3.5 represents the possible outcome scenarios, corresponding 
layers of protection (LOP) involved, and applicable losses at different stages of the 
IBLFHTE. In Figure 3.5, BPCS denotes the basic process control system, OP is the operator, 
ESD refers to the emergency shutdown system, and HA and HHA denote the high 
temperature alarm and the high–high temperature alarm, respectively. Considering the high 
temperature event scenario in the CSTR, i.e. right side curve in Figure 3.5, the following 
outcome states are identified: 
 C2-NM: Near-miss. Upon deviation of the reactor temperature from the target 
temperature and up to 160 ºC the BPCS is expected to operate and bring the system 
to normal operation. With an increase in the deviation of the reactor temperature, 
the undesired reaction accelerates, along with the loss of quality. In Figure 3.5, the 
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IBLF up to 160 ºC and the horizontal line after that represents loss associated with 
C2-NM.  
 C2–C3: If the reactor temperature exceeds the set-point of the high alarm, the 
operator is expected to take corrective action. If the operator is successful, this 
situation is referred to as a near-miss. If the operator fails to detect and diagnose 
the temperature deviation, the reactor temperature may approach the set point for 
the high–high temperature alarm, 180 ºC, where activation of the high–high alarm 
and ESD system will result in process shut-down (mishap).  
 C3-SD: Process shut-down. When the reactor temperature reaches 180 ºC, 
successful operation of the high–high temperature alarm followed by successful 
activation of the automatic ESD system or, if the automatic ESD is not activated, 
operator action to manually activate the ESD system, will result in process shut-
down (mishap).  
 C3–C4: Failure of the ESD system will cause the reactor to experience a runaway 
reaction which ultimately might cause reactor failure. The higher the reactor 
temperature at which the reactor fails, the more extensive the resulting damage area 
and the higher the resulting losses. Based on the effectiveness of physical protection 
and mitigation systems in place, either an incident or an accident will occur. 
 C4-RA/QM: Runaway/Quality Meltdown. It is considered that at 220 ºC the reactor 
failure occurs in a catastrophic manner. Given that all protection layers have failed 
to protect the reactor or mitigate the consequences, the most severe losses are 
considered for this situation (disaster). 
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Figure 3.5. Overall loss function for the high temperature event and the low temperature event in the 
CSTR 
 
3.4.3. Scenario Probability Analysis for the CSTR 
The event tree analysis is used for scenario probability estimation. As discussed in Section 
3.3.4, the adjusted demand rate and the probability of failure on demand of each safety 
barrier are used to calculate the failure frequency of safety barriers. Equation (3.6) is used 
to determine the demand rate adjustment factor. For illustration purposes, the shape 
parameter in Equation (3.6) is considered as = 3.81DRAF . Equation (3.5) is then used to 
obtain the adjusted demand rate where the process deviation frequency is assumed as 1 
event per month. Table 3.4 shows the considered probability of failure on demand values 
for the CSTR safety barriers adopted from standard handbooks, e.g. Center for Chemical 
Process Safety [31] and using expert judgement.  
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Table 3.4. Probability of failure on demand values for different safety barriers in the CSTR 
SBi Safety Barrier  PFD (Event/year)  
SB1  Control system   0.01  
SB2  High temperature alarm   0.05  
SB3  Operator action   0.2  
SB4  Hi-Hi temperature alarm   0.05  
SB5  Automatic ESD   0.01  
SB6  Manual ESD   0.4  
 
After the calculation of the process deviation frequency and the probability of failure on 
demand of the safety barriers, the failure frequency of each safety barrier is determined 
using Equation (3.4). Frequencies of process end states are calculated based on Equation 
(3.7). For instance, frequency of occurrence of process shutdown due to high temperature 
event, 3( )SDF C  , is calculated as 
3 1 2 3 4 5
1
( ) = (1 ) (1 ) (1 )SD SB SB SB SB SBF C IBLF IBLF IBLF IBLF IBLF        . (3.10) 
Similarly, 
3
2
( )SDF C   to 3
6
( )SDF C   are also calculated to estimate 
6
3 3
=1
( ) = ( )SD
i
i
F C F C  .  
The frequencies of near-miss 2 NMC   and runaway ( 4 /RA QMC  ) for the high temperature event 
and probabil- ity of shutdown for the low temperature event are calculated using Equation 
(3.7), and the results are plotted in Figure 3.6. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, any deviation of reactor temperature to either side of the 
target increases the frequency of a near-miss happening, resulting in an undesired reaction 
inside the reactor and loss of quality of product. If the control system fails to return the 
reactor temperature to the normal operating value, followed by a failure of the high-
temperature alarm and operator intervention, the ESD system is designed to shut down the 
reactor. This situation is shown in Figure 3.6 with a dashed and dotted line, where the 
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frequency of process shutdown occurrence starts to increase beyond 160 ºC and below 140 
ºC, the set points for high- temperature and low-temperature alarms, respectively. For the 
high temperature scenario, if the ESD system fails to shut down the process, the undesired 
exothermic reaction accelerates and the probability of runaway increases. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Frequency of occurrence of process end states vs.  reactor temperature in the CSTR 
 
3.4.4. Estimated Risk for the CSTR 
Figure 3.7 illustrates the risk of reactor temperature deviation for both high and low 
temperature scenarios determined from Equation (3.8).  Three curves on the right side of 
the reactor target operating temperature (150 ºC) represent the risk of near-miss, process 
shutdown, and runaway conditions due to the temperature deviations. From 150 ºC to 165 
ºC (5 ºC above the high temperature alarm set point) the risks of process shutdown and 
runaway are negligible and the risk of quality loss is the only considerable risk. Although 
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the reactor does not experience unsafe situations while the temperature deviations are 
within the safe operating window, occurrence of such deviations imposes quality loss to 
the system due to production of off-specification products, material wastage, associated 
internal and external quality costs and so on.  
If the control and safety systems fail to bring the deviated reactor temperature to its target, 
the reactor will experience unsafe conditions. Risk of process shutdown is shown in Figure 
3.7 where the temperature starts to increase beyond 165 ºC. At 180 ºC, the automatic and/or 
manual ESD systems are supposed to shut down the reactor. If these protection layers also 
fail, the reactor will experience a runaway condition. As can be seen in Figure 3.7, runaway 
risk increases suddenly after the temperature exceeds the ESD set point (180 ºC). Above 
200 ºC, the risk of runaway will be the dominant risk with a very sharp increased rate and 
the risk of process shutdown becomes constant at about 0.12 million dollars per year. 
The two curves to the left of the reactor target in Figure 3.7 show the risk of near-miss 
(quality loss) and process shutdown due to a low temperature scenario. As shown in Figure 
3.7, at low temperatures, the system experiences quality loss. If the control system fails, at 
temperatures below the set point of the low-alarm (140 ºC), the operator is expected to take 
corrective action; otherwise, the reaction stops when the temperature falls below 100 ºC. 
The dashed red line illustrates the total risk of the reactor, which is determined by taking 
the maximum risk of all potential scenarios for each given temperature range.  
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Figure 3.7. CSTR risk due to reactor temperature deviation  
 
As shown in this case study, it is possible to analyze the effects of process deviations on 
both the probability and consequences of process end-states using the proposed 
methodology. By providing a clear representation of how the risk profile dynamically 
changes with process deviations, the proposed methodology facilitates monitoring of safety 
and quality performance in an integrated way. This will allow the overall evaluation of 
performance improvement strategies.  
 
3.5. Conclusions  
A loss function-based consequence evaluation method is proposed. The concept of the 
demand rate adjustment factor is introduced to incorporate the effect of process deviations 
on the demand rate of safety barriers. The adjusted demand rate is then combined with the 
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probability of failure on demand to determine the updated probability of failure of the 
safety barriers at a current process state. The proposed methodology provides risk profiles 
associated with different process end states. This enables integrated assessment and 
continuous monitoring of process safety and quality performance. In order to achieve the 
highest levels of safety and quality, the improvement measures need to be incorporated 
into day-to-day activities. Instead of relying on the safety level considered at the design 
stage, the estimated risk profile will enable operators to make informed decisions based on 
the real-time operational risk. This can also be used as a criterion to annunciate, prioritize, 
and analyse warnings generated as a result of process deviations. However, in practical 
applications a typical process system possesses multiple key characteristics related to 
product quality and process safety. Developing a generalized multivariate loss function-
based consequence analysis methodology for process systems is a subject for future 
research.  
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4. CORRELATION AND DEPENDENCY IN MULTIVARIATE 
PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT3 
 
Preface 
A version of this manuscript has been published in the proceedings of the IFAC 
SAFEPROCESS 2015. I am the primary author of this paper. Along with the co-authors, 
Faisal Khan and Salim Ahmed, I formulated the problem and carried out most of the 
literature review, data collection and analysis. I prepared the first draft of the manuscript 
and subsequently revised the manuscript based on the co-authors’ feedback and also the 
peer review process. The co-author Faisal Khan helped in developing the concepts/models 
and their testing, reviewed and corrected the models and results, and contributed in 
preparing, reviewing and revising the manuscript. The co-author Salim Ahmed contributed 
through support in the development, testing and improvement of the model. Salim Ahmed 
also assisted in reviewing and revising the manuscript. 
 
Abstract 
Process safety and risk assessment are often multidimensional and hence require the joint 
modeling of several potentially correlated random variables. Any effort to address the 
correlation among the input variables is important and could improve the accuracy in 
practical applications of risk assessment models. This paper discusses the problems with 
                                                          
3 Hashemi et al. IFAC SAFEPROCESS 2015: 9th IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and 
Safety for Technical Processes., vol. 48, Paris; 2015, p. 1339–44. 
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correlated variables used in risk assessment and presents a copula-based technique to 
model dependency among variables to improve uncertainty analysis. Using the copula 
approach, capturing the dependence structure among different risk factors and estimating 
the univariate risk marginals can be separated. This advantage simplifies the overall risk 
estimation for systems with multiple dependent risk sources. The advantage of the copula-
based framework for generalization over the traditional correlation analysis technique is 
demonstrated using a case study. Methods are also presented for copula selection and 
estimation of the copula parameters.  
Keywords: Correlation coefficients; dependence; copula function; copula estimation; 
safety analysis. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increased attention in the integrated management of risk 
in process industries. It is no longer the best practice to consider each risk factor in 
isolation. Correlations among the factors and their potential synergy to cause catastrophic 
losses need attention. Thus, understanding the joint distribution of all risk sources is of 
paramount importance in process industries. Choosing and estimating a useful form for the 
marginal distribution of each variable in its domain is often a straightforward task. In 
contrast, other than the normal and t-distributions, univariate distributions usually do not 
have a convenient multivariate generalization [1]. Moreover, for these two families, the 
marginal distributions are also normal or t-distributed, respectively. This restriction limits 
their application to practical situations. Indeed, modelling and estimation of flexible 
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(skewed, multi-modal, heavy tailed) high-dimensional distributions is still an existing 
challenge. Developing a framework which allows specifying the marginal distributions 
irrespective of the dependence structure is a potential approach to address this challenge.  
Risk practitioners need to deal with complex process systems with multiple correlated 
variables. However, the available mathematical tools to analyse, extract and make use of 
their correlation information are limited. The best known tool has been the linear 
correlation coefficient. Linear correlation, or Pearson correlation, is a global measure that 
attempts to summarize the dependence between two variables using a single number. It 
cannot be expected to adequately summarize complex dependencies into a single number 
[2]. As shown later in this paper, two datasets with different dependence patterns can have 
the same correlation coefficient. 
Copula functions [3] offer a general framework for constructing multivariate distributions 
using any univariate marginals and a copula function C that links these marginals. The 
copula approach is important from a modelling perspective as it provides a tool to separate 
the choice of the marginals and that of the dependence structure which is expressed in C 
[1]. In practice, this advantage often lead to significant improvement in the analysis of 
multivariate systems. Accordingly, there has been an increased interest in copulas in oil 
and gas industries, with applications ranging from process safety assessment [4] to the 
estimation of oil well drilling duration [5].  
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4.2. The Correlation Challenge 
The word “correlation” has been frequently used (or misused) as an over-arching term to 
describe all sorts of dependence between two random variables [6]. However, correlation 
is only one particular measure of stochastic dependency among many. It is the canonical 
measure in the world of multivariate normal distributions, and more generally for spherical 
and elliptical distributions [7]. However, several researches in process loss modelling and 
risk assessment shows that the distributions of the real world are seldom in this class [4]. 
Figure 4.1 represents the motivation of this study, where 1000 bivariate realization from 
two different risk models for (R1, R2) are shown. In both models, R1 and R2 have identical 
log-normal and Weibull marginal distributions, respectively, and the linear correlation 
between them is 0.75. However, it is clear that the dependence between R1 and R2 in the 
two models is qualitatively different. Moreover, if we consider the random variables to 
represent risk classes, the second model is more dangerous from the point of view of a 
process risk analyst, since extreme losses generally occur together. We will return to this 
example later in the paper. For the time-being, as pointed out by [7], it should be noted that 
the dependence in the two models cannot be distinguished on the grounds of correlation 
alone.   
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Figure 4.1. 1000 bivariate realization from two distributions with identical marginal distributions 
and the linear correlation 0.75, but different dependence structure 
 
The main objective of this paper is to describe the importance of correlation and 
dependency in the context of multivariate risk assessment of process industries. The 
concept of copulas is discussed in Section 4.3 as an effective tool to capture and 
demonstrate the dependency. Section 4.4 collects and clarifies the essential ideas of 
dependence, linear correlation (and its shortcomings), and rank correlation, which have not 
been addressed properly in related process industries literature. Section 4.5 discusses the 
importance of considering dependence among both frequencies and consequences of 
abnormal events when analysing the aggregate risk of a process. Section 4.6 is another 
contribution of this study that addresses two challenges in application of copula-based 
approaches: the copula parameter estimation and copula model selection. Using a simple 
case study, the application of nonparametric and semi-parametric methods to estimate 
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copula parameters are presented in Section 4.6 and the difference between these two 
estimates is then used to select the best fitting copula.   
 
4.3. Copulas 
Copulas are used to describe the joint distribution of dependent random variables. With 
copula modelling, the marginal distributions from different families can be combined [8]. 
This is the main advantage of copulas compared with alternative methods, such as the use 
of multivariate distributions, to construct dependencies.  
Let R = R1, …, Rd be a random vector with continuous marginal cumulative distribution 
functions (CDF) F1, …, Fd. Based on Sklar’s theorem, the CDF H of R can be represented 
as: 
      
1 11 2 , ...,,..., d dH R R C F R F R       (4.1) 
for all real R1, …, Rd in terms of a unique function C: [0, 1]d → [0, 1], called a copula [3]. 
To provide a formal definition for copulas, let U1, …, Ud be real random variables 
marginally uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. A copula function is a joint distribution function 
defined as 
   
1 1 1
, ..., , ...,
d d d
C u u P U u U u   .      (4.2) 
The representation in Equation (4.1) is very fundamental for a copula application in risk 
assessment; it indicates that given any marginal risk distribution (R1, …, Rd) and a copula 
function C, Equation (4.1) can be used to obtain the joint risk distribution function. The 
main advantage provided to the process risk analysts by this representation is that the 
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selection of an appropriate model for the dependence between risk sources, represented by 
C, can then proceed independently from the choice of the marginal risk distributions.  
Nelsen [3] reviewed different copula families and discussed methods of constructing 
copulas. For instance, Table 4.1 shows three common families of Archimedean copulas 
and their parameter space.   
Table 4.1. Three common families of Archimedean copulas and an expression for the population 
value of Kendall’s τ 
Family C(u, v)    τ 
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Note: Here,      1 0 1
xD x e dx

    is the first Debye function. 
Copula is sometimes referred as a “dependency function” since it contains all of the 
dependence information between random variables [6]. For instance, using the Frank 
copula, all the information about the dependence between the two random variables is in 
the parameter δ, whose value can be interpreted in terms of a coefficient like Kendall’s τ 
rank correlation. Different measures of dependence (correlation coefficients) are discussed 
in the next section.  
 
4.4. Dependence Measures 
Two kinds of dependence measures are briefly discussed in this section; the traditional 
Pearson linear correlation, and the rank correlation. The latter measure is based on a copula 
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function, however, both of the measures calculate scalar measurement for a pair of random 
variables. Nevertheless, the specification and the nature behind each of them varies. In the 
following section, at first, the definition of the linear correlation and its shortcomings when 
applied in non-elliptical models are provided. Then, the rank correlation and its 
representative, the Kendall’s τ rank correlation, are described. 
 
4.4.1. Linear Correlation 
The word “correlation” is used in this work only in its technical sense of linear correlation 
or Pearson’s correlation, denoted by ρ. Let X and Y represent two random variables with 
non-zero finite variances. The linear correlation coefficient for (X, Y) is: 
 
 
   
,
, ,
Cov X Y
X Y
Var X Var Y
         (4.3) 
where Cov and Var are the covariance and variance operators, respectively. This well-
known measure of correlation has the following properties: 
  , 1,1 ,X Y    
  , 1X Y   means perfect correlation, positive or negative, 
  , 0X Y   indicates no correlation between the random variables. 
However, it needs to be stated that if two random variables are not correlated, it does not 
mean that they must be independent. No correlation indicates that there is no dependency 
only under normality. Correlation is considered to be only one particular measure of 
stochastic dependence among many others [6]. Another drawback of linear correlation is 
its assumption of finite variances of X and Y. This could be a problem when this measure 
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is to be applied on heavy-tailed distributions, where the variance of random variables may 
be infinite [7].  
Though linear correlation is a popular measure of dependence, it is often misinterpreted. 
As pointed out by Klaus (2012), the wide application of correlation is primarily due to its 
simple computation. Moreover, it is a natural scalar measure of dependence for elliptical 
distributions (for example for multivariate normal distribution). Nevertheless, using 
correlation as a measure of dependence by assuming that all multivariate distributions are 
elliptically distributed would produce misleading results in real life problems.  
 
4.4.2. Rank Correlation 
The copula of two random variables completely determines any dependence measures that 
are scale-invariant, that is, measures that remain unchanged under monotonically 
increasing transformations of the random variables. More generally, if φ and Ψ are two 
increasing transformations with inverses φ−1 and Ψ−1, the copula of the pair (Z, T) with Z = 
φ(X) and T = Ψ(Y) is the same as that of (X, Y); for a proof see [8]. Expressed in different 
terms, the construction of the multivariate distribution in Equation (4.1) implies that the 
copula function C is invariant under monotonically increasing transformations of its 
margins. Therefore, scale-invariant dependence measures can be expressed in terms of a 
copula-based measure of dependence, the rank correlation. Unlike linear correlation, rank 
correlation does not depend on marginal distribution but only on copula [9]. 
The most widely used rank correlation, also known as concordance measure, is Kendall’s 
τ. Informally, a pair of random variables are concordant if large (or small) values of one 
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tend to be associated with large (or small) values of the other [3]. The Kendall’s τ can be 
defined by introducing a concordance function between two continuous random vectors 
(X, Y) and (X’, Y’) with possibly different joint distributions, but with common marginal 
distributions.  
For a bivariate random vector (X1, X2) with copula C, Kendall’s τ is interpreted as the 
difference between the probability of concordance and dis-concordance of two independent 
and identically distributed observations [3]: 
   
1 1
1 2 1 2
0 0
4 , , 1.C u u dC u u           (4.4) 
Note that τ is a symmetric dependency measure and takes values 1,1   , where −1 
signals a perfect negative correlation, 1 displays a perfect positive correlation and 0 shows 
no correlation. However, similar to linear correlation, this does not indicate independency 
[6].  
Spearman’s ρ is another rank correlation which is proportional to the difference between 
the probability of concordance and dis-concordance of two vectors. There are also other 
dependence measures based on copulas. For example, tail dependence is a very important 
measure when studying the dependence between extreme events. These dependence 
measures are not within the scope of this work; an interested reader may refer to [3]. 
 
4.4.3 Choosing Dependence Measures 
There are numerous guidelines on when to use each correlation coefficient, though their 
suggestions sometimes contradicts each other [10]. However, based on [10], a common 
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practice is not to use the linear correlation coefficient for non-normal data with obvious 
outliers and for highly skewed distributions.  
To wrap up this section, it can be concluded that while the linear correlation coefficient is 
still needed to parameterize the underlying bivariate normal, rank correlations are more 
useful in describing the dependence between random variables, because they are invariant 
to the choice of marginal distribution. 
 
4.5. Dependence in Risk Assessment  
Although the application of risk-based fault detection [11] and warning system design [12] 
approaches are increasing in the process industries literature, the effect of dependence 
among risk model parameters have not been studied well yet.  
As an example of a system with two risk sources, let us denote R1 and R2 as the aggregate 
operational and business risks, respectively, with the following: 
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1
N N
n m
n m
R R R L L
 
            (4.5) 
where R is the global aggregate risk, L1 and L2 are loss amounts (i.e. severity of events) 
and N1 and N2 are the frequencies of each loss. When incorporating the dependence 
structure in risk assessment, it is necessary to clarify which dependence we are talking 
about since each type of risk is driven by two elementary sources of randomness, i.e. 
frequency (or probability) and loss (or consequence). In this respect, as described in the 
following sections, dependence among aggregate risks may result from dependence among 
frequencies or among losses or between both.  
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4.5.1. Frequency Dependence 
Intuitively, frequency dependence means that, historically, the number of (for example) 
mishaps resulted in both operational and business losses is high when the number of (for 
example) near-misses resulted in process variations and consequent operational loss is also 
high. It likely happens when both frequencies N1 and N2 share common dependence with 
respect to some variables such as the performance of the control system and safety barriers. 
Empirically, frequency correlation could be evidenced and measured by computing the 
historical correlation between past frequencies of events, provided of course that data are 
recorded for a sufficiently long period of time [13]. Frequency dependence and its effect 
on aggregate risk assessment is an interesting subject for future research.  
 
4.5.2. Loss Dependence 
Mathematically, loss dependence would mean that loss amounts randomly drawn from 
different classes of events are not independent of one another. It may be observed when, 
for example, operational loss amounts due to the production of off-specification product 
are high (or low), then reputational and business loss amounts are also high (or low). 
Empirically, the correlation among different loss classes can be identified by monitoring 
the business performance and loss amounts of a given process over time. The concept of 
loss dependence and the application of copula functions for aggregation of dependent loss 
random variables is studied in an earlier work by the authors [4].  
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4.6. Case Study 
A detailed study on how and to what extent frequency and/or loss dependence impact the 
aggregate risk is a subject for a future study. However, this section aims to illustrate the 
significance of observing the dependence among random variables when conducting risk 
analysis. For this purpose, the motivating example in the Introduction section is used to 
investigate the effect of dependence between operational and business risk classes of a 
hypothetical distillation process when estimating the global aggregate risk.  
From the operational history of the distillation process, the operational risk (R1) due to the 
deviation of the distillation column key process variables from their target values is 
estimated to follow a log-normal distribution with mean µ = 0.35 million US dollars (USD) 
per year and standard deviation σ = 0.42 million USD/year. Analysing the process business 
performance within the past 12 months, the business risk (R2) of the process due to 
interrupted production is considered to be Weibull distributed with shape parameter βw = 
5.79 and scale parameter θw = 2.16 million USD/year. The focus of this case study is on 
modelling the dependence between the two risk classes. Sensitivity analysis investigations 
are provided in Sections 7.6.4 and 8.4.5 to evaluate the impact of uncertainty in data on 
estimated correlation parameter. 
 
4.6.1. Assessment of Dependence  
Before a copula model for the pair (R1, R2) is determined, the scatter plot of the data was 
used to check for the presence of dependence. The scatter plot of (R1, R2) pairs shown in 
Figure 4.2 suggests the presence of positive association between operational and business 
95 
risks, as might be expected. Figure 4.2 has histograms alongside a scatter plot to show both 
the marginal distributions of R1, R2, and the dependence. To quantify the degree of 
dependence in the pair (R1, R2), sample value of Kendall’s τ and Pearson ρ  are determined 
in Table 4.2 using the MATLAB® [14] software corr function. According to a simple 
comparison in Table 4.2, as discussed in Section 4.4.2, transformation of variables does 
not affect the rank-based Kendall’s τ correlation coefficient.   
 
Table 4.2. Comparison between the Pearson ρ and Kendall’s τ values 
Dependence Measure R1 × R2 Log (R1) × Log (R2) 
Pearson ρ 0.75 0.70 
Kendall’s τ 0.56 0.56 
 
In order to model the dependence between the operational risk (R1) and the business risk 
(R2) of the distillation process, only the class of Archimedean copulas are considered in 
this work for simplicity. The simple closed functional forms of Archimedean copulas along 
with their desired properties made them suitable for variety of applications [3,5]. Three 
widely used Archimedean models used in the literature are: Gumbel’s family with upper 
tail dependence; Clayton’s family with lower tail dependence; and Frank’s family that has 
reflection symmetry. 
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Figure 4.2. Business risk and operational risk distributions for the distillation process data 
 
4.6.2. Copula Estimation 
Next step to model the joint risk density is to estimate the copula parameters. Among 
different techniques to estimate and select copulas, a nonparametric estimation of the 
copula [15] and a semi parametric estimation based on the method of maximum 
pseudolikelihood [16] are presented in this work. After obtaining both estimates, the results 
are compared to select the best fitting copula.  
Genest and MacKay [17] presented that for parametric copulas, such as Archimedean 
models, one can estimate the copula parameter from the closed form relationship between 
the copula parameter and Kendall’s τ. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, Kendall’s τ is the 
difference between the probability of concordance and the probability of discordance of 
independent pairs of realizations of a joint distribution. Therefore, the sample version of 
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Kendall’s τ is given by    ˆ c d c d    , where c denotes the number of concordant pairs 
and d the number of discordant pairs in the sample [18]. Table 4.1 gives an expression for 
τ for the three most common Archimedean models. An advantage of this approach is that 
the marginal distributions do not need to be specified, however, this method is only 
applicable to the one parameter copulas [18]. For the estimated Kendall’s τ value of 0.56, 
the nonparametric estimates of each copula family parameter are obtained as ˆ 2.54
NP
Clayton
  , 
ˆ 2.27
NP
Gumbel
  , and ˆ 6.95
NP
Frank
  . 
The other copula estimation procedure is the canonical maximum likelihood (CML), or the 
semi-parametric estimation, method proposed by [16]. In this two-step estimation 
procedure, at first the empirical distribution functions of the series of interest for each 1 ≤ 
i ≤ p are determined as 
   
1
1
1
n
j
in ij
F x X x
n 
 

ˆ 1        (4.6) 
where  
ij
X x1  is the indicator function. Then, the semi-parametric estimate of the copula 
parameter δ is the value that maximize the log-likelihood function of the copula density 
using the transformed variables given by  
       1 1
1
log , ...,
n
n k pn pk
k
c F X F X



      (4.7) 
where cδ is the copula density. Although the numerical work involved with this method 
may make it less attractive, however, the CML method is generally applicable for more 
copula models. Moreover, application of the CML method does not require the marginal 
distribution to be known and also does not require the dependence parameter to be real. 
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Given the copula families in Table 4.1, the copula parameters for the current case study 
were obtained using the presented CML methodology for sample size of n = 10,000 as 
ˆ 2.45
SP
Clayton
  , ˆ 4.38
SP
Gumbel
  , and ˆ 13.15
SP
Frank
  . 
 
4.6.3. Copula Selection 
Given that there exists only three competing copulas for this case study, the absolute value 
of the distance between the nonparametric and semi-parametric copula parameter 
estimates, ˆ
ˆ ˆNP SP
C C
    , is used as a criterion in this case study to select the best copula. 
When the 
ˆ
  value is small, one has an indication of a reasonable fit. In this case study, 
the 
ˆ
  values for different copulas are determined as: ˆ
Clayton

 = 0.09, ˆ
Gumbel

 = 2.11, and 
ˆ
Frank

 = 6.20. Thus, the Clayton with the smallest 
ˆ
  is selected as the best fitting copula 
for this case study. This result is not surprising as the scatter plot of the risk data 
observations in Figure 4.2 matches the lower tail dependence property of Clayton copula.  
 
4.6.4. Overall Risk Estimation 
Having estimated the copula parameters, each copula is used to simulate the joint density 
and marginal distributions of R1 and R2. For instance, the joint density of the overall risk 
simulated from Frank and Clayton copulas are shown in Figure 4.1. The mean (μR) and 
standard deviation (σR) of the aggregate risk (summation of R1 and R2) simulated from each 
copula are then determined as: 7.176
Frank
R
   and 3.232
Frank
R
  ; 6.431
Clayton
R
   and 2.991
Clayton
R
  ; 
6.705
Gumbel
R
   and 3.189
Gumbel
R
   (all numbers are in million USD/year).  From Figure 4.1 and 
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the estimated aggregate risk values, it can be clearly seen that miss-estimation of the 
dependence structure may have a significant effect on the estimated aggregate risk of a 
process. 
In this case study, it is assumed that the joint risk distribution could be well represented by 
of the three Archimedean models. Obviously, consideration of all potential copula models 
is required to ensure selection of the best fitting model. This will require a more formal and 
adequate copula selection method. Application of the information theory to copula 
selection is a subject for an ongoing research to address this challenge.   
 
4.7. Conclusions  
Deviation of process characteristics along with the failure of control systems and safety 
barriers cause undesired process events. This paper discusses the importance of considering 
correlation and dependency among frequencies and loss severities of such events for the 
purpose of integrated risk management. Both linear and rank correlation coefficients are 
introduced as the most commonly used measures of dependence in data analysis. These 
correlation coefficients can be represented as differently weighted averages of the same 
concordance indicators. The copula-based Kendall’s correlation coefficient is preferable 
for risk assessment purposes due to usually a non-normal distribution of model parameters 
with non-linear dependence structures. 
This paper also demonstrates the flexibility and strength of copula-based approaches in 
modelling the dependence among random variables. The practical application of copula-
based risk aggregation and the importance of considering the correlation and dependency 
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in risk assessment of process industries are highlighted using a case study. The findings 
from the case study highlight the fact that selection of wrong dependence structure and/or 
wrong estimation of the copula parameter(s) could result in over or under-estimation of the 
overall risk.  
The integration of proposed copula-based dependence modelling with existing risk-based 
fault detection and warning generation methods can improve the accuracy of the estimated 
risk by decreasing the uncertainty involved in the exiting risk models due to the assumption 
of independent model parameters. The copula Bayesian networks, recently introduced in 
actuarial studies [1], is an interesting topic for future study to capture both the connectivity 
and dependency in probability estimation models. By combing a copula Bayesian network 
with the copula-based loss aggregation methodology proposed in an earlier work [4], a new 
dynamic risk assessment model will be developed for process safety monitoring and 
warning generation of process industries.  
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5. LOSS SCENARIO ANALYSIS AND LOSS AGGREGATION FOR 
PROCESS FACILITIES4 
 
Preface 
A version of this manuscript has been published in the Journal of Chemical Engineering 
Science. I am the primary author of this paper. I formulated the problem and proposed 
alternate solutions.  Along with the co-authors, Faisal Khan and Salim Ahmed, I developed 
the conceptual model and subsequently translated this to the numerical model. I carried out 
most of the data collection and analysis. I prepared the first draft of the manuscript 
and subsequently revised the manuscript based on the co-authors’ feedback and also the 
peer review process. The co-author Faisal Khan helped in developing the concepts/models 
and their testing, reviewed and corrected the models and results, and contributed in 
preparing, reviewing and revising the manuscript. The co-author Salim Ahmed contributed 
through support in the development, testing and improvement of the model. Salim Ahmed 
also assisted in reviewing and revising the manuscript. 
 
Abstract 
This study presents an overall loss modelling methodology for process facilities. The 
methodology comprises loss scenario identification and aggregation of losses due to 
process deviations. The identification of loss scenarios and determination of the time 
                                                          
4 Hashemi et al. Chemical Engineering Science 2015;128:119–29. 
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periods at which a process experiences each scenario are described first. Then, the 
application of the copula functions and their integration with the Monte Carlo (MC) 
approach are proposed to address the existing challenge of loss aggregation for multiple-
loss scenarios. The proposed loss aggregation provides a flexible and realistic approach to 
construct joint multivariate distribution of the losses by considering their interdependence. 
The sensitivity of the model to the choice of correlation parameters is investigated. The 
results serve as a reminder to risk analysts about the significance of choosing an appropriate 
loss aggregation model for risk analysis purposes. The application of the methodology is 
demonstrated using a distillation column case study.  
Keywords: Loss modeling; Loss aggregation; Copula function; Distillation column 
flooding 
 
5.1. Introduction  
Any process is subject to deterioration with time due to natural and assignable causes. As 
a result, the process characteristics, for example a reboiler heat duty, deviate from the 
specification limits and the process experiences unsafe situations that can eventually 
impose different losses. The losses due to abnormal conditions in process facilities can be 
classified into: Class 0—allowable operational loss; Class I—unallowable operational loss; 
Class II—business losses; and Class III—event losses. An overall loss modelling approach 
should identify, estimate, and aggregate all applicable significant loss elements.  
The concept of identifying potential consequences and process outcomes due to abnormal 
events has been widely studied, usually using event tree analysis [2–6]. However, there has 
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been less effort to consider the time-dependent process deterioration in estimating the 
duration of loss scenarios. One of the contributions of this paper is to introduce a 
methodology to estimate the duration of loss scenarios based on the process history and 
safety performance. This has been integrated with the loss aggregation methodology to 
quantify the overall loss of the scenarios. The novelty of the proposed method is to address 
the time-dependent process deterioration with non-constant process mean and variance.  
An important aspect of an overall loss model is the ability to aggregate the negative 
outcomes of scenarios with multiple losses in process facilities. This usually requires 
aggregation of a diverse range of loss categories with different loss distributions. More 
importantly, different losses are usually interrelated. However, most of the existing loss 
models for process facilities assume independence among these loss elements while 
estimating the overall loss. This simplification may cause misestimation of the overall loss.  
Another contribution of this paper is to address the issue of determining the aggregated 
loss resulting from an incident when the losses belonging to different classes are dependent. 
Oil spills, for example, can harm people, damage both the physical assets and the 
surrounding environment, and at the same time can affect the reputation of the organization 
with negative economic consequences. In recent years, modelling the dependencies using 
copulas has become popular in the actuarial, insurance, and finance literature [7,8]. 
Copulas may be used to construct joint multivariate distribution of losses and are rather 
flexible and realistic in terms of allowing a wide range of dependence structure. This paper 
provides a loss aggregation method based on the superposition principle. Then, aggregation 
methodologies based on copula functions are proposed, considering the dependence both 
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among the elements of a loss class and also among different loss classes. Thus, based on 
available information, the user can choose an appropriate aggregation method on a case-
by-case basis.  
The remainder of the paper has been structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents framework 
of the proposed overall loss modelling methodology and a loss scenario analysis procedure 
based on time-dependent deterioration of process characteristics. Section 5.3 reviews the 
existing loss aggregation approaches and provides the necessary technical background on 
copulas. Section 5.4 discusses the methodology and assumptions used in developing a 
copula-based loss aggregation method. The practical application of the methodology is 
illustrated in Section 5.5 using a distillation column case study. Finally, the paper is 
concluded with remarks on the proposed methodologies, their limitations, and potential 
direction for future research on the subject of using the proposed overall loss model in 
operational risk analysis.  
 
5.2. Loss Scenario Modelling   
The framework of the proposed overall loss modelling methodology is demonstrated in 
Figure 5.1. In the proposed methodology, the estimated duration of an abnormal process is 
required to determine the overall magnitude of time-dependent loss classes, which are 
operational and business losses. This section provides models to estimate time periods at 
which a process may experience each loss scenario. In this work, a loss scenario is defined 
as a description of a predicted loss situation based on process conditions and may include 
a single loss class or a combination of classes.  
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Generate loss scenarios
Start
Are there any other loss 
scenarios?
Report the overall loss 
for each scenario
Yes
No
Aggregate the losses 
Identify and estimate 
applicable loss classes 
and elements
Consider a loss scenario
Operational Losses
Class 0 and Class I
Business Losses
Class II
Event Losses
Class III
 
Figure 5.1. Methodology for overall loss modelling of process facilities 
 
5.2.1. Time-Dependent Process Deterioration  
Process operations are subject to deterioration with time due to chance and assignable 
causes. It is not possible to maintain a zero variation among materials, methods, operators, 
equipment, instruments, and measurements. It is process deterioration that moves the 
process characteristic into abnormal (out-of-control) states and increases the process 
variance at a random point in time [9]. These conditions impose different loss classes to 
the system based on the magnitude of the deviation and the performance of safety barriers. 
Tahera et al. [9] reviewed the issue of time-dependent process deterioration in the 
107 
manufacturing industry and proposed methods to determine quality loss considering the 
effect of non-constant process variance. This section considers the issue of process 
deterioration in chemical facilities and the resulting loss scenarios.  
Consider a process system with a specific key characteristic x that is normally distributed 
with target mean µ0 and an initial variance σ02. It is assumed that an assignable cause occurs 
at a random point in time (τD) and changes the mean and variance in a time-dependent 
manner. As described in Table 5.1, according to the performance of the control system and 
the safety barriers, the process characteristic value could fall in four regions at a given point 
of time. Different process states associated with each process characteristic region and the 
typical actions to address the associated abnormal situations are described in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the four loss scenarios and applicable loss elements based on the 
process characteristic value at time t.  
The scope of this work is to develop models to estimate overall loss associated with each 
loss scenario, which are provided in the following section. For this purpose, it is assumed 
that the distribution of loss elements associated with each scenario are available.  
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Table 5.1. Different process characteristic regions and associated process states 
Process 
Characteristic 
Region 
Process State Description Required Action 
Central Region Normal—Type 0 
(Acceptable) 
Process is controlled and it is 
operating under a stable system 
of natural causes. 
Process characteristic should be 
measured and compared with 
process target to ensure continued 
normal operation. 
Warning Region Abnormal Type 1 
(Controllable)  
 
Control system has failed to 
maintain the process 
characteristic within the 
specification limits and process 
is under the effects of assignable 
causes. 
Raise alarm. While the process is 
in-service, preventive measures 
such as operator action are 
required to identify, diagnose, and 
eliminate the assignable cause(s) 
and to return the process to 
normal operation.  
Action Region Abnormal Type 2 
(Manageable)  
 
Preventive measures have failed 
to return the deviated process 
characteristic within the 
specification limits and process 
is under the effects of assignable 
causes. 
Raise alarm and immediately shut 
down the process or relieve the 
pressure (if applicable). While the 
process is stopped, identify, 
diagnose, and eliminate the 
assignable cause(s) and restart the 
process. 
Mitigation Region  Abnormal Type 3 
(Mitigatable)  
Preventive and protective 
measures have failed to stop the 
process or relief the pressure 
and loss of containment has 
occurred.  
Utilize mitigatory measures to 
contain the release and activate 
the emergency response measures 
to minimize the loss. 
 
Table 5.2. Loss scenarios and applicable loss classes 
Loss 
Scenario 
Process 
Characteristic 
Region 
Process 
State 
Applicable 
Loss Classes 
Applicable 
Loss 
Elements 
Description of Loss Elements 
Scenario 0 Central 
Region 
Type 0 Class 0 (L0)  Allowable operational loss 
Scenario 1 Warning 
Region 
Abnormal 
Type 1 
Class I (LI) 
 
Unallowable operational loss 
Scenario 2 Action 
Region 
Abnormal 
Type 2 
Class I (LI)  Unallowable operational loss 
Class II (LII)  Business interruption loss  
Scenario 3 Mitigation 
Region 
Abnormal 
Type 3 
Class I (LI)  Unallowable operational loss 
Class II (LII)  Business interruption loss  
 Reputational loss 
Class III (LIII)  Asset loss 
 Human health loss 
 Environmental cleanup loss 
  
0
Ol
O
Il
O
Il
BI
IIl
O
Il
BI
IIl
R
IIl
A
IIIl
HH
IIIl
EC
IIIl
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5.2.2. Loss Scenarios 
5.2.2.1. Loss Scenario 0: Normal Process 
Under normal process conditions, it is assumed that the process characteristic is normally 
distributed with mean µ0 and an initial variance σ02. Deviations of the process 
characteristic, although within the specification limits, impose some degree of operational 
loss due to production of sub-quality products. However, the loss due to normal 
fluctuations of the process characteristic within the specification limits is considered as a 
constant characteristic of a normal process and assumed to be compatible with the 
acceptable tolerances. The loss Scenario 0 is quantified as:  
    *Scenario 0 0 0 0
0
,
t
OL E l P t dt          (5.1) 
where P(t) is the production rate (e.g. barrel/hour) and   * 0 0 0,OE l    is the average 
observable loss per unit of produced product (e.g. dollar/barrel), referred to as the unit 
expected Class 0 loss in this work.  
 
5.2.2.2. Loss Scenario 1: Abnormal Process Type 1 
Under abnormal condition Type 1, it is assumed that at a random point in time the mean of 
the process characteristic changes in a time-dependent manner due to occurrence of an 
assignable cause. The change in variance is also assumed to occur at the same time as a 
change in the mean. According to Table 5.2, an abnormal process Type 1 experiences 
operational (Class I) loss due to process deviation beyond the specification limits. The 
cumulative expected operational loss for loss Scenario 1 is then determined as: 
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    *Scenario 1
0
,
C
O
I t tL E l dtP t

 

        (5.2) 
where P(t) is the production rate and   * ,OI t tE l    is the unit expected Class I loss, which 
can be estimated as the expected value of MINLF. The 
C  is the length of time between 
the starting time of the abnormal process (τD) and the time when the process fault(s) is (are) 
detected and corrected (τC). The C  is assumed to be exponentially distributed with a 
mean of 
1
C
 .  
In Equation (5.2), the µt and σt are the process characteristic mean and standard deviation 
at time t. Considering a deteriorating process, the general case includes an unstable process 
with a positive shift in mean with an age-dependent positive drift while process variance 
increases [9]. If t < τD (normal process) then σ2t = σ02 and µt = µ0. Alternatively, if t > τD 
(abnormal process) then σ2t = σ02Wσ (t, τD) and µt = µ0 + Wµ(t, τ), where Wσ (t, τD) and Wµ(t, 
τD) represent respectively the variance and mean deteriorating function. In the simple case, 
a linear change in both mean and variance after maintaining a steady state for a while may 
be considered. In this case, the deteriorating functions are assumed as Wσ (t, τD) = (t – τD + 
1) and Wµ(t, τD) = δµ + (t – τD)θµ where δµ is the shift in mean, and θµ is the drift rate of 
mean. However, based on available information, any other deteriorating function that 
provides a better representation of the process deterioration can be used.  
Finally, the distribution of the Class I loss is determined using the MC method by repeating 
the following two steps for J time: 
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Step 1. Simulate a realization of jC  from a defined exponential distribution with a 
mean of 
1
C
 . 
Step 2. Obtain an observation for loss Scenario 1 by replacing simulated jC  in 
Equation (5.2). 
From the loss distribution, the expected value of loss Scenario 1 can be obtained as the 
mean (or the median) of the simulated samples: 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 1
1
1 J j
j
E L L
J 
  .       (5.3) 
In the proposed approach, the greater amount of simulation runs (J) the better the precision 
of the estimation. The number of simulation runs of J = 106 is found as the value to ensure 
optimal balance between precision and computational time. 
 
5.2.2.3. Loss Scenario 2: Abnormal Process Type 2  
In Scenario 2, the operator fails to detect, diagnose, and correct the out-of-control process 
and the process fault(s) propagate(s). Over time the process characteristic deviates more 
from the target, the probabilities of unsafe conditions increase, and the process incurs more 
operational (Class I) loss. Once the process mean exceeds the high-high alarm (HHA) limit, 
it is considered that the successful activation of safety barriers shuts down the system at 
time τSD. The length of time during which the process experiences loss Scenario 2 is the 
summation of process downtime (Δτdt) and business recovery (Δτrp) periods. The overall 
loss associated with loss Scenario 2 is determined as: 
112 
 Scenario 2 I 0 II| , ,SDL Aggregated L L L       (5.4) 
where I 0|
SDL

 captures the system operational loss over the period of time between 
deviation of process characteristic from its target value and the process shutdown (ΔτSD). 
IIL is the business loss and represents the lost production and associated business 
interruption losses during process downtime. A methodology to estimate the business 
interruption loss using the business interruption insurance (BII) approach is proposed in 
[1]. Zero reputational loss is considered for Scenario 2 as no loss of containment has 
occurred. The captures all other residual losses which are not covered by the defined 
loss classes. The loss aggregation methodologies are proposed in Section 5.4 based on the 
dependence structure among loss elements. 
 
5.2.2.4. Loss Scenario 3: Abnormal Process Type 3  
In Scenario 3, the failure of the control system and safety barriers causes unmanageable 
unsafe conditions. Failure to shut down the system or relieve the overpressure (if 
applicable) results in loss of containment (LOC). The cumulative overall loss associated 
with Scenario 3 is modeled as: 
 Scenario 3 I 0 II III| , , ,LOCL Aggregated L L L L  .     (5.5) 
The ΔτLOC is the time span between the deviation of process characteristic and the loss of 
containment. LI denotes operational loss class, LII is the business loss class including the 
business interruption loss and reputational loss elements, and LIII represents event loss class 
L
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comprising asset loss, human health loss and environmental cleanup losses [1]. The 
application of copula functions in loss aggregation is discussed in the following sections.  
 
5.3. Loss Aggregation Overview  
5.3.1. Challenges in Loss Aggregation  
Let L1, L2, …, LD be the random variables that represent the elements of a given loss 
scenario i. Then, it can be shown that the expected value and the variance of the overall 
loss LScenario i = L1 + L2 +… + LD are given by:  
   
1
D
d
d
E L E L

  
and 
     
1
'
1 1 '
2 ,
D D D
d d d
d d d d
Var L Var L Cov L L

  
    
where  dE L  and  dVar L  are, respectively, the mean value and the variance of each Ld, 
and  ',d dCov L L  is the covariance between Ld and Ld’. The covariance measures the 
dependence among random loss variables and has the value of zero for the case of 
independent losses. Thus, the  Var L
 
is equal to the sum of the individual variances only 
for independent losses. As the covariance can be either positive or negative, for the case of 
dependent losses the  Var L  can be either less than or higher than the sum of the individual 
variances. As it can be seen, dependence does not affect the mean overall loss. However, 
it does impact the variance significantly and will consequently affect the extreme values of 
the overall loss distribution (for example the 10th and 90th percentiles) [10]. 
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Dependencies among loss elements within a single class or across the various loss classes 
are well recognized in the insurance and finance literature [11–13]. A comprehensive 
review of the consequence analysis literature related to process facilities shows that the 
potential dependencies among different losses have been virtually ignored in almost all of 
the existing methodologies. The superposition principle is used mostly to linearly add 
different loss elements to determine the overall loss [4,6,14–16]. Such an approach is 
applicable only if the losses for a given scenario are absolutely independent, which is not 
the case for most of the loss scenarios.  
The dependence structure is recognized in this paper to estimate the overall loss. The next 
section describes a brief technical background of copulas to model the dependencies among 
random variables, which is used in Section 5.4 to develop a loss aggregation methodology.  
 
5.3.2. Copula-Based Aggregation of Losses 
5.3.2.1. Copula Functions 
In the finance literature, there are several ongoing discussions about the application of 
copula models to account for possible dependencies among losses [11–13]. Copulas are 
used to describe the joint distribution of dependent random variables. With copula 
modeling, the marginal distributions from different families can be combined [17]. This is 
the main advantage of copulas compared with alternative methods, such as the use of 
multivariate distributions, to construct dependencies.  
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Let L = (L1, ..., Ld) be a random vector with continuous marginal cumulative distribution 
functions (CDF) F1,…, Fd. Based on Sklar’s theorem, the CDF H of L can be represented 
as: 
H(l) = C{F1(l1), . . . ,Fd(ld)}, l ∈ Rd,       
in terms of a unique function C: [0, 1]d → [0, 1], called a copula [18]. This representation 
suggests breaking the construction of a model for H into two parts: the estimation of the 
marginal CDFs F1,…, Fd, and the estimation of the copula C. A comprehensive list of 
copula families and a review of the statistical issues involved in the model-building can be 
found Nelsen (2006). 
 
5.3.2.2. Interactions and Copulas 
To describe the dependencies among a set of related random variables, both linear and non-
linear correlation coefficients could be used. The linear correlation coefficient expresses 
the linear dependence among normally distributed random variables. For non-linear cases, 
a rank correlation coefficient, such as the Kendall’s τ or the Spearman’s ρ, is more 
appropriate [19]. The possibility of using rank-correlation coefficients, which are 
insensitive to the marginal distributions, is a useful property of copula modeling. This 
advantage allows the random variables to interact and share information through the 
elements of the dependence matrix [20]. 
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5.3.2.3. Selection of Copulas 
Copula functions for a specific application may be based on actual observed data, or can 
be estimated using parametric methods [8], non-parametric methods and goodness-of-fit 
tests [21]. Alternatively, different copulas may be used to determine the sensitivity of 
simulation results to the input distribution.  
Sectio 7.4 of this thesis provides a methodlogy to select the best fitting copula for a given 
application. A comprehensive review of the application of different copula-based methods 
used in economic risk modeling is provided elsewhere [7,11]. It is concluded that the 
Student-t copula (or simply t-copula) may be considered as the most appropriate copula to 
model the dependence structure for risk management as it is able to model both the center 
and tail dependencies of skewed distributions [7,11]. The t-copula is used in this work to 
construct the dependence structure among the loss elements and loss classes.  
 
5.4. Loss Aggregation Methodology 
Three different cases of loss aggregation are considered in this section: 
 Case 1: Independent loss classes with independent loss elements  
 Case 2: Independent loss classes with dependent loss elements  
 Case 3: Dependent loss classes with dependent loss elements  
In defining the above cases, it is assumed that the dependencies among loss classes are 
actually due to their dependent loss elements. Therefore, the case of dependent loss classes 
with independent loss elements is not considered. The loss aggregation approaches for the 
above cases are discussed in the following sections. 
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5.4.1. Case 1: Independent Loss Classes with Independent Loss Elements 
The superposition principle for loss aggregation is used for Case 1 by simply adding all 
loss elements, assuming independent losses. The proposed approach is shown in Figure 
5.2. For a given scenario, all applicable losses are added to estimate the overall loss. This 
step is repeated J times to determine the parameters of the overall loss distribution.  
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Figure 5.2. Case 1 loss aggregation using the superposition principle and Monte Carlo simulation 
 
5.4.2. Case 2: Independent Loss Classes with Dependent Loss Elements 
Copula functions are used to construct the dependence structure among elements of loss 
Classes II and III (note that Class I has only one element). Suppose there are CDFs FL(h), h 
= 1, …, H of loss values for each loss element. The distribution functions for the overall 
loss for each of the Classes II and III are obtained by repeating the following three steps 
for J times: 
Step 1. Simulate a realization of a multivariate random vector ū = (u1, …, uH) with 
uniformly distributed marginal on [0, 1] from a defined copula C.  
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Step 2. Obtain a loss scenario for each loss element lj(h), h = 1, …, H, by applying the 
inverse CDF to each uniformly distributed realization (simulated in previous 
step):      
1
j hL h
l h F u . 
Step 3. Obtain a total loss scenario, Lj, summing losses lj(h) for each h = 1, …, H:  
 
1
H
j j
h
L l h

 .  
The simulated empirical distribution functions for the overall loss for Classes II and III are 
obtained. Then, considering the independence of loss classes, the simulated random 
numbers of all loss classes are added to estimate the overall loss.  
 
5.4.3. Case 3: Dependent Loss Classes with Dependent Loss Elements 
In Case 3, the dependence structure is considered among all elements from all loss classes 
to provide a more realistic representation of a real-life situation. The loss aggregation 
approach for Case 3 is shown in Figure 5.3, which is the modification of the Case 2 loss 
aggregation by taking into account the correlation among all loss elements. 
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Figure 5.3. Case 3 loss aggregation: copula-based estimation of aggregated loss (dependent loss 
classes with dependent loss elements) 
 
5.5. Case Study: Distillation Column 
5.5.1. Process Description 
The practical application of the proposed loss scenario analysis and loss aggregation 
methodologies is demonstrated using a hypothetical distillation column case study. 
Flooding is a common abnormal process condition that can cause loss of separation and 
negatively impact the safety and energy efficiency of the distillation process. Depending 
on the effectiveness of existing safety barriers, the system could experience different 
process end-states ranging from incipient flooding to runaway flooding [22].  
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To simplify the case study, assuming a fixed feed rate and pressure, the differential pressure 
(DP) across different sections of the column is used as the key process characteristic to 
measure the efficiency of the distillation process. A significant increase in DP across any 
section of a distillation column can indicate that the liquid level in the trays in that particular 
section is building, which is an indication of a potential flooding [23]. However, every 
process facility possesses a number of process characteristics that jointly impacts the 
process operational loss (e.g. temperature, DP, flow rate and product composition for a 
column). Development of multivariate loss functions for multiple dependent key process 
characteristics is a subject of an ongoing research by the authors.  
Figure 5.4 shows the simplified event tree to identify different process states and loss 
scenarios due to DP deviation. For the sake of simplicity, control system, alarms, operator 
intervention, and emergency shutdown system (ESD) are considered as the only existing 
safety barriers. Based on the performance of these safety barriers, the column experiences 
different loss scenarios (Figure 5.4). The description of each loss scenario are presented in 
the following sections.  
 
Figure 5.4. Event tree for DP deviations in the distillation column 
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5.5.2. Scenario 0: Normal Operation  
During normal operation of the column, a normal distribution of the DP across the stripping 
section of the column with mean µ0 = 2 and inherent standard deviation σ0 = 0.25 in inches 
of H2O is assumed. The target DP is considered as DPT = 2 inches of H2O. The unit 
expected Class 0 operational loss is obtained as  * . .0O PE L = $0.89/bbl for column 
overpressure and  * . .0U PE L = $1.11/bbl for under-pressure scenarios. Then, using Equation 
(5.1) and the 20,000 bbl/day production rate, the accumulated Class 0 loss is obtained as 
. .
Scenario 0
O PL = $742/hour and 
. .
Scenario 0
U PL = $925/hour. 
The calculated Class 0 loss is the loss due to inherent process variability resulting from 
control performance due to external disturbances and limitations on control action. It may 
be possible to reduce the variability and associated expected loss through improved control 
system performance, reduced measurement error, or advanced control functionality.  
 
5.5.3. Scenario 1: Incipient Flooding—Restored Process 
When the relative flow rates of the vapor and liquid are such that the drag force from the 
upward vapor flow is greater than or equal to the gravity force, the liquid stops flowing 
down the column. This condition is called incipient flooding [22]. The off-target operation 
of the column during flooding conditions causes the operational loss due to degradation of 
product quality. Equation (5.2) and the proposed MC method can be used to determine the 
Class I distribution.  
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5.5.4. Scenario 2: Runaway Flooding—Stopped Process 
In Scenario 2, failure of the operator to correct the process fault triggers the runaway 
flooding. To avoid unsafe conditions and prevent damage to upstream equipment due to 
the column overflow, the high-high alarm and ESD system are implemented. This 
condition is referred to as abnormal process Type 2, where the system experiences 
operational (Class I) and business interruption (Class II) losses.  
 
5.5.5. Scenario 3: Runaway Flooding—Loss of Containment 
In Scenario 3, after failure of all existing safety barriers, a hypothetical incident in the 
distillation column is considered, where a runaway flooding resulted in column failure and 
material release. It is assumed that the flammable released hydrocarbons eventually found 
an ignition source, resulted in fire and explosion in the distillation unit. Deviation of the 
distillation column DP from its target value prior to the time τLOC caused operational loss 
primarily due to production of off-specification products and increased energy usage. 
During the distillation section shutdown, the organization’s lost market share resulted in 
business interruption loss. Also, the attracted media attention and resulting negative public 
perception of the organization’s safety performance and the lost market share imposed 
additional reputational loss. The loss of containment and subsequent fire and explosion 
caused event losses including human health loss, asset loss, and environmental cleanup 
loss.  
Figure 5.5 shows the estimated distributions for different loss elements. The operational 
loss is estimated using the INLF. The business interruption insurance (BII) approach that 
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organizations use to propose business interruption claims to insurance companies is used 
to determine the business interruption loss. The Weibull distribution is used to represent 
the reputational loss, where the distribution parameters were estimated based on a scenario-
based approach and management interviews. The component damage area is used to 
estimate the asset loss. The human health loss is calculated based on the estimated 
personnel injury consequence area along with the reported value of statistical life (VSL) in 
the literature. The environmental loss is considered as negligible assuming that the majority 
of the spill volume of fluid does not require cleanup due to rapid volatility. The 
distributions in Figure 5.5 are for illustration purposes; the calculation steps for each loss 
element are not within the scope of this work. Since the estimation of individual loss 
elements is not within the scope of this work, these calculations are skipped here to avoid 
repetition and to keep the paper concise. These estimated distributions are used in next 
section to demonstrate the application of the proposed loss aggregation methodology. The 
vertical dashed lines in Figure 5.5 show the 5th percentile (P5), 50th percentile (P50), and 
95th percentile (P95). 
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Figure 5.5. The distillation column loss distributions for Scenario 3. The vertical dashed lines show 
the P5, P50, and P95 
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5.5.6. Loss Aggregation  
Having estimated the individual loss elements for each scenario, aggregation of losses is 
required for Scenarios 2 and 3 that have multiple loss elements in order to determine the 
overall loss. Scenario 3 is selected to demonstrate the application of the proposed loss 
aggregation methodologies. Similar aggregation steps are also applied to Scenario 2.  
 
5.5.6.1. Case 1: Independent Loss Classes with Independent Loss Elements 
The proposed numerical loss aggregation methodology (shown in Figure 5.2) is applied to 
loss Scenario 3 of the distillation column case study. For this purpose, the distributions of 
loss elements are integrated with the proposed MC method. The resulted histogram of the 
overall loss and the associated statistical information are shown in Figure 5.6 in Section 
5.5.6.3. The three vertical lines in Figure 5.6 depict P10, P50, and P90.   
 
5.5.6.2. Case 2: Independent Loss Classes with Dependent Loss Elements 
The Case 2 loss aggregation methodology is used to simulate the dependency among the 
loss data within a loss class using the following three steps:  
Step 1. Estimation of the marginal distributions for each loss element; 
Step 2. Selecting the copula family and correlation parameters; and 
Step 3. Determining the correlations among loss elements. 
In Step 1, the marginal distributions can be estimated by fitting a parametric model 
separately to each loss element dataset. However, a parametric model may not be 
sufficiently flexible. Instead, an empirical model for the marginal distributions is used by 
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computing the empirical inverse CDF. Step 2 involves the selection of copula family and 
estimation of the correlation parameters. As discussed earlier, the t-copula is selected in 
this work to construct the dependence structure among loss elements. 
In Step 3, the correlation coefficients are used to represent the degree of correlation in joint 
loss distributions using copulas. For this purpose, the Kendall’s τk rank correlation 
coefficient is used, which is a function of the copula alone and is independent of the 
marginal distributions of the correlated loss elements. The closed-form expressions for τk 
rank correlation coefficient as a function of its correlating parameters (ρ) are provided in 
the literature [18]. Table 5.3 provides the specified ρ and associated τk rank correlation 
coefficients for the loss Scenario 3. Note that the correlation coefficients lie between 0 and 
1, with higher values representing more interaction and lower values representing fewer 
interactions. The specifications in Table 5.3 are determined using expert knowledge. Based 
on available incident history and system loss performance data, these coefficients can be 
estimated using regression techniques to provide a better estimate of overall loss. 
 
Table 5.3. Case 2 loss aggregation correlation coefficients 
Loss Class  Loss Elements Correlation Parameter (ρ) Kendall’s Coefficient (τk) 
Class II BI
IIl  and 
R
IIl   , 0.75
BI R
II IIl l    , 0.54BI Rk II IIl l   
Class III A
IIIl  and 
HH
IIIl   , 0.82
A HH
III IIIl l    , 0.61A HHk III IIIl l   
 
Using the three step technique discussed above, a t-copula, denoted by , is constructed 
between elements of Class II and III losses with the value of ρ specified in Table 5.3 and 
νC = 1 (the degree of freedom). The developed Class II and Class III joint loss distributions 
, C
tC 
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are then integrated with the MC method to estimate the Case 2 aggregated loss for the loss 
Scenario 3. The resulting histogram of the overall loss and the associated statistical 
information are shown in Figure 5.6. As can be seen from Figure 5.6, the mean and P50 of 
the overall loss are close to those of the Case 1; however, the P10 and variance are changed 
significantly. The variance of the overall loss in Case 2 is about 33% higher than in Case 
1 due to the correlations considered among loss elements. In another words, ignorance of 
the positive correlations among loss elements underestimates the overall loss variance 
significantly. This observation is discussed further in Section 5.5.8 using a sensitivity 
analysis.   
 
5.5.6.3. Case 3: Dependent Loss Classes with Dependent Loss Elements 
In Case 3, the potential dependence among elements from different loss classes is also 
considered. Table 5.4 provides the specified correlation parameter for the Case 3 loss 
aggregation. The correlation parameters between elements of each loss class are assumed 
to be similar to those provided using expert knowledge in Table 5.3 for Case 2.  
Using the same approach discussed for Case 2, a t-copula is constructed among the 
elements of loss classes. Figure 5.6 shows the histogram of the loss data with associated 
statistical information. As can be seen, the variance of overall loss data has a significant 
increase (11% higher than Case 2 and 48% higher than Case 1).  
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Table 5.4. Case 3 loss aggregation correlation coefficients 
Correlation Parameter (ρ) Kendall’s Coefficient (τk) 
                 
1 0.55 0.25 0.45 0.35
0.55 1 0.75 0.65 0.60
0.25 0.75 1 0.65 0.80
0.45 0.65 0.65 1 0.82
0.35 0.60 0.80 0.82 1
BI R A HH
I II II III III
I
BI
II
R
II
A
III
HH
III
l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                 
1 0.37 0.16 0.30 0.23
0.37 1 0.54 0.45 0.41
0.16 0.54 1 0.45 0.59
0.30 0.45 0.45 1 0.61
0.23 0.41 0.59 0.61 1
BI R A HH
I II II III III
I
BI
II
R
II
A
III
HH
III
l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
Mean $15.735×106 $15.659×106 $15.732×106 
Variance 8.812×1013 11.766×1013 13.085×1013 
P10 $7.116×106 $4.928×106 $5.377×106 
P50 $13.341×106 $12.269×106 $12.719×106 
P90 $27.144×106 $28.412×106 $29.596×106 
Figure 5.6. Overall loss for distillation column loss Scenario 3. Left: Case 1—independent loss classes 
with independent loss elements; Middle: Case 2—independent loss classes with dependent loss 
elements; Right: Case 3—dependent loss classes with dependent loss elements 
 
5.5.7. Discussion  
Table 5.5 summarizes the results of the case study. The aggregated losses for Scenario 2 
are estimated following the procedure described for Scenario 3. For the Scenario 2 Case 3 
loss aggregation, the correlation coefficient between the operational loss and business 
interruption loss is estimated as  , 0.45O BII IIl l   based on expert opinion.    
Table 5.5 highlights the necessity of considering the dependence among loss elements. 
Although selection of copula function and estimation of correlation coefficients in Cases 2 
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and 3 require resources, these help to avoid underestimation of the loss variance. For 
practical applications, the Case 1 aggregation approach that considers independent losses 
can be used as a starting point. Then, by analysing the process business performance over 
time and the loss information determined from process incidents, the correlation 
coefficients among loss elements can be captured to implement Cases 2 and 3 aggregation 
approaches. To better understand the impact of dependency on the estimated overall loss 
distribution, a sensitivity analysis is conducted and results are presented in the subsequent 
section. 
 
Table 5.5. Mean (µ) and variance (σ2) of estimated loss values for the distillation column loss 
scenarios 
Loss Type 
Estimated Loss Value 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
O
Il  
µ = $3.05×104 
σ2 = 4.70×109 
µ = $1.41×105 
σ2 = 1.01×1011 
µ = $4.07×105 
σ2 = 8.32×1011 
BI
IIl  
NA* µ = $2.83×105 
σ2 = 1.32×1010 
µ = $9.94×106 
σ2 = 8.12×1013 
R
IIl  
NA NA µ = $5.13×106 
σ2 = 6.25×1012 
A
IIIl  
NA NA µ = $1.63×104 
σ2 = 7.89×107 
HH
IIIl  
NA NA µ = $1.80×105 
σ2 = 4.72×1010 
Overall Loss (Case 1†) µ = $3.05×104 
σ2 = 4.70×109 
µ = $4.23×105 
σ2 = 11.36×109 
µ = $15.74×106 
σ2 = 8.81×1013 
Overall Loss (Case 2††) NA NA 
(Note 1) 
µ = $15.66×106 
σ2 = 11.77×1013 
Overall Loss (Case 3‡) NA µ = $4.23×105 
σ2 = 15.08×109 
µ = $15.73×106 
σ2 = 13.09×1013 
* NA: Not applicable 
†  Case 1: Independent loss classes with independent loss elements 
†† Case 2: Independent loss classes with dependent loss elements 
‡  Case 3: Dependent loss classes with dependent loss elements  
Note 1: Not applicable because each class has only one element for Scenario 2 
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5.5.8. Sensitivity Analysis  
A sensitivity analysis is performed to investigate the effect of the choice of correlation 
coefficient on the simulated overall loss for both positive and negative values of ρ. Table 
5.6 shows the results of 11 experiments conducted with different ρ for t-copula with νC = 
1 to determine the overall business (Class II) loss of Scenario 3. In each experiment, the 
MC method with J = 106 is used to generate the reputational and business interruption 
losses and the copula-based aggregation approach is applied to determine the overall Class 
II loss. Table 5.6 shows the P10, P50, and P90 percentiles along with the estimated 
variance. The variance ratios in Table 5.6 represent the ratio of the overall loss variance of 
the experiments with dependent losses to the variance of the overall loss in experiment 6 
for independent losses (ρ = 0).  
As can be seen from Table 5.6, as the value of ρ decreases from 0.95 to -0.95, the mean of 
the overall Class II loss remains almost constants; however, the variance, and therefore the 
variance ratios, decrease. The slight difference between the mean values is due to the 
sampling error, which can be reduced by increasing the number of simulation runs. 
Roughly speaking, the amount of dependence measures the degree to which large or small 
values of correlated losses associate with each other. In another words, dependence is 
different from overlapping structure among losses. While dependence affects the variance, 
the overlapping structure may affect the expected value of the overall loss. The study of 
overlapping structure could be a subject for further study, especially for the Class II loss 
where the lost market share may cause a potential overlap between reputational and 
business interruption loss elements.   
131 
Table 5.6 also shows the uncertainty factor (UF), defined as the ratio of P90 to P10 for 
different correlation coefficient values. The UF also decreases as the value of ρ decreases. 
Thus, it can be concluded that for positively correlated losses, which is the case for most 
process facilities operations, the uncertainty of the estimated overall loss is more sensitive 
to the uncertainty of model input parameters. Therefore, more research and resources will 
be required to choose less uncertain input parameters for the case of positively correlated 
losses, compared to independent and negatively correlated losses. 
 
Table 5.6. The mean, variance ratio and percentiles of overall Class II loss for Scenario 3 for 
different ρ values 
Experiment ρ Mean 
Percentiles 
Variance 
Variance 
Ratio UF P10 P50 P90 
1 0.95 $15.06×106 $4.52×106 $12.11×106 $29.40×106 1.257×10
14 1.48 11.03 
2 0.8 $15.13×106 $4.81×106 $12.26×106 $28.86×106 1.192×10
14 1.37 10.23 
3 0.6 $15.10×106 $5.25×106 $12.33×106 $28.11×106 1.108×10
14 1.29 9.31 
4 0.4 $15.13×106 $5.59×106 $12.44×106 $27.69×106 1.037×10
14 1.22 8.50 
5 0.2 $15.11×106 $6.11×106 $12.48×106 $27.01×106 9.633×10
13 1.10 7.64 
6 0 $15.01×106 $6.65×106 $12.53×106 $26.21×106 8.934×10
13 1.00 6.78 
7 -0.2 $15.13×106 $7.34×106 $12.60×106 $25.84×106 8.288×10
13 0.94 5.96 
8 -0.4 $15.04×106 $7.98×106 $12.57×106 $25.08×106 7.643×10
13 0.87 5.12 
9 -0.6 $15.02×106 $8.77×106 $12.52×106 $24.39×106 6.809×10
13 0.79 4.29 
10 -0.8 $15.00×106 $9.62×106 $12.43×106 $23.68×106 6.094×10
13 0.70 3.52 
11 -0.95 $15.05×106 $10.39×106 $12.36×106 $23.27×106 5.393×10
13 0.61 2.95 
 
5.6. Conclusions  
The chemical process systems deteriorate and eventually move to an out-of-control state 
due to the occurrence of assignable causes. In the present study, the time-dependent process 
deterioration with non-constant mean and variance of process variables is studied. Methods 
are provided to estimate the time period at which a process may experience different loss 
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scenarios. The estimated time periods are required to quantify the overall magnitude of 
time-dependent losses such as operational and business losses.  
The aggregation of multiple loss elements is also required to quantify the overall loss for 
scenarios with multiple loss elements. This paper considers three different cases of loss 
aggregation, including independent losses, dependent loss elements assuming independent 
loss classes, and dependent loss elements and classes. A copula-based loss aggregation 
methodology is proposed to consider the dependence structure among losses. Both linear 
aggregation of independent losses and a copula-based approach are applied in a distillation 
column case study. The t-copula is used to model the dependence structure due to its 
flexibility in modeling skewed distributions. 
The results demonstrate the benefits of considering the correlation among losses to avoid 
misestimation of the overall loss variance. For the case of the distillation column case 
study, it is shown that ignoring the potential positive correlation among losses causes 
under-estimation of the overall loss variance by %48 compared to the simplified case of 
independent losses. The sensitivity of the approach to the choice of correlation parameters 
is investigated. The results show that increasing the correlation among loss elements does 
not affect the mean of the overall loss, however, it does affect the variance as the variance 
also increases significantly.  
The case study results also highlight the potential for modelling errors if a wrong 
combination of copula function and correlation coefficient is selected. Therefore, it is 
imperative for the user to select the dependence structure that is most reflective of the 
system under analysis using the system’s business performance and loss information from 
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process incident history. While the theoretical properties of copula functions are now fairly 
well understood, inference for copula models is, to an extent, still under development. The 
literature on the subject is yet to be collated in a future study, with a focus on choosing the 
best copula and estimating the copula parameters for application in process industries. 
The paper demonstrates the benefits of copula modeling in estimating the overall loss. 
Although the implementation of the copula-based method adds to the complexity of the 
model, it enables a better description of the organization’s loss exposure by taking into 
consideration the dependencies among losses. Integration of the Bayesian approach with 
the proposed loss models is another subject for future research to update the probability of 
different losses based on new information from the system. The ultimate goal is to develop 
a dynamic risk assessment methodology for process facilities by combining the proposed 
overall loss model in this paper with a dynamic probability analysis approach. The 
developed dynamic risk assessment tool would be more effective in generation of early 
warnings and accident predictions.   
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6. PROBABILISTIC MODELLING OF BUSINESS INTERRUPTION 
AND REPUTATIONAL LOSSES FOR PROCESS FACILITIES5 
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Ahmed, I developed the conceptual model. I conducted the literature review and proposed 
alternate solutions to model business losses, including reputational loss. I prepared the first 
draft of the manuscript and subsequently revised the manuscript based on the co-
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developing and testing the concepts/models, reviewed and corrected the models and results, 
and contributed in preparing, reviewing and revising the manuscript. The co-author Salim 
Ahmed contributed through support in development, testing and improvement of the 
models. Salim Ahmed also assisted in reviewing and revising the manuscript. 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents probabilistic models to estimate business losses due to abnormal 
situations in process facilities. The main elements of business loss are identified as business 
interruption loss and reputational loss. The business interruption insurance approach is 
used to model business interruption loss. The sub-elements of business interruption loss 
                                                          
5 Hashemi et al. Process Safety Progress 2015;34:373–82 
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are modeled based on expert knowledge using Program Evaluation Review Technique 
(PERT), which are then integrated using the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation approach. The 
reputational loss is considered as Weibull distributed and the parameters are estimated by 
applying a scenario-based approach. Copula functions are then used to develop the 
distribution of the aggregate loss, considering the correlation between business interruption 
and reputational losses. The application of the loss models is demonstrated using a 
distillation column case study. The models presented here provide a mechanism to monitor 
process facility’s business performance, with associated uncertainties, and to make swift 
operational and safety decisions. This will help to improve process facilities safety 
performance and optimal allocation of resources where they are needed the most.  
Keywords: Loss aggregation; loss modelling; copula; distillation column 
 
6.1. Introduction  
Continued occurrence of major losses in oil and energy sector along with adamant media 
attention as well as the strictly competitive and unstable oil market warn the oil and energy 
industry sector about the importance of managing business and reputational risks. Safe and 
cost effective performance of process facilitates is strongly correlated with the clients’, 
regulators’, and counterparties’ perception of a company’s trustworthiness [1–3]. The 
results of such perception, usually referred as company’s reputation, not only affects the 
company in short term, but also affects growth sustainability in long term. Therefore, 
development of highly sophisticated process loss modelling methodologies has been an 
interesting area of research in recent years. Compared to accidental losses caused by the 
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release of material and energy, business and reputational loss modelling have received 
relatively less attention in the process industries literature. However, cost effective 
operation of process systems is equally important as the safety of operations, and both 
aspects require consideration for management decision making about continued operation 
and sustainable growth. 
The business loss is defined in this work as the failure of an organization owning a process 
plant to generate enough revenue to cover all expenses associated with the process 
operation. The two most common causes for process systems to incur business loss are: (i) 
process shutdown due to process abnormal situation along with the failure of safety 
systems; and (ii) process downtime after an incident. A distinction has been made in this 
work between financial loss and business loss. Financial loss is a general term which refers 
to the expression of different losses (such as operational loss, asset loss, human health loss, 
environmental cleanup loss, as well as business loss) in monetary units. The objective of 
this work is to present methodologies for the modelling of process industries business 
losses. 
Business loss is often difficult to quantify as it depends on several internal and external 
factors and loss is not simply attributed to the affected process unit as part of an overall 
service. The causes of business loss often have a severe impact on the organization in terms 
of business disruption and the service provided to clients, which eventually affects 
reputation [2]. Therefore, in the context of process facilities, business interruption loss and 
reputational loss are identified as the main elements of the business loss.  
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The existing loss modelling approaches for process industries are primarily based on fire, 
explosion, toxic release, and dispersion models [4–9]. The effects of reputational events 
are ignored in almost all existing models and studies. Moreover, in the existing methods to 
estimate the business interruption loss, only interrupted production and associated cost to 
restore the system are considered [4,5,10]. However, other relevant negative consequences 
and compensations such as loss of profit during the recovery period, insurance coverage, 
and fixed operating expenses should also be considered to avoid over/under-estimation of 
the financial consequences.  
There could be a correlation between business interruption loss and reputational loss, which 
causes difficulty in separating them from each other. However, they are modeled separately 
in this work as different approaches are required to model each factor. The business 
interruption loss occurs mainly due to a gap in production, where extended downtime may 
also result in losing customers or market share, thus extending the loss of profit beyond 
production restart [11]. In contrast, the reputational loss occurs primarily due to the 
damaged organization’s trustworthiness in the marketplace after a major incident with 
media coverage takes place [1,2].  
Another contribution of this paper is to address the loss aggregation challenge, when 
different losses are correlated. The application of copula functions in process industries is 
reported recently as a promising tool for loss aggregation [12]. A copula-based approach 
is used in this work to estimate the aggregate business loss, considering the potential 
dependence structure among business interruption loss and reputational loss.   
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The organization of this paper is as follows. The modelling of business interruption loss 
and reputational loss are first discussed in Sections 6.6.2 and 6.6.3, respectively. Then a 
copula-based approach is provided in Section 6.6.4 to estimate the aggregate business loss. 
Finally, the practical application of the methodology is illustrated using a distillation 
process case study, followed by some concluding remarks.  
 
6.2. Modelling of Business Interruption Loss  
In most existing methodologies, the business interruption loss, denoted by LBI in this work, 
is simply calculated based on production hours lost during process downtime multiplied by 
the production cost per hour [5,13]. Consideration of other expenses such as maintenance 
costs, material wastage costs, and material recycling costs are also proposed [4]. A rigorous 
method for estimating LBI should take into account all major affecting factors to ensure 
proper evaluation [11]. 
To provide a better estimate of LBI, this study applies the business interruption insurance 
(BII) approach that organizations use to propose claims to insurance companies [14,15]. 
Table 6.1 shows the elements of the proposed framework to calculate the expected LBI after 
a process downtime. 
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Table 6.1. Elements of business interruption loss (LBI) 
1. Profit loss due to lost production over process downtime in $/day (
dt
profitl ) 
2. Profit loss over recovery period in $/day (
rp
profitl ) 
3. All fixed operating expenses which will NOT be incurred during process downtime in $/day (
dt
foC ) 
 3.1. Regular maintenance costs 
 3.2. Building services 
 3.3. Utility bills 
 3.4. Rent (depends on lease agreement conditions during emergencies)  
 3.5. Expected payroll for staff who will not be employed during the indemnity period 
 3.6. Other 
4. Expected costs to fix the damage and restore the business in $ (
dC ) 
 4.1. Start-up cost 
 4.2. Shutdown cost 
 4.3. Service costs (maintenance worker costs and contractor costs) 
 4.4. Material costs (spare parts acquisition, transportation, and spare parts inventory costs) 
 4.5. Material wastage and material recycling costs  
 4.6. Other 
5. Business interruption insurance coverage (if applicable) in $ ( IC ) 
 
The first two elements in Table 6.1 measure the lost profit. Profit loss due to process 
downtime  dtprofitl  is to be determined as the expected gross revenues from sales of product 
over a period of time by projecting the past 12 to 24 months of the organization’s sales 
forward, minus expected changes in inventory values, material use and transportation costs. 
Profit loss over the recovery period, denoted by , occurs mainly due to lost market 
share and is determined by comparing the organization’s business performance in the past 
12 to 24 months before process downtime with the performance over the recovery period. 
If there is not enough past data available, for example for the case of a new business, the 
expert knowledge based on the data available from the process under study as well as data 
from similar processes can be used as a starting value to estimate profit loss. These loss 
rp
profitl
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estimates should be revised as more information from the business performance becomes 
available over time.   
 The third element in Table 6.1 is fixed operating expenses ( ) and is defined as those 
expenses which will not be incurred because of the process shutdown and include different 
sub-elements as shown in Table 6.1. The expected costs to fix the damage, the fourth 
element in Table 6.1 denoted by Cd, are the lump sum expenses associated with repairing 
the damaged facility. Finally, insurance coverage (IC) is defined as the percentage of the 
LBI that will be recovered by the insurer. 
Severity distribution is considered for the loss elements in Table 6.1 due to their stochastic 
nature. For this purpose, the severity is estimated through a distribution known as Program 
(or Project) Evaluation Review Technique (PERT). The PERT distribution is used in 
project and cost planning for modeling expert estimates of expected time, cost and other 
variables. The PERT distribution is a special case of the Beta distribution that uses three 
parameters: minimum, most likely (mode), and maximum values. Typically, sampling 
from the Beta distribution requires minimum and maximum values (scale) and two shape 
parameters, v and w. The PERT distribution uses the mode or most likely parameter to 
generate the shape parameters v and w [16]. 
In the proposed method, the expert is asked to estimate three values (minimum, most likely 
and maximum) for each element in Table 6.1. Then, a set of modified PERT distributions 
is plotted using Equation (6.1) and the expert is asked to select the shape that fits his/her 
opinion most accurately: 
dt
foC
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

      (6.1) 
where x is any of the elements in Table 6.1 and B(v, w) is a Beta function with parameters 
of the Beta distribution as: 
mode min
max min
1 P
x x
v
x x

 
   
 
       (6.2) 
and  
max mode
max min
1 P
x x
w
x x

 
   
 
.        (6.3) 
The Equations (6.1) to (6.3) are used to determine PERT distributions for different 
elements in Table 6.1. In the standard PERT, P  equals 4. By increasing the value of P , 
the distribution becomes progressively more peaked and concentrated around the mode 
(and therefore less uncertain). Conversely, by decreasing the P  the distribution becomes 
flatter and more uncertain [17]. The default P  = 4 can be used as the starting value to 
develop the PERT distributions. 
By extending the estimated elements in Table 6.1 over the affected time, the overall 
business interruption loss is determined as: 
 dt dt rpBI dt profit fo d rp profitl l C C l IC            (6.4) 
where Δτrp and Δτdt are the recovery period and process downtime, respectively. Small 
letter l represents individual observations from a random loss variable L.  Process 
downtime is defined as the following:  
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 For a stopped process with no loss of containment, process downtime is the time 
period between activation of the emergency shutdown device (ESD) due to a 
process fault and the diagnosis and correction of the fault. 
 For a failed system that has experienced a release, process downtime is the time 
period between process shutdown and the time that the damaged equipment is 
repaired. An allowance should be made for the drawing up of new building plans, 
construction time, locating new premises, ordering, importing and installing new 
machinery. 
The recovery period is the time span that the organization considers it would take from the 
production restart to restoring the business income to the same position it had before the 
loss occurred. An exponential distribution is considered for both Δτdt and Δτrp. The 
exponential distribution is often used to model the time between events that happen with a 
constant occurrence rate at a random point in time. For the case of non-constant rates, 
distributions with a time-dependent hazard function, such as Weibull and lognormal, can 
be used [18]. The Dow Fire and Explosion Index is a typical method of estimating 
downtime after a fire or explosion [11], which can be used to estimate process downtime 
for applicable scenarios. Regarding the recovery period, when lacking information, Δτrp = 
0.5×Δτdt can be used as a starting value. This value can be revised based on expert 
knowledge and failure history.  
Having estimated the distribution of different elements in Equation (6.4), the Monte Carlo 
(MC) technique is used to model the distribution of overall 
BIL  by repeating the following 
steps for J realizations: 
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Step 1. Generate random variables representing each of the five elements in Table 6.1 
from PERT distribution with the estimated parameters v and w. 
Step 2. Generate random variables from exponential distribution to calculate jdt  and 
j
rp . 
Step 3. Determine the jBIl  from Equation (6.4) and using loss elements simulated in 
Step 1 and 
j
dt  and 
j
rp  simulated in Step 2. 
From the simulated loss distribution, the expected overall 
BIL  can be obtained as the mean 
(or the median) of the sample 1 ,..., JBI BIl l   : 
 
1
1 J j
BI BI
j
E L l
J 
  .        (6.5) 
 
6.3. Modelling of Reputational Loss  
The reputational loss is the missing element in almost all existing consequence analysis 
methods. There is no official definition of reputational loss and no loss measuring 
technique universally accepted by regulators or the industry. The reputational component 
is considered in this work as an intangible asset and an important part of a business 
involving a process facility. The effects of a reputational event may include, but are not 
limited to, the following [1–3]: 
 Lost market share due to a change in the clients’ preference to choose an alternate 
competitor. 
 A fall in the company’s share price. 
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 A negative impact on employees’ confidence in the company’s trustworthiness and 
difficulties in attracting highly-skilled human resources. 
 An increased demand for greater disclosure and a need for quality control 
reassurance forced by regulators and rating agencies. 
 For the case of major accidents, a negative impact of the entire sector’s business.  
The following section describes the methodology and the shortcomings of the share price 
volatility approach usually used in the literature to measure reputational loss. Then, Section 
6.3.2 proposes an alternate scenario-based methodology to model reputational loss. 
 
6.3.1. Share Price Volatility Approach   
Soprano et al. [2] measured reputational loss of financial institutions as a function of the 
company’s share price values. Way et al. [1] reviewed existing literature and also provided 
models to measure reputational loss as a function of share price volatility for process 
facilities. The assumption in share price volatility approach is that reputational events 
directly impact the company’s market value [2]. One limitation of this approach is that it 
can only be applied for listed financial institutions. Moreover, the effect of insurance 
coverage is not considered in the share price volatility approach, which can result in an 
overestimation of the reputational loss. Other drawbacks of this approach include its 
dependence on availability of firm figures to represent the hard losses (such as products 
and assets, fines, and others) at specific points in time, and the difficulty to evolve the 
model into a predictive method [1]. Moreover, the results of a share price volatility 
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approach could be misleading as the share values might be affected by other risk factors 
and other forces at play, not only by the reputational component [2].   
 
6.3.2. Scenario-Based Approach  
An alternative scenario-based approach for modeling reputational loss (
RL ) is applied in 
this paper to address the limitations of the share price volatility approach. The practical 
implementation of scenario-based approaches to measure the reputational loss has been 
reported in banking literature [2]. Figure 6.1 shows the framework for the scenario-based 
approach to measure reputational loss for process industries. As shown in Figure 6.1, firstly 
the critical processes which could suffer from reputational events should be identified. 
Then, for each critical process, the reputational scenarios are determined. A reputational 
scenario is defined as a hypothetical event that has not occurred but which could impact 
the organization. The next step includes carrying out management interviews using 
structured questionnaires. The minimum information that should be gathered for each 
identified scenario using interviews includes the average and variance of the loss amount 
and the potential insurance coverage. This information is then used to determine the 
expected reputational loss for each scenario. 
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Figure 6.1. The proposed framework to estimate the reputational loss for process facilities 
 
The severity of reputational loss is estimated through a Weibull distribution with the 
following probability density function [2]: 
      1 expw ww w w
w
R R Rf l l l
 
 


        (6.6) 
where βw and θw are the parameters of the Weibull distribution. The parameters of the 
distribution will be estimated using the empirical mean and the variance of loss data. The 
mean and the variance values, obtained from the questionnaire for management interviews, 
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are converted into the shape and scale parameters of the Weibull distribution using the 
following equations: 
1
1R w
w
L 

 
   
 
,        (6.7) 
2
2 2 2 11 1
RL w
w w
 
 
     
                 
     (6.8) 
where Γ is the gamma function. The loss distribution is simulated by applying the MC 
technique to draw J realizations from the severity distribution which results in a sample of 
simulated losses 1 ,..., JR Rl l   . Protecting organizations against reputational losses is a 
relatively new service provided by some insurance companies [19]. Insurance coverage, if 
applicable, can be taken into account by applying an adjustment factor to the simulated loss 
samples. It is assumed that a fraction, αins, of the loss could be recovered (0 ≤ αins ≤ 1); then 
the loss samples are adjusted as follows [2]: 
   1( ) 1 ,..., 1
J
R ins R ins R insL l l        . 
From the loss distribution, the expected reputational loss can be obtained as the mean (or 
the median) of the sample 1
( ) ( ),...,
J
R ins R insl l   : 
  ( )
1
1 J j
R R ins
j
E L l
J 
  .        (6.9) 
If more than one scenario is identified, considering independence among scenarios, it is 
sufficient to add the simulated loss samples obtained from each scenario.  
Due to the nature of the reputational loss and its strong correlation with other business loss 
elements, the application of a qualitative approach based on expert-knowledge is a more 
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viable option, compared to using quantitative methods like share price volatility. The main 
advantages of the interview-based approach to estimate the distribution parameters include, 
but are not limited to: 
 Developing a questionnaire for interviews is flexible and easy to tailor to the 
process organization. 
 Identifying areas of weakness and the need to focus on specific topics after a few 
interviews. 
 The structure of the approach makes it easy for people to understand and participate 
in the interviews.   
However, like any other expert knowledge-based analysis, the shortcoming of the proposed 
approach is the potential inconsistency of the assessment results. In order to tackle this 
challenge, each questionnaire can also be completed by managers, auditors, customers, and 
business specialists. Although this may add to the complexity of the assessment, this will 
make the assessment results robust and consistent. Proper training of the assessment team 
and all contributors involved in the reputational loss study is another key requirement to 
ensure successful implementation of the proposed method. Assigning an independent and 
trained reputational loss assessment team, along with a structured and auditable assessment 
procedure and management support, will ensure successful implementation of the proposed 
methodology.   
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6.4. Aggregate Business Loss 
6.4.1. Copula-Based Loss Aggregation 
The modeling of reputational loss (LR) and business interruption losses (LBI) is strictly 
related. The LBI usually has a reputational impact and managerial decisions affecting LR 
will impact business performance. Ignorance of the potential correlation between LBI and 
LR could result in misestimation of the aggregate loss [12].  The aggregation and combined 
management of losses are active areas of research in financial and banking literature [20–
22], however, it has received less attention in the process industry’s literature.  
In an earlier work by the authors [12], the concept of copula functions is used to describe 
the joint distribution of dependent random loss variables and develop aggregate loss. With 
copula modeling, the marginal dependent losses with any distributions can be combined. 
Let LBI and LR be random variables representing business interruption loss and reputational 
loss with individual (marginal) loss distributions F and G and joint distribution L. Based 
on Sklar’s theorem, the joint distribution L can be represented as: 
      , , ,BI R BI RL l l C F l G l       (6.10) 
in terms of a unique function C, called a copula [23], for all real values of lBI an lR. The 
main advantage provided to the risk practitioner by this representation is that the selection 
of an appropriate model for the dependence between losses, represented by C, can then 
proceed independently from the choice of the marginal loss distributions, F and G. For an 
introduction to the theory of copulas and a large selection of related models, the reader may 
refer, for example, to Nelsen [23], and an earlier work by the authors [12] in which process 
loss aggregation is considered. 
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6.4.2. Correlation and Copulas 
When analyzing Gaussian data, means and variances–covariances could be modeled 
separately, and the dependency is uniquely characterized by Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient that is intrinsically related with linear dependence and the normal distribution. 
For other types of data, in general, this is not valid anymore and a rank correlation 
coefficient, such as the Kendall’s τ, is required [24]. Rank correlation τ takes values 
1,1   , where −1 signals a perfect negative correlation, 1 displays a perfect positive 
correlation and 0 shows no correlation.  The possibility of using rank-correlation 
coefficients, which are insensitive to the marginal distributions, is a useful property of 
copula modeling. 
 
6.4.3. Copula Selection 
It has been shown that the Student-t copula (or simply t-copula) may be considered as an 
appropriate copula to model the dependence structure for risk management and loss 
modelling as it is able to model both the center and tail dependencies of skewed 
distributions [2,22]. The t-copula is used in this work to construct the dependence structure 
among losses. Developing a framework to correctly and efficiently estimate the copula 
parameters and to discriminate between competing copula models for a specific application 
is a subject for an ongoing research by the authors.  
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6.4.4. Loss Aggregation Methodology  
Consider u1 = F(lBI) and u2 = G(lR), where F and G are the cumulative distribution functions 
(CDFs), associated to random loss variables LBI and LR. A t-copula is constructed between 
LBI and LR starting from a bivariate t distribution and degree of freedom vt, denoted by  
, ,tvT  and transformation using the corresponding CDFs. Then, the developed bivariate t 
distribution is parameterized with the Kendall’s rank correlation τ. Therefore, the joint 
business loss distribution determined from marginal distributions of LBI and LR using t-
copula is:  
           1 21 1, , ,, ,t t t t
t
v v v vBI R BI RL C F l l T T u T ul l G 
  ,   (6.11) 
where , t
t
vC  denotes a t-copula with Kendall’s rank correlation τ and degree of freedom vt. 
Using the above procedure to construct dependence structure among losses, the aggregate 
loss distribution is then obtained by using the MC method and repeating the following three 
steps for J times: 
Step 1. Simulate an observation from a bivariate random vector  1 2,j ju u  with 
uniformly distributed marginal on [0, 1] from a t-copula , t
t
vC .  
Step 2. Apply the CDFs F-1 and G-1 to  1 2,j ju u  simulated in the previous step to 
determine a loss scenario as    11 1j jBIl u F u  and     12 2j jRl u G u . 
Step 3. Obtain the total value of the loss scenario as:    1 2j jj BI RL l u l u  . 
The empirical distribution of the business loss includes the simulated samples  1,..., JL L .  
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6.5. Case Study: Distillation Column 
The proposed business loss modelling method is applied to a distillation column case study, 
as modified from Hashemi et al. [12]. In this case study, a fixed feed rate and pressure are 
assumed for the distillation column operation. Therefore, the differential pressure (DP) 
across the column can be used as the key process variable to monitor the operation of the 
distillation column. Figure 6.2 shows the safety barriers in place to prevent DP deviations 
and potential flooding conditions in the column. Failure of the safety barriers can cause the 
column DP to exceed a critical threshold that eventually triggers flooding conditions. The 
simplified event tree to identify different process end states due to DP deviation and 
associated loss scenarios are shown in Figure 6.2.  
 
Initiating 
Event 
Safety Barriers 
Process State 
Loss 
Scenario Control 
System 
Hi Alarm and 
Operator Action 
Hi-Hi Alarm 
and ESD 
    
Normal operation Scenario 0 
        
DP Deviation 
    Restored process Scenario 1 
      
      Runaway flooding; 
Stopped process 
Scenario 2 
       
 
 
     
 
 
 
    
 
     Runaway flooding; 
Column failure 
Scenario 3 
    
Figure 6.2. The simplified event tree for the distillation column case study 
 
As shown in Figure 6.2, four different loss scenarios are identified for this case study based 
on the performance of the safety barriers. As no process downtime and reputational event 
have occurred in loss Scenario 0 (normal process) and Scenario 1 (restored process after a 
DP deviation) in Figure 6.2, zero business interruption loss is assumed for these two 
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situations. However, the system experiences business loss in Scenarios 2 and 3 due to the 
runaway flooding and the resulted process downtime. The description of loss Scenarios 2 
and 3 and the calculation of the associated business interruption loss are provided in the 
following sections.  
 
6.5.1. Scenario 2—Process Shutdown 
In Scenario 2, upon failure of the control system and operator to correct the DP deviation, 
the high-high alarm and the emergency shutdown device (ESD) system are activated to 
shut down the process and avoid unsafe conditions. This process shutdown resulted in 
business loss due to lost production and associated expenses. However, as no major 
accident and reputational event have occurred, the business interruption loss (LBI) due to 
stopped production is identified as the only element of the business loss.  
The business interruption insurance (BII) questionnaire approach presented in Section 6.2 
is used to determine the minimum, the most likely (mode) and the maximum values for 
different LBI elements as identified in Table 6.1. These values are determined based on 
expert estimates by investigating the past 12 months of the organization’s business 
performance and maintenance history and are presented in Table 6.2. For instance, the Cd 
in Table 6.2 (the total expected cost to correct the process fault and fix the damaged 
equipment after the process shutdown) is estimated using expert knowledge based on the 
recorded cost for similar previous maintenance activities. All other loss elements in Table 
6.2 are estimated similarly. The parameters of Beta function (vi and wi) in Table 6.2 are 
determined from Equations (6.2) and (6.3).  
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Based on the process maintenance history, the process downtime after a shutdown is 
estimated using exponential distribution with 1
dt
 = 34 hours. From the organization’s 
business performance, the mean of the business recovery period after a process shutdown 
due to activation of safety barriers is estimated as 1 10.5 17
rp dt 
       hours. Using the 
MC method proposed in Section 6.2 and Equations (6.4), the overall business interruption 
loss is simulated (see Figure 6.3 for the results).  
 
Table 6.2. Business interruption loss elements for the distillation column case study. All monetary 
values are in thousand US dollars 
  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Loss 
Element  
Description Min. Mode Max. vi wi 
 
Min. Mode Max. vi wi 
dt
profitl  
Profit loss due to 
production loss over 
process downtime (on a 
daily basis) 
60 130 180 3.33 2.67  60 130 180 3.33 2.67 
dt
foC  
All fixed operating 
expenses which will not 
be incurred because of 
the process downtime 
(on a daily basis) 
25 38 62 2.41 3.59  25 38 62 2.41 3.59 
dC  
Total expected costs to 
fix the damage and 
restore the process 
150 215 250 3.60 2.40  650 905 1,215 3.74 2.26 
rp
profitl  
Profit loss over recovery 
period (on a daily basis) 
5 8 11 3.00 3.00  14 25 39 2.76 3.24 
IC Business interruption 
insurance coverage 
0 0 0 - -  0 0 0 - - 
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Figure 6.3. The distillation column business interruption loss for Scenario 2. The vertical dashed lines 
show the 5th percentile (P5), P50, and P95 
 
6.5.2. Scenario 3—Loss of Containment  
In Scenario 3, a hypothetical incident in the distillation column is considered, where 
runaway flooding resulted in the column failure and material release. It is assumed that the 
steam flow controller is failed and the reboiler heat duty started increasing at a constant 
rate. Increasing the reboiler heat duty caused more vapor to be boiled up, which increased 
the vapor flow up the column. Eventually, the column DP exceeded a critical threshold and 
triggered flooding. The operator failed to stop the runaway flooding and the column 
overflowed and sent liquid into the distillate process lines. When the hydrocarbon liquid 
overflowed into the outlet line of the column, the line ruptured due to mechanical shock. 
The hydrocarbon liquid and vapor mixture released from the outlet line became an 
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explosive mixture that drifted within the process area prior to being ignited by a heater. 
The incident included the fire in the crude distillation section and damage to several pieces 
of equipment and connecting pipelines with subsequent process shutdown. 
During the distillation section shutdown, the production loss and consequent organization’s 
lost market share resulted in business interruption loss. The attracted media attention and 
its negative impact on the public perception of the organization’s safety performance 
imposed additional reputational loss. The estimation of the Scenario 3 LBI and LR are 
provided in the following sections. The loss of containment and subsequent fire and 
explosion caused accidental losses including human health loss, asset loss, and 
environmental cleanup loss. Estimation of these accidental losses is not within the scope 
of this paper. 
 
6.5.2.1. Scenario 3—Business Interruption Loss 
Table 6.2 shows the minimum, the most likely (mode), and the maximum values for 
different LBI elements after the incident in the distillation column, determined based on 
expert estimates. As can be seen from Table 6.2, the expected cost to fix the damage and 
restore the process has a significantly higher value for Scenario 3 compared to Scenario 2 
because of the extensive fire and explosion damage to the surrounding equipment in 
Scenario 3. The calculated Beta function parameters that are used to develop the PERT 
distributions are shown in Table 6.2. From the organization’s business performance, the 
mean of the process downtime and business recovery period are estimated as 
1 60
dt
   
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and 
1 120
rp
   days, respectively. Figure 6.4 illustrates the results of the MC simulation 
for overall business interruption loss based on Equation (6.4) and with J = 106.  
 
 
Figure 6.4. The distillation column business interruption loss for Scenario 3 
 
6.5.2.2. Scenario 3—Reputational Loss 
The severity of reputational loss (LR) is estimated through a Weibull distribution using 
Equation (6.6). The empirical mean and variance of RL  are obtained from a questionnaire 
using hypothetical management interviews as 62.00 10RL   and 
2 120.16 10
RL
   . Using 
Equations (6.7) and (6.8), these values are converted into the shape and scale parameters 
of the Weibull distribution as βw = 5.79 and θw = $2.16×106. After estimating the Weibull 
distribution parameters, the distribution of RL  is determined using the MC method with J 
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= 106 realizations. Zero reputational insurance coverage is assumed for this case study. 
Figure 6.5 shows the result of the MC simulation of RL  distribution.   
 
 
Figure 6.5. Reputational loss for distillation column case study Scenario 3 
 
6.5.3. Uncertainty Analysis Methodology 
This paper addresses the uncertainty in the proposed loss models through development of 
probability distributions for the input parameters and model outputs. For example, the 
application of the proposed PERT distributions aids in estimation of the distribution for 
subjective LBI sub-elements based on expert estimates.  
Having estimated different loss distributions, various percentiles of the distribution on the 
simulated loss can be extracted. The nth percentile (Pn) is the level of loss that is exceeded 
with a probability of  100 n  percent. The uncertainty is then characterized by the P5, 
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P50, and P95 of the uncertainty distribution on each of the loss distributions considered. 
The extent of the uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty factor (UF) and is presented 
using the ratio of the P95 to P5 percentiles [25]. The UF has a value equal or greater than 
1, with smaller values of UF representing less uncertain estimated loss. 
 
6.5.4. Discussion of Results 
Table 6.3 summarizes the results of the case study, including the P5, P50, P95, and UF for 
loss elements of each scenario. The region between P5 and P95 of each loss is the area with 
90% confidence of containing the true loss value. The UF size reflects the extent by which 
the loss model outputs may be affected by the input parameters values. The higher UF 
reflects the larger uncertainty associated with estimating the input elements of each loss 
model. This method of presenting the uncertainty shows the extent to which the uncertainty 
could be reduced by allocating resources required to better estimate the parameter values 
and to reduce the parameter uncertainties.  
 
Table 6.3. The value of estimated loss elements for the distillation column (all monetary values are in 
million US dollars; UF is unitless) 
 Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Loss 
Element 
StD* Mean P5 P50 P95 UF 
 
StD Mean P5 P50 P95 UF 
BIl  0.133 0.282 0.170 0.251 0.424 2.49 
 
8.997 9.926 1.796 7.154 27.443 15.28 
Rl  0 0 0 0 0 NA 
 
2.502 5.122 1.459 4.880 9.619 6.59 
* Note: StD denotes standard deviation. 
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As can be seen from Table 6.3, Scenario 2 with a process shutdown of a few days’ length 
has considerably less business interruption loss amount in comparison to Scenario 3 which 
has several months of process downtime. A short process shutdown to correct the process 
fault and restore the process may not even be reflected in local media. These types of 
incidents have minimal reputational impact as a reasonable number of unplanned process 
shutdowns might be expected for a given process plant as long as they do not have any 
severe impact on people, properties and the environment. However, the loss of containment 
and subsequent fire and explosion in Scenario 3 with potentially severe consequences are 
usually reflected in national (or international) media with a negative impact on the 
reputation of the organization. Incidents similar to Scenario 3 involve several loss classes 
with different levels of severity, including business as well as accidental losses due to 
potential hazard scenarios. For such incidents, the loss models presented in this work can 
be used to model business loss elements. Accidental loss elements can be estimated using 
the well-established fire, explosion and dispersion models in the literature [4–9]. Then, the 
presented copula-based loss aggregation methodology in this work can be applied to 
estimate the overall loss of a given scenario.       
 
6.5.5. Aggregate Business Loss 
The presented copula-based loss aggregation methodology is applied to the loss Scenario 
3 to estimate the aggregate business loss distribution by constructing the dependence 
structure between LBI and LR using the copula function. The marginal inverse CDFs 
required for Step 2 of the MC methodology in Section 6.4.4 can be estimated by fitting a 
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parametric model separately to each loss element dataset. However, a parametric model 
may not be sufficiently flexible. Instead, the empirical inverse CDFs for LBI and LR are 
computed from their empirical marginal distributions. Figure 6.6 shows the inverse CDF 
plots for LBI and LR in Scenario 3, determined from simulated loss datasets in Figures 6.4 
and 6.5, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Inverse CDFs for loss Scenario 3 
 
The next step involves a selection of the copula family and estimation of the rank 
correlation value. As discussed earlier, the t-copula is used in this work to construct the 
dependence structure among losses. The degree of freedom of vt = 1 and the Kendall’s τ 
value of 0.4 are determined using expert knowledge as the starting values. Based on 
available incident history and system loss performance data, these values can be revised 
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using the maximum likelihood evaluation method to provide a better estimate of joint loss 
distribution. 
Figure 6.7 shows the joint loss distribution determined using the presented copula-based 
methodology. Figure 6.7 has histograms alongside a scatter plot to show both the marginal 
loss distributions and the dependence. It may be seen that the marginal histograms in Figure 
6.7 closely match those of the original loss data in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 for BIL  and RL , 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6.7. 1000 simulated business interruption loss and reputational loss data, using t-copula for 
loss Scenario 3 
 
Table 6.4 shows the mean, standard deviation (StD) and different percentiles of the 
aggregate business loss distribution, determined from the proposed three-step MC 
simulation procedure in Section 6.4.4 for J = 106. To highlight the importance of 
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considering a dependence structure, Table 6.4 also shows the aggregate loss by assuming 
independence between BIL  and RL  and simply adding their values.  
 
Table 6.4. The aggregate business loss for the distillation column loss Scenario 3. All monetary values 
are in million US dollars 
Dependence Assumption StD* Mean P5 P50 P95 UF 
Simulated Using a t-
copula 
1, 0.4
t
C
  
 
10.812 15.059 3.600 12.271 36.043 10.01 
Independent Losses 9.348 15.060 5.352 12.663 33.005 6.17 
  
As can be seen from Table 6.4, dependence structure between BIL  and RL  has almost no 
impact on the mean and P50 of the aggregate loss, but it does have a significant impact on 
the standard deviation, distribution extremes (e.g. P5 and P95 values), and the uncertainty 
factor. At first glance, it can be seen that putting effort to collect more information to 
construct the dependence structure between losses has increased the uncertainty of the 
aggregate loss. Although considering the positive dependence structure has increased the 
uncertainty, it provides a more realistic representation of the aggregate loss. In other words, 
ignoring the potential positive correlation among business loss elements, like most of the 
existing loss modelling methodologies, has the risk of under-estimating the aggregate loss 
uncertainty, leading to misallocation of resources.  
 
6.6. Conclusions  
In this study, models are proposed to assess the business loss elements, including business 
interruption loss and reputational loss. In addition to the cost of lost production and asset 
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repairs, the effects of lost market share during the recovery period, insurance coverage, and 
operating expenses are considered in the presented business interruption loss modelling. A 
scenario-based approach is proposed to model reputational loss that uses management 
interviews to identify reputational scenarios and the parameters of the loss distribution. The 
utilization of the MC method in the proposed loss models allows consideration of 
variability in input parameters and representation of loss results in the form of probabilistic 
distributions. The proposed approaches are flexible and can be adapted with respect to the 
level of details required. Depending upon the availability of the information, the user can 
simulate a model using either point-based estimates or probabilistic distributions for each 
variable. A mechanism is proposed to incorporate uncertainties in expert knowledge 
estimates using the PERT distributions and also to assess the uncertainty factor, which is 
determined as the ratio of 5th percentile to 95th percentile. This paper also demonstrates 
the flexibility and strength of copula-based approaches in modelling the dependence among 
losses while estimating the aggregate business loss. 
The proposed models are applied to a distillation column. The results show the flexibility 
of the methodology in modeling business losses and associated uncertainties. The model 
presented for business interruption loss provides deeper understanding of the effects of 
contributing business loss elements, leading to an effective allocation of resources on actual 
loss drivers. Likewise, assessing and monitoring the reputational loss exposure of processes 
will improve relations with clients, investors, and regulators, and strengthen credit risk 
management, which will lead to lower losses and costs. The case study results also show 
that ignoring the potential positive correlation between estimated business interruption and 
166 
reputational losses causes under-estimation of the aggregate loss uncertainty. Therefore, 
care must be taken and resources should be allocated for proper estimation of the 
dependence structure among losses to avoid misestimating of the overall loss.  
Integration of the Bayesian approach with the proposed loss models could be a subject for 
future research to update the loss distributions based on new loss information from the 
system. Future work by the authors will examine the application of the maximum 
likelihood evaluation method for copula parameter estimation and application of the 
information theory for best copula selection. The model is to be extended into a business 
risk assessment of process industries by considering both the frequency and severity 
distributions of losses.   
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7. OPERATIONAL LOSS MODELLING FOR PROCESS 
FACILITIES USING MULTIVARIATE LOSS FUNCTIONS6  
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6 Hashemi et al. Chemical Engineering Research and Design 2015;104:333–45. 
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Abstract  
This paper presents a methodology to develop multivariate loss functions to measure the 
operational loss of process facilities. The proposed methodology uses loss functions to 
provide a model for operational loss due to deviation of key process characteristics from 
their target values. Having estimated the marginal loss functions for each monitored 
process variable, copula functions are then used to link the univariate margins and develop 
the multivariate loss function. The maximum likelihood evaluation method is used to 
estimate the copula parameters. Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) is then applied to 
rank the copula models and choose the best fitting copula. A simulation study is provided 
to demonstrate the efficiency of the copula estimation procedure. The flexibility of the 
proposed approach in using any form of the symmetrical and asymmetrical loss functions 
and the practical application of the methodology are illustrated using a separation column 
case study.   
Key words: Process risk assessment; copula function; multivariate model; process safety; 
distillation column; Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) 
 
7.1. Introduction  
Different sources of variations in a process operation, such as feed specifications, wrong 
settings, control system malfunction and operator error can cause deviation of process 
variables from the specification limits. The subsequent unprofitable process operation 
incurs operational loss, which is defined in this work as the loss due to production of sub-
quality products and increased energy usage resulting from a deviated process variable. 
170 
Process facilities possess different characteristics that jointly impact process operational 
loss. For example, the temperature and differential pressure across a distillation column 
can be used jointly to monitor the operational loss of the distillation system. Thus, 
integrated operational loss modeling of process industries requires understanding the joint 
distribution of all key process characteristics and their correlations.   
The loss function approach is widely used to quantify quality loss in the manufacturing 
industry [1,2] by relating a key characteristic of a system (e.g. product composition) to its 
business performance. More recently, loss functions have been applied to model 
operational loss for process facilities [3]. Choosing and estimating a useful form for the 
marginal loss functions of each process characteristic is often a straightforward task [3,4], 
given that enough loss information from the system is available. For multivariate cases, 
traditionally, the pairwise dependence between loss functions has been described using 
traditional families of loss functions. The two most common models occurring in this 
context are the multivariate quadratic loss function (QLF) [5,6] and the multivariate 
inverted normal loss function (INLF) [7,8]. For instance, Spiring [7] proposed the 
following equation for bivariate cases with two parameters for which INLF can be used to 
represent operational loss: 
     1
1
1 exp
2
L EML
         
  
Y Y Τ Γ Y Τ      (7.1) 
where Y and T are 2 × 1 column vectors of key process characteristics under scrutiny and 
associated target values, respectively. EML is the maximum estimated loss and Γ is a 2 × 
2 scaling matrix (shape parameter) relating deviation from target to loss for both 
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parameters. The main limitation of this approach is that the individual behaviour of the 
marginal loss functions must then be characterized by the same parametric family of loss 
functions. This restriction has limited their useful application in practical situations. 
Moreover, other than the QLF and INLF, loss functions usually do not have a convenient 
multivariate generalization. 
According to a review of the existing literature in the area of multivariate loss functions 
conducted by Hashemi et al. [3], it can be concluded that the existing research challenge is 
to develop a flexible framework to assign appropriate marginal loss functions to key 
process characteristics irrespective of their dependence structure. Copula models, which 
provide this flexibility, have begun to make their way into process engineering literature 
[9–11]. Copulas are used to describe the joint distribution of dependent random variables 
with any marginal distribution. While the theoretical properties of copula functions are now 
fairly well understood, inference for copula models is, to an extent, still under development 
[12]. 
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, a new methodology is provided to 
construct multivariate loss functions using copulas. Second, methodologies are provided 
to estimate copula parameters and choose the best copula for a specific application. The 
main objective of this paper is to present the successive steps required to use copulas for 
modelling the dependent losses and constructing multivariate distributions for specific 
purposes, including operational loss modelling.   
Following the introduction, Section 7.2 proposes a methodology to develop multivariate 
loss functions using copula functions. Section 7.3 reviews the theory of copula functions 
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and Section 7.4 provides methods to estimate and select copula functions and conduct an 
uncertainty assessment. A separation column case study is then used in Section 7.5 to 
illustrate the practical implementation of copulas, followed by some concluding remarks. 
 
7.2. Methodology: Copula-Based Multivariate Loss Functions 
It has been shown in earlier studies that the application of the general class of inverted 
probability loss functions (IPLFs) is a flexible approach to model loss due to process 
deviations [1,3]. However, the application of IPLFs for systems with multiple key process 
variables is an existing research challenge due to the restriction in multivariate 
generalizations. Copula functions are used in this work to overcome this challenge. 
Before developing a multivariate loss function, it would be helpful to review the common 
basis of developing IPLFs. According to [1], let  if x  be a probability density function 
(PDF) possessing a unique maximum at xi, where xi represents a key process characteristic 
(KPC) and i = 1, …, I represents I KPCs (e.g. temperature, pressure, composition, etc.). 
Let Ti = xi be the value at which the PDF attains its unique maximum, where denotes the 
target value. Let    ,i i ix T f x  ,    sup i ii x Xm f x f T  , and define loss inversion 
ratio (LIR) as: 
   , , /LIR i i i i if x T x T m .       (7.2) 
Then, any IPLF takes the form: 
    , 1 , /i i i i i iL x T EML x T m           (7.3) 
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where EMLi is the maximum estimated loss incurred when the target is not attained. It can 
be seen from the structure of Equation (7.3) that  ,i ix T  is in the form of a PDF in terms 
of xi and Ti, mi is the maximum of  ,i ix T ; the LIR,  , /i i ix T m , is unitless and has a 
minimum value of zero when xi takes on values far from the Ti, and a maximum value of 
one when xi is exactly on target, i.e.,  0 , / 1i i ix T m   [1].  
Table 7.1 shows the important IPLFs determined from inversion of Normal, Gamma, and 
Beta distributions using the method described above. A comparative study of the flexibility 
of different IPLFs for application in the process industries is provided in [3]. 
 
Table 7.1. Listing of univariate inverted probability loss functions (IPLFs) 
Type of Loss 
Functions 
Reference Formulation of Loss Function† 
INLF [7]   2 2, {1 ( ( ) / 2 )}L x T EML exp x T      where / 4x    
Modified 
INLF 
[13]   2 22 {1 ( ( ) / 2 )}
1 { 0.5( / ) }
,
x
EML
L exp x T
exp
x T 

   
  
 
IBLF [14] 
  (1 )/ ( 1), {1 [ (1 ) ] }T TL x T EML D x x       
where 1 / 1[ (1 ) ]T TD T T     
IGLF [1]       1, 1 / exp /L x T e T x xEML T     
† EMLΔ is the estimated maximum loss at distance Δx, where Δx is the distance from the target to the point 
where the maximum loss EML first occurs; x represents the process measurement; T denotes the target value; 
γ and α are shape parameters. 
 
The same basis as in Equation (7.3) is used in this work to develop multivariate loss 
functions. As shown in Figure 7.1, the proposed methodology includes the following steps: 
Step 1a) The proposed methodology starts with the identification of key process 
characteristics (KPCs), xi, i = 1, …, I. A KPC is a feature that, if nonconforming, 
missing, or degraded, may cause unsafe conditions and/or a loss of product 
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quality. For example, operating temperature is the KPC for a polymerization 
reactor. Different approaches, such as check lists, preliminary hazard analysis 
(PHA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), 
hazard and operability study (HAZOP), and master logic diagrams, are often used 
to identify KPCs [4]. In this study, it is assumed that the KPCs are known. 
Step 1b) The next step is to assign a loss inversion ratio,  , /i i i iLIR x T m , to each 
identified KPC. A least-squares based method to determine the parameters of each 
LIR is described in Hashemi et al., (2014a). 
Step 2) The best copula function and associated parameter(s) should then be selected to 
represent the dependence structure among identified LIRs.  
Step 3) The copula decomposition property (see Equation (7.3) in Section 7.3) is then used 
to develop the multivariate density (MVD) function from the product of copula PDF 
and marginal LIRs. Finally, the multivariate loss function is developed by inverting 
the multivariate density function. 
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Identification of key process 
characteristics (KPC)
x1 xIx2
Identification of applicable 
loss inversion ratio (LIR) for 
each KPC 
π(x1,T1)/m1 π(xI,TI)/mIπ(x2,T2)/m2
Compute the PDF of the selected copula C for a 
uniformly distributed vector u on [0, 1], f(C)
Develop the multivariate density (MVD) function:
mvd = f(C)×LIR1×∙∙∙×LIRI  
Inverse the developed mvd and multiply by the 
estimated maximum loss (EML) to determine the 
multivariate loss function (MVLF):
MVLF = EML×(1 – mvd)
Estimate the parameter(s) of each copula 
function by maximizing the log-likelihood 
function (Equations 6 & 7)
Create a list of all potential copula 
functions
Choose the best copula model that 
minimize the Akaike weight
Estimate the Akaike weights for all 
copula models (Equation 11)
 
Figure 7.1. The proposed methodology for copula-based estimation of multivariate loss function 
 
Application of copula functions is relatively straightforward using computational software 
packages such as R [15] and MATLAB [16]. However, the main challenges are to estimate 
the copula parameters and to select the best copula. A brief discussion of the copula concept 
is provided in Section 7.3. To overcome these challenges, methods based on maximum 
likelihood evaluation and information theory are then presented in Section 7.4. 
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7.3. Copula Functions   
7.3.1. Definition  
Copulas are used to describe the joint distribution of dependent random variables. With 
copula modelling, the marginal distributions from different families can be combined [17]. 
This is the main advantage of copulas compared with alternative methods, such as the use 
of multivariate distributions, to construct dependencies.  
In this study, as shown in Figure 7.1, the copula concept is used as a mechanism to develop 
a joint multivariate loss density function. Considering the bivariate case, the process of 
developing a joint distribution function can be shown using Figure 7.2, where each pair of 
real numbers (x, y) leads to a point (F(x), G(y)) in the unit square [0, 1]×[0, 1]. This 
mapping process, which assigns the value of the joint distribution function to each ordered 
pair of values of marginal distribution function is indeed a copula [18]. 
 
(x, y) H(x, y)
(0, 0)
(1, 1)G(y)
F(x)
Copulas
 
Figure 7.2. Representation of a two-dimensional (2d) copula. A 2d copula is a distribution function 
on a unit square [0, 1]×[0, 1], with standard uniform marginal distributions 
 
In Figure 7.2, F(x) and G(y) represent cumulative distribution functions, which can be 
estimated using methods such as the rescaled empirical distribution function and the 
continuous empirical distribution function (EDF), or other estimates of the EDF including 
Kaplan–Meier estimate, r/n, mean rank estimate, r/(n + 1), or median rank estimate, (r - 
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0.3)/(n + 0.4) [19], where n and r denote sample size and rank respectively (see Section 
7.4.2). 
To provide a formal definition for copulas, let 1,..., dU U  be real random variables uniformly 
distributed on [0, 1]. A copula function C: [0, 1]d → [0, 1] is a joint distribution function: 
    1 1 1,..., ,...,d d dC u u P U u U u   . 
Copulas are important because of the following seminal result. Let  1,..., dL LL  be a 
random loss vector with continuous marginal cumulative distribution functions (CDF) with 
lower case letters li denoting assignment to loss variables. Based on Sklar’s theorem [20], 
the CDF H of L can be represented as: 
 𝐻(𝒍) = 𝐶{𝐹1(𝑙1),… , 𝐹𝑑(𝑙𝑑)}, 𝐿 ∈ ℝ
𝑑,    
in terms of a unique copula C [18]. For the proof and other important properties see [18]. 
The following representation of the joint density known as the copula decomposition of a 
joint distribution is of central interest in this work in developing the multivariate loss 
density function (see Step 3 in Figure 7.1): 
 𝐻(𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑑) = 𝑓1(𝑙1) × …× 𝑓𝑑(𝑙𝑑) × 𝑐(𝐹1(𝑙1), … , 𝐹𝑑(𝑙𝑑))   (7.4) 
where c is the density of the copula [21]. The main advantage provided to the process loss 
analysts by this representation is that the selection of an appropriate model for the 
dependence between loss sources, represented by C, can then proceed independently from 
the choice of the marginal distributions.  
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7.3.2. Examples of Copulas  
As described by [22], it is common to represent a copula by its distribution function. 
Restricting attention to the bivariate case for the sake of simplicity, copulas can be 
represented as: 
     , , , ,
u v
C u v P U u V v c x y dxdy
 
          (7.5) 
where c(x, y) is the density of the copula. Those copulas without a closed form solution for 
which the double integral at the right-hand side of Equation (7.5) are implied by well-
known bivariate distribution functions, are called implicit copulas [22]. Two examples are 
the Gaussian copula (derived from the multivariate normal distribution) and the Student’s 
t-copula (derived from multivariate Student’s t-distribution), generally known as elliptical 
copulas. Compared with other copulas, the Gaussian copula has a nearly full range (-1, 1) 
of pairwise correlation coefficients—yielding a general and robust copula, which is used 
in most applications. The Gaussian copula, however, lacks the tail dependence; that is, the 
probability of observing extreme observations in all random variables at once. This 
limitation can be addressed by using Student’s t-copula or other copula classes such as the 
Archimedean copula family [10]. For the case of Student’s t-copula (or simply t-copula), 
Equation (7.5) takes the following form: 
 
 
  
 
 
2 2
22
1 1
2
2
, ,
1 2
, 1
12 1
t
t
t
v vt t
v
t u t v
v
x xy y
C u v dxdy
v


 
 


 
 
 
 
  
 
 

 
 
where δ and vt are the parameters of the copula, and 
1
tv
t   is the inverse of the standard 
univariate t-distribution with vt degrees of freedom, expectation 0 and variance vt/( vt - 2) 
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[22]. A higher value for vt decreases the probability of tail events. As the t-copula converges 
to the Gaussian copula for vt → ∞, the t-copula assigns more probability to tail events than 
the Gaussian copula [23]. 
On the other hand, explicit copulas are not derived from multivariate distribution functions, 
but do have simple closed forms. The Frank, the Clayton, and the Gumbel copulas (see 
Table 7.2) from the Archimedean copula family are examples of explicit copulas. 
Archimedean copulas are suitable for low-dimensional systems because of their simple 
closed functional forms. For d-dimensional distributions, serial iterations of Archimedean 
copulas are constructed, but these do not provide arbitrary pairwise correlations [10]. Other 
examples of this class of copulas include the Gumbel and the Clayton copulas. Table 7.2 
includes the most commonly used copulas in the literature. A more comprehensive list of 
copulas can be found in [18] among other publications.  
 
Table 7.2. Examples of frequently used copula functions 
Copula C(u, v)    
Clayton 
 
1
1u v  

      1, 0   
Gumbel 
    
1
exp ln lnu v
     
 
 1,  
Frank 
1 11
ln 1
1
u ve e
e
 

 

                
    
 
   , 0   
Gaussian     1 1,N u v      1,1  
t     1 1, ,t t tv v vT T u T v
 
  1,1  
 
As an example of how to construct a joint distribution from copulas, consider u = F1(x) and 
v = F2(y), where F1 and F2 are any two one-dimensional distributions, associated with two 
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random variables X and Y. Then, one joint distribution of X and Y, for example, using the 
Gumbel copula with a dependence parameter δ, is: 
             2
1
1 21 exp ln ln, ,H C F x F y F x F yx y 
      
 
 . 
Therefore, using the copula approach, joint distributions can be constructed from arbitrary 
univariate distributions.  
A copula is sometimes referred to as a “dependency function” since it contains all of the 
dependence information between random variables [24]. For instance, using the Gumbel 
copula, all the information about the dependence between the two random variables is in 
the parameter δ, with values which can be interpreted in terms of a coefficient like 
Kendall’s τ rank correlation, because it is not affected by strictly increasing transformations 
of the random variables [25]. More discussion on the selection of dependence measures 
can be found in Hashemi, Ahmed, & Khan (2015a).  
 
7.4. Copula Estimation and Model Selection 
7.4.1. Review of the Parameter Estimation Methods 
When modelling the joint density of two random variables using copula functions, care 
must be taken to correctly and efficiently estimate the copula parameters. Genest & Favre 
[12] proposed a nonparametric way of estimating the copula by using the relationship 
between Kendall’s τ and the copula parameter to get an estimate of the latter. However, 
this method is suitable for explicit copulas, mainly Archimedean copulas, and requires the 
Kendall’s τ to be known.  
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Methods based on maximizing the likelihood function are frequently used as an alternative 
method in the literature to determine the copula parameter. Two examples are the exact 
maximum likelihood method and the method of inference functions for margins (IFM), 
which estimate both the parameters of the marginals and the copula function [21]. Genest 
& Favre [12] proposed the canonical maximum likelihood (CML) estimation procedure 
that is appropriate when one does not want to specify a parametric model to describe the 
marginal distributions.  
The efficiency and consistency of maximum likelihood estimations have been shown in 
several studies [12,21]. For the purpose of this study, only the parameter(s) of the copula 
function should be estimated since the marginal loss functions are already determined (see 
Figure 7.1). Therefore, the maximum log-likelihood (ML) estimator method is used in the 
following section to estimate the copula parameter.  
 
7.4.2. Methodology to Estimate Copula Parameter  
Let δ be the copula parameter to be estimated. Let  , , 1,...,LIRi i if x T i I  be a continuous 
function denoting the loss inversion ratio for key process characteristic xi with target value 
Ti, and  ,
iLIR i i
F x T  be the LIR distribution function of Xi. Given a random sample 
  1 ,..., : 1,...,k Ikx x k n  observed from distribution     1 1, ,..., ,LIR I IF x T x T
   
    
1 1 1
, ,..., ,
ILIR LIR I I
C F x T F x T , the resulting log-likelihood function for copula C with 
parameter δ denoted by  CLL   can be represented by: 
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      
1 1 1
1
ln , ,..., ,
I
n
C LIR k LIR Ik I
k
LL c F x T F x T

 
      (7.6) 
where cδ is the copula density. Then, the copula parameter δ is estimated using the ML 
estimator by maximizing the log-likelihood function of the copula density: 
 ˆ arg max CLL  .         (7.7) 
As discussed before, the uniform marginals  ,
iLIR i i
F x T  in Equation (7.6) can be estimated 
using rescaled versions of their empirical counterparts [12,21,27], as follows: 
   
1
1
, 1 , 1,...,
1i
n
LIR i i ik i
k
F x T X x i I
n 
  

 .     (7.8) 
The rank-based estimates, r/(n + 1), can also be used to estimate the uniform marginals 
 ,
iLIR i i
F x T , where n is the sample size and r denotes the rank of each observation.  
The above-mentioned ML estimation method for copula parameter estimation may seem 
superficially attractive both because it involves numerical work and also requires the 
existence of a density cδ. At the same time, however, it is much more generally applicable 
than the inversion of Kendall’s τ method, since it does not require the dependence 
parameter to be known [12]. Moreover, the application of a rank-based estimation of the 
distribution function  ,
iLIR i i
F x T  in Equation (7.6) adds to the flexibility of the approach 
to be applicable to the empirical loss inversion ratio  ,
iLIR i i
f x T  as well. 
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7.4.3. Review of Copula Selection Methods 
Having estimated the parameters of certain copulas, another challenge is to discriminate 
among competing models. A goodness-of-fit test for copulas, such as that proposed by 
[28], and graphical methods, such as the construction of QQ-plots [27] and K-plots [12] 
have been used for copula selection. However, none of these methods are proven to be 
superior [21]. It is recommended to use different methods and compare the results, should 
one use the goodness-of-fit and graphical methods. 
A more formal way to rank the candidate copulas is the application of Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC). The AIC approach, with a fundamental link to information theory, uses an 
empirical log-likelihood function to estimate the relative expected “information” lost, 
referred to as Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance, when a candidate model is used to 
approximate the true (real) model [29].  
An alternative information-theory-based model selection method is the application of 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). BIC arises from a Bayesian viewpoint with equal 
prior probability on each model and vague priors on the parameters, given the model. BIC 
is a dimension-consistent criterion that assumes that the true model remains fixed as sample 
size approaches infinity [29]. However, this assumption may not be applicable in most 
process system applications as increased sample size in process industry usually stems 
from the addition of new measurement sensors and inclusion of larger data sets. 
Accordingly, as the sample size increases, the number of factors in the model also 
increases. In contrast to BIC, as discussed by [29], AIC provides a scientific understanding 
of the process or system under study by searching for model with smallest estimated KL 
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distance. Therefore, AIC is used in this study as the preferred method for copula model 
selection. For a detailed conceptual comparison of BIC and AIC, an interested reader may 
refer to [29].  
 
7.4.4. AIC Approach to Copula Selection 
Accioly & Chiyoshi [19] used Equation (7.9) to calculate the AIC of each copula model 
through the resulting values of corresponding estimated pseudo log-likelihoods. 
 2 2AIC L P           (7.9) 
where P is the number of estimable parameters. In this work, except for the t-copula, for 
other copulas in Table 7.2, P = 1 because the only estimable parameter is δ, given that the 
parameters of marginal loss functions are already determined. For the t-copula, P = 2 since 
in addition to δ, estimation of the degrees of freedom (vt) is also required.  
An individual AIC value, by itself, is not interpretable due to the unknown constant 
(interval scale). The AIC is only comparative relative to other AIC values in the model set 
[29]. Therefore, the best model is determined by examining their relative distance from the 
“true” model through computation of the AIC differences, 
mini iAIC AIC           (7.10) 
over all candidate models. The smaller Δi is, the more likely it is that the adjusted model is 
the best model. Better interpretation could also be achieved with the Akaike weights [29]: 
 
 
1
exp 0.5
exp 0.5
i
i R
r
r
w

 

 
.       (7.11) 
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The weight wi is the evidence that model i is the best model, given the data and set of R 
candidate models. The wi depends on the entire set; therefore, if a model is added or 
dropped during a post hoc analysis, the wi must be recomputed for all the models in the 
newly defined set. 
 
7.4.5. A Simulation Study 
7.4.5.1. Selection of Candidate Copulas   
To illustrate the application and also to evaluate the performance of the presented copula 
estimation and selection methodologies, a simulation study is conducted using a bivariate 
set of loss inversion ratios    ,LIR x LIR y    with a presumable dependence structure. 
This represents two correlated inverted probability loss functions IPLF(x) and IPLF(y). 
The first step is to select a set of candidate copulas for this study. The Gaussian copula is 
selected as the traditional candidate for modelling dependence. The t-copula is selected as 
it can capture dependence in the tails of the distributions without giving up flexibility to 
model dependence in the center. The Gumbel copula from the Archimedean family is 
directly related to multivariate extensions of extreme value theory, which has gained 
popularity in risk management over the last few decades [23]. The Frank and the Clayton 
copulas from the class of Archimedean copulas are also selected due to their useful 
properties and ease in construction [19].  
The above mentioned copulas, listed in Table 7.2, have been frequently used in the 
literature for modelling dependence in safety assessment [10], operational loss modelling 
[30], business loss modelling of process facilities [31], process loss aggregation [11], and 
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drilling time decision process [19]. Moreover, these copulas are included in the 
MATLAB® [16] statistical toolbox, which simplifies their implementation.  
 
7.4.5.2. Parameter Estimation  
For the purpose of this simulation study, data is simulated using Gaussian, t, Clayton, 
Gumbel and Frank copulas with U(0, 1) marginals and parameters corresponding to 
Kendall’s τ equal to 0.2 (low correlation) and 0.8 (high correlation). To study the effect of 
sample size on the performance of the parameter estimation, both 1,000 and 5,000 
observations are used. According to the procedure provided in Section 7.4.2, in the first 
step, each pair of observations    1 1,LIR x LIR y   , …,    ,n nLIR x LIR y    is 
transformed to their rank-based representation,    ,LIR i LIR iF x F y   , by  
 
 
1
ix
LIR i
rank LIR
F x
n


 and  
 
1
iy
LIR i
rank LIR
F y
n


. 
Then, Equation (7.6) is used to calculate the log-likelihood function using different copulas 
in Table 7.2. Finally, the parameter estimation is carried out through the maximization of 
the ML estimator. To assess the precision of the parameter estimation methodology, the 
simulation is iterated for S = 500 and S = 1,000 for each sample size. As an example, for 
the case of the Frank copula with τ = 0.2, increasing the sample size and simulations from 
n = 1,000 and S = 500 to n = 5,000 and S = 1,000 resulted in about a 60% decrease in the 
standard deviation of the estimated parameter. The estimated mean (
i
 ˆ ) of the copula 
parameters for Kendall’s τ of 0.2 and 0.8 are given in Table 7.3. Table 7.3 also provides 
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the closed form relationships between Kendall’s τ and copula parameters. These 
relationships are used to calculate the true copula parameter values. This simulation study 
shows the acceptable performance of the presented parameter estimation methodology. 
Moreover, as expected intuitively, higher sample size and simulation runs result in a higher 
precision (lower standard deviation) and higher accuracy (lower ˆ
i
i 
   value) of the 
estimated parameters. 
 
Table 7.3. Estimated copula parameters for the simulation case study 
Copula δ and τ Relationship Ref. 
Kendall’s τ = 0.2  Kendall’s τ = 0.8 
True 
Parameter 
Estimated Parameter  
True 
Parameter 
Estimated Parameter 
n=1000* 
S=500 
n=5000 
S=1000 
 
n=1000 
S=500 
n=5000 
S=1000 
Frank   
 1 0
1
1
1 4 1
tD t e dt
D


  
 
  
 
  
  
[19] 1.861 1.625 1.843  18.192 19.222 17.983 
Gumbel 1
1 

   
[19] 1.250 1.240 1.243  5.000 4.843 4.929 
Clayton   2   
 
[19] 0.500 0.517 0.509  8.000 7.660 7.786 
Gaussian     2 arcsin  
 
[12] 0.309 0.305 0.324  0.951 0.953 0.951 
t    2 arcsin  
 
[12] 𝛿 = 0.309 
?̂? = 1.000 
𝛿 = 0.326 
?̂? = 1.116 
𝛿 = 0.316 
?̂? = 1.000 
 𝛿 = 0.953 
?̂? = 1.000 
𝛿 = 0.953 
?̂? = 1.003 
𝛿 = 0.951 
?̂? = 1.000 
* n: sample size; S: number of simulations  
 
7.4.5.3. Copula Selection 
From the estimated copula parameters in Table 7.3, the associated log-likelihood function 
and the AIC values for each copula model with Kendall’s τ of 0.2 are then calculated for 
both 1,000 and 5,000 sample sizes and S = 1,000 simulations. The values of AIC 
differences  i i minAIC AIC    are also calculated which allows the results to be more 
easily interpreted. In real-life problems, the Δi values can be used to rank the candidate 
copulas for a specific application. Experiment 1 in Table 7.4 shows the results for the case 
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when the Gaussian copula is used to generate the original data. As shown in Table 7.4, for 
n = 5,000, the copula selection methodology has selected the Gaussian copula with an 
Akaike weight of 0.826. The t-copula with a degree of freedom of 4.67×106 is also selected 
as the second best model with an Akaike weight of 0.174. The reason is that as the degrees 
of freedom parameter are made larger, a t-copula approaches the corresponding Gaussian 
copula [23]. 
Simulation study was also conducted for the other four copulas (Experiments 2 to 5 in 
Table 7.4). Again, the presented copula selection methodology successfully identified the 
original copula used to construct the dependence structure. For the sample size of n = 5,000, 
the differences between the original copula used (the true model) and the candidate copulas 
are so huge that the Akaike weights of the others can be considered as zero. Therefore, for 
Experiments 2 to 5, only the results for the highest Akaike weights are included to keep 
Table 7.4 concise. According to Table 7.4, as expected, it can be seen that the model 
selection procedure becomes more powerful with larger samples sizes.  
 
Table 7.4. The copula selection results for the simulation case study for the Kendall’s τ = 0.2 and 
sample sizes 1,000 and 5,000 
Exp. 
No. 
Copula 
Used  
Candidate 
Copula 
LLC(δi) AICi Δi wi 
n=1000 n=5000 n=1000 n=5000 n=1000 n=5000 n=1000 n=5000 
1 Gaussian          
  Gaussian 53.93 290.54 -105.85 -579.08 0.00 0.00 0.407 0.826 
  t 53.92 288.98 -105.84 -575.97 0.01 3.11 0.404 0.174 
  Clayton 48.56 206.26 -95.12 -410.52 10.73 168.56 0.002 0.000 
  Gumbel 36.62 247.19 -71.24 -492.38 34.61 86.70 0.000 0.000 
  Frank 53.14 274.93 -104.29 -547.87 1.56 31.21 0.186 0.000 
2 t t 124.59 1363.00 -247.18 -2724.00 0.00 0.00 1.000 1.000 
3 Clayton Clayton 55.36 341.71 -108.72 -681.42 0.00 0.00 0.999 1.000 
4 Gumbel Gumbel 39.72 324.79 -77.43 -647.58 0.00 0.00 0.995 1.000 
5 Frank Frank 35.94 237.75 -69.88 -473.49 0.00 0.00 0.972 1.000 
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A similar copula selection case study is repeated for the case of Kendall’s τ = 0.8. Again 
the results showed a good performance of the copula model selection procedure with 
Akaike weights of 1 for the case of sample size n = 5,000. The table of results is not 
included to keep the paper concise. Altogether, the AIC was found to be a good criterion 
for finding the best fitting copula. For a small sample size its performance may not be 
entirely satisfactory; however, the AIC still finds the correct model or will chose one that 
is close to it. The remaining question is whether an even better model might have been 
postulated for the models other than the candidate copula functions. Information criteria 
attempt only to select the best model from the candidate models available; if a better model 
exists, but is not offered as a candidate, then the information-theoretic approach cannot be 
expected to identify this new model [29]. Therefore, when using the AIC approach, it is 
strongly recommended to choose all possible copula functions as candidate models.  
 
7.4.6. Copula Model Selection Uncertainty Assessment   
The AIC allows a ranking of copulas and the identification of copula models that are nearly 
equally useful versus those that are clearly poor explanations for the data at hand. However, 
one must keep in mind that there is often considerable uncertainty in the selection of a 
particular model as the “best” approximating model. Loss function relates the process 
measurements to observed operational loss values. However, process measurements are 
noisy and consequently the shape of the loss functions, determined from the inversion of 
LIR distribution as a function of process measurement (see Equation 7.3), is uncertain. 
Thus, the observed loss values and resulting estimated LIRs are conceptualized as random 
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variables; their values would be different if another independent loss dataset were 
available. It is this “loss observation (sampling) variability” that results in uncertain 
statistical inference about the dependence structure from the particular loss dataset being 
analyzed. Various computer-intensive resampling methods may further improve the 
assessment of the uncertainty of inferences, but it remains important to understand that 
proper model selection is accompanied by a substantial amount of uncertainty.  
The bootstrap technique is a type of Monte Carlo simulation which is used frequently in 
applied statistics for bias assessment and the evaluation of model selection uncertainty. In 
practical application, the empirical bootstrap means using some form of resampling with 
replacement from the actual data x to generate (e.g., 1,000) bootstrap samples. The sample 
data consists of b independent units, and it then suffices to take a simple random sample of 
size n, with a replacement, from the b units of data, to get one bootstrap sample. A more 
detailed explanation of the bootstrap method to estimate model selection uncertainty can 
be found in [29]. 
The bootstrap method is used in this section to estimate the proposed copula model 
selection uncertainty. Although the bootstrap method is very advantageous to allow 
insights into model selection uncertainty, its computer-intensive nature will continue to 
hinder its use for large problems. Therefore, the bootstrap sampling in this simulation study 
is limited to 1,000 samples due to high computation time. The Frank copula (representing 
a symmetrical copula) and the t-copula with 1 degree of freedom (representing an 
asymmetrical copula) are selected to generate the loss inversion ratios. To study the effect 
of loss sample size, both n = 1,000 and n = 5,000 pairs of    ,LIR x LIR y    observations 
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are simulated using the Frank copula and the t-copula with U(0, 1) marginals and parameter 
corresponding to Kendall’s τ equal to 0.4 and 0.8. Then, 1,000 bootstrap samples are 
generated from these simulated LIR data to enable model selection uncertainty assessment 
due to sampling variability. Finally, for each bootstrap sample, the AIC difference and 
Akaike weights of a set of five candidate copula functions in Table 7.2 are computed.  
Table 7.5 shows the relative model selection frequencies (πi) from applying the AIC to 
each of the 1,000 bootstrap samples. From Table 7.5, it can be seen that when the Frank 
copula with τ = 0.4 and n = 1,000 is used to simulate the original data, the model selection 
procedure has chosen the Frank copula as the best possible model in this group with a 
relatively low frequency of 0.764. However, for the case of n = 5,000 simulated LIR data, 
the performance of the procedure is increased significantly and the Frank copula is chosen 
with a relative frequency of 0.957. Table 7.5 also shows the bootstrap analysis results of 
using the Frank copula with τ = 0.8 where both n = 1,000 and n = 5,000 simulated LIR data 
and the model selection procedure selected the Frank copula with a relative frequency of 
1. Similar performance is also observed for the case that the t-copula is used to generate 
the LIR data.  
From the bootstrap analysis, it can be concluded that the uncertainty of the model selection 
procedure decreases significantly with increasing sample size. Moreover, the copula 
selection uncertainty is lower for higher rank correlation values as it is intuitively easier to 
recognize the dependence structure for highly correlated data. An important conclusion is 
that using a large sample size is crucial to study the dependence structure among variables 
and select the correct copula, especially for low correlation values.  
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Table 7.5 also shows the calculated Akaike weights. It can be seen that the relative 
frequencies for copula i being selected as the best copula are similar to the Akaike weights, 
but are not identical. This important observation shows that there is not any particular 
advantage in the bootstrap selection frequencies over the Akaike weights. In other words, 
comparing the results in Table 7.5, one can assess the model selection uncertainty directly 
from Akaike weights. Considering the extensive computation time required for the 
computation of the model selection frequencies using bootstrap analysis, the Akaike 
weights, in general, can be used as a preferred method for both model selection and 
uncertainty assessment.  
Moreover, as shown in Table 7.5, compared to the bootstrap analysis, considerably smaller 
sample sizes (n = 500 and n = 1,000) have provided a good support for the best copula 
using Akaike weights. This means that using Akaike weights for uncertainty assessment of 
copula selection is much less sensitive to the loss observations sample size than the 
bootstrap analysis. Overall, Akaike weights are easy to estimate with minimal computation 
time and provide a better estimate of the best model, given an a priori set of models. This 
conclusion is also consistent with the observations by Burnham & Anderson [29] on the 
advantages of Akaike weights.     
 
Table 7.5. Comparison of bootstrap and Akaike weight performance in model selection uncertainty 
analysis 
Copula 
Used  
Bootstrap Selection Frequency (πi)  Akaike Weight (wi) 
τ = 0.4 τ = 0.8  τ = 0.4 τ = 0.8 
n=1000 n=5000 n=1000 n=5000  n=500 n=1000 n=500 n=1000 
Frank 0.764 0.957 1.000 1.000  0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 
t 0.806 0.998 0.996 1.000  0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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7.5. Case Study: Separation Column 
7.5.1. Case Study Description  
The practical application of the proposed multivariate operational loss model is 
demonstrated using a de-ethanizer column case study. The de-ethanizer simplified process 
schematic and the feed and product characteristics are depicted in Figure 7.3. A liquid feed 
stream, consisting of a mixture of hydrocarbon components to be separated, is fed into the 
column. If the top product (ethane) is within specification (≤3% C3), it is fed to a 
downstream unit for further processing and transportation to the market. Off-specification 
ethane goes to a tank and may be reprocessed or used as fuel (which is of lower value). 
Similarly, the bottom product (C3+) is used in another part of the plant or fed to a pipeline 
to produce a higher-value product if it meets specifications (≤5% C2), and any off-
specification product may be sent to a tank for reprocessing. 
Feed
20,000 bbl/day
$60/bbl
C3+ Product
10,000 bbl/day
C2 Product
10,000 bbl/day ≤3% C3
$60/bbl
>3% C3
$40/bbl
≤5% C2
$80/bbl
>5% C2
$60/bbl
 
Figure 7.3. Feed and product characteristics for the de-ethanizer column case study 
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7.5.2. Economic Analysis of Separation  
Flooding is a common abnormal process condition that can cause loss of separation and 
negatively impact the safety and energy efficiency of the separation process. Different 
measurable process variables can be used as key process characteristics (KPC) to indicate 
the flooding conditions in a separation column. For a typical de-ethanizer, a simultaneous 
increase in the column bottom temperature (or reboiler temperature) derivative and the 
differential pressure derivative across the column could be an indication of flooding 
conditions [32]. Accordingly, the de-ethanizer column bottom temperature (Tc) and 
differential pressure (DP) are considered as the KPCs in this case study. Under normal 
operating conditions, these two KPCs are considered to be normally distributed with the 
values of mean and standard deviation as follows: 51DP   (set point) and 3.75DP   in 
millimetre (mm) of H2O, 82
cT
   (set point) and 5
cT
   in degrees centigrade (o C). Using 
the proposed methodology, it is easy to expand the study from bivariate to multivariate 
analysis by considering more monitored process variables. 
The operational loss due to the variability of the separation process includes the cost of 
increased energy usage and decreased product value. As noted in Figure 7.3, the off-
specification products have lower value compared to on-specification products. The 
operational loss data in Table 7.6 are considered for the operation of the de-ethanizer 
column. The financial information and process characteristics used in this case study are 
for illustrative purposes. This information is used in the following section to determine the 
loss functions shape parameter.  
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As shown in Table 7.6, the operational loss is divided into Class 0-allowable operational 
loss and Class I-unallowable operational loss. The Class 0 is the loss due to normal 
fluctuation of the process characteristic(s) within the specification limits. The Class 0 is 
referred to as allowable operational loss as organizations accept that people, processes and 
systems are imperfect and that losses will arise from errors and ineffective operations. The 
Class I loss is the unallowable operational loss recorded as a result of deviation of process 
characteristic(s) beyond the specification limits. The subsequent unprofitable process 
operation may result in production of sub-quality products, increased energy usage, and 
unsafe process conditions.  
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Table 7.6. The assumed operational loss information for the de-ethanizer column 
KPC Symbol Value 
Alarm 
Tag 
Associated 
Operational 
Loss ($/bbl) Description 
Differential 
Pressure 
(mm H2O) 
DPT   51 - 0 Target differential pressure 
3
T DP
DP   62.25  Hi 4.2 Maximum Class 0 operational 
loss for column overpressure. 
maxDP  
84  Hi-Hi 20 Maximum Class I operational 
loss for column overpressure. 
3
T DP
DP   39.75  Low 6.5 Maximum Class 0 operational 
loss for column under-pressure.  
minDP  
34 Low-Low 12 Maximum Class I operational 
loss for column under-pressure. 
A lower value of operational 
loss is considered for under-
pressure of the column, 
compared to overpressure case, 
due to different impact on the 
separation process. 
Column 
Bottom 
Temperature 
(o C) 
cT
T  82 - 0 Target column bottom 
temperature 
3
cT Tc
T   97 Hi 4 Maximum Class 0 operational 
loss for column over-
temperature. 
maxc
T  135 Hi-Hi 20 Maximum Class I operational 
loss for column over-
temperature. 
3
cT Tc
T   67 Low 4.2 Maximum Class 0 operational 
loss for column under-
temperature.  
minc
T  55 Low-Low 14 Maximum Class I operational 
loss for column under-
temperature. 
 
7.5.3. Description of Incident Scenarios 
A hypothetical overpressure scenario in the de-ethanizer column is considered, where the 
failure of the existing control systems resulted in flooding conditions. Eventually, the 
column DP exceeded a critical threshold and triggered flooding. Once the high-high alarm 
triggered, the operator successfully diagnosed and corrected the process fault by cutting 
the reboiler heat duty. The flooding conditions began relaxing during the reboiler’s 
interrupted period. Consequently, after a few minutes the column bottom temperature and 
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differential pressure set points returned to target values. No process downtime or loss of 
containment happened; however, the production of sub-quality products during flooding 
conditions resulted in operational loss. 
Similarly, a column under-temperature/under-pressure scenario is also considered in this 
case study as another cause of operational loss due to the production of sub-quality 
products.  
 
7.5.4. Marginal Loss Functions  
As mentioned in Figure 7.1, the first step in implementation of the proposed multivariate 
operational loss methodology is to assign a loss function for each identified KPC. In an 
earlier study, Hashemi et al. [3] concluded that modified INLF (MINLF) and IBLF 
demonstrate better performance than other IPLFs as their shape can be modified more 
flexibly to suit the practitioner’s needs for both symmetric and asymmetric problems. 
Using the loss data points identified in Table 7.6 and the search algorithm based on the 
least-squares method in [3], the shape parameters of the MINLF and IBLF for column over-
temperature and under-temperature cases are determined as shown in Figure 7.4. The loss 
values at low alarm ( ) and high alarm ( ) set points for column bottom 
temperature used to determine the loss functions shape parameters are also shown in Figure 
7.4. From Figure 7.4, it can be seen that IBLF fits the system loss behaviour better than the 
MINLF. 
Similarly, Figure 7.5 illustrates the resulting MINLF and IBLF and associated shape 
parameters for column overpressure and under-pressure cases along with the loss values at 
3
cT Tc
T  3
cT Tc
T 
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low and high alarms set points for column pressure. From Figure 7.5, it can be seen that 
both IBLF and MINLF demonstrate almost similar performances for column DP. As IBLF 
is selected for the column bottom temperature, it is decided to choose MINLF for column 
DP to show the flexibility of the proposed multivariate loss function methodology in using 
different marginal loss functions. 
 
Figure 7.4. MINLF and IBLF and associated shape parameters for de-ethanizer column bottom 
temperature (UT: under-temperature; OT: over-temperature) 
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Figure 7.5. MINLF and IBLF and associated shape parameters for de-ethanizer column differential 
pressure (UP: under-pressure; OP: overpressure) 
 
7.5.5. Development of Multivariate Loss Function  
Proceeding with the multivariate analysis, the copula parameter estimation and copula 
selection procedures proposed in Section 7.4 are used to determine the best copula for 
construction of the multivariate loss function. Table 7.7 represents maximum likelihood 
estimation results and the estimated parameters together with AIC differences and Akaike 
weights for different copulas. As can be seen, there is a good support to show that the t-
copula model is the best possible model in this set of models since its Akaike weight is 
significantly greater than the others. Figure 7.6(a) shows the contour plot and Figure 7.6(b) 
shows the three-dimensional plot of the multivariate loss function developed using t-copula 
for the de-ethanizer column, following Step 3 of the methodology in Figure 7.1. 
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From Figure 7.6, one can see that the de-ethanizer process experiences zero operational 
loss when both column bottom temperature and differential pressure are on target (i.e. DPT 
= 51 mm H2O and TcT = 82
o C). For the overpressure and over-temperature (OP-OT) 
scenario, the system’s operational loss attains its maximum value at $20/bbl (see Figure 
7.6). For the under-pressure and under-temperature (UP-UT) scenario, the system attains 
lower maximum loss values as indicated in Table 7.6. Comparing the developed 
multivariate loss function with the loss information provided in Table 7.6, it can be seen 
that the proposed multivariate loss function approach has a good performance in modelling 
the system loss when dealing with more than one key process characteristic.  
Table 7.7. Maximum likelihood estimation results with calculated AIC differences and Akaike 
weights for the de-ethanizer column 
Copula 
i
ˆ  L(δi) AICi Δi wi 
Gaussian 0.02 -0.04 2.08 4.30 0.08 
t 0.01 3.11 -2.21 0.00 0.65 
Clayton 0.02 0.35 1.30 3.51 0.11 
Gumbel 1.02 0.09 1.83 4.04 0.09 
Frank 0.04 0.01 1.99 4.20 0.08 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6. (a) Contour plot and (b) three-dimensional plot of the multivariate loss function 
developed using the t-copula for the de-ethanizer column 
(a) (b) 
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From Table 7.7, it can be concluded that the Clayton and the Gumbel copulas from the 
Archimedean family are the next two copulas which can be used for this case study. It is 
not surprising to see that the first three copulas with the lower Akaike differences in Table 
7.7 are of the extreme-value type since the marginal loss functions are asymmetric. The 
Frank and Gaussian copulas, both with a radial symmetry property, have the largest Akaike 
differences. As mentioned before, the larger Δi is, the less plausible it is that the candidate 
model is the best model. Table 7.8 provides some rules of thumb that can be used to identify 
the level of support of different candidate models. Based on the guidelines in Table 7.8 and 
the calculated Akaike differences in Table 7.7, it can be concluded that four other copulas 
other than the t-copula can also be taken into consideration as an approximating 
dependence model for further analysis. The multivariate loss functions determined using 
Clayton, Gumbel and Frank copulas are shown in Figure 7.7(a-c). Comparison of Figures 
7.6(a) and 7.7(a-c) indicates that all of these copula functions considered in this case study 
are able to provide the overall dependence structure between the column differential 
pressure and bottom temperature. However, as concluded from the calculated Akaike 
weights in Table 7.7, for this study, t-copula provides the best approximating model.   
 
Table 7.8. AIC differences and level of support for candidate models [29] 
Δi Level of Empirical Support for Model i 
0 - 2 Substantial  
4 - 7 Considerably less 
> 10 Essentially none 
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Figure 7.7. Contour plots of the multivariate loss function developed using (a) Clayton copula, (b) 
Frank copula, (c) Gumbel copula and (d) bivariate INLF (Equation 7.1) 
 
7.5.6. Discussion 
To compare the performance of the proposed copula-based multivariate loss function with 
traditional approaches, Equation (7.1) is used to develop a bivariate loss function based on 
the inverted bivariate normal loss function. For this case study, Equation (7.1) takes the 
following form: 
 
1
1 12
12 2
1
1 exp
2 c c
DP DP
L EML
T T
 
 
                          
           
Y T T  
a b 
c d 
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where 
t
cT
DP
T
 
  
 
T  and DPt, TcT and EML are to be replaced from Table 7.6. In the equation 
above, γ1 = ΔDP/4, ΔDP being the Euclidean distance from T to the point where maximum 
loss occurs along the principal (DP) axis; γ2 = ΔTc/4, ΔTc being the Euclidean distance from 
T to the point where maximum loss occurs along the secondary (Tc) axis; and 
2
12 16,cT    where η is the slope of the principal axis [7]. From the structure of equation 
above, the following limitations are identified: 
i. Expanding this method to multivariate systems is difficult due to mathematical 
restrictions.  
ii. Only INLF should be used for both marginal loss functions.  
iii. Only symmetrical loss functions can be used for marginal loss functions. In other 
words, for instance, the maximum loss for both over and under-pressure scenarios 
should be the same, which may not be the case for real-life applications. 
iv. There is no straightforward method to estimate η. 
Figure 7.7(d) shows the bivariate loss function for the de-ethanizer column using the 
approach described above, where η = 0.01 is found as the best estimate to represent the loss 
information in Table 7.6. Comparing the contour plots in Figure 7.7(d) with the loss 
information provided in Table 7.6, significant differences between the estimated loss 
values and the actual loss information can be seen. The bivariate loss function shown in 
Figure 7.7(d) overestimates the operational loss as the system almost attains its maximum 
loss even when DP and Tc are within the specification limits. 
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The proposed copula-based multivariate loss function approach overcomes the limitations 
of the traditional approaches based on classical multivariate distributions and provides a 
more accurate and realistic estimation of the system’s operational loss. As demonstrated 
using this case study, the proposed copula-based methodology has the following 
advantages: 
 The method can be easily expanded from a bivariate case to a multivariate case. 
 Any type of symmetrical or asymmetrical loss function can be used for the marginal 
loss functions. 
 Estimation of the marginal loss functions and the dependence structure can be done 
separately, which simplifies the practical application of the methodology. 
 The simulation study in Section 7.4 demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed 
framework in estimating the copula parameter and choosing the best copula. 
 
7.6. Conclusions 
In this paper, a methodology to construct the multivariate loss functions is proposed using 
copula functions, which allows selection of any type of inverted probability loss function 
for the marginal loss functions irrespective of their dependence structure. Although 
application of copula functions in practical problems is straightforward using the existing 
computational software, challenges exist in estimation of the copula parameter(s) and 
selection of the best copulas. To address these challenges, a method based on maximum 
likelihood evaluation and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is presented and its 
efficacy is demonstrated using a simulation case study. The simulation study showed that 
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the performance of copula estimation procedure is acceptable for both low and high 
correlations with more satisfactory results for larger sample sizes. The AIC approach 
heavily depends on the set of selected copula models; thus, a broad set of candidate copulas 
should always be favoured. Bootstrap analysis is used to assess the uncertainty of the 
copula selection procedure due to the sampling variability and the results are found to be 
consistent with the copula ranking based on Akaike weights. Therefore, it is concluded that 
Akaike weights, in general, can be used as a preferred method for both model selection and 
uncertainty assessment.   
The overall methodology is applied to a separation case study. From the case study results, 
it is observed that several copulas provide acceptable models of the dependence in the 
separation column under study. The copulas with the highest Akaike weights are of the 
extreme-value type and a comparison study showed that all candidate models have some 
level of support for modelling purposes. For this case study, the t-copula is identified as 
the best approximating model by having the largest Akaike weight. Although the case study 
presentation was limited to the case of two variables, the methodology described here 
extends to the multidimensional case. As the number of variables increases, of course, the 
intricacies of modeling become more complex. The case study results show a significantly 
improved representation of the process loss behaviour when using the presented copula-
based multivariate loss function methodology instead of the classical multivariate inverted 
normal loss function approach. Even for independent losses (or any random variables), the 
copula approach is still a useful tool for constructing multivariate distributions, where the 
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advantage is solely due to the flexibility in using any form of marginal univariate 
distribution.   
The combination of the multivariate operational loss modeling proposed in this work with 
a probabilistic approach leads to a multivariate methodology for operational risk 
assessment of process industries. To achieve this goal, further research is required to apply 
the copula approach in probability assessment of abnormal situations for multivariate 
processes.   
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8. MULTIVARIATE PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS OF 
PROCESS FACILITIES USING THE COPULA BAYESIAN 
NETWORK MODEL7 
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Abstract 
Integrated safety analysis of hazardous process facilities calls for an understanding of both 
stochastic and topological dependencies, going beyond traditional Bayesian Network (BN) 
analysis to study cause-effect relationships among major risk factors. This paper presents 
a novel model based on the Copula Bayesian Network (CBN) for multivariate safety 
analysis of process systems. The innovation of the proposed CBN model is in integrating 
the advantage of copula functions in modelling complex dependence structures with the 
cause-effect relationship reasoning of process variables using BNs. This offers a great 
flexibility in probabilistic analysis of individual risk factors while considering their 
uncertainty and stochastic dependence. Methods based on maximum likelihood evaluation 
and information theory are presented to learn the structure of CBN models. The superior 
performance of the CBN model and its advantages compared to traditional BN models are 
demonstrated by application to an offshore managed pressure drilling case study.  
Key words: Correlation; dependence structure; multivariate probabilistic model; Akaike’s 
information criterion.  
 
8.1. Introduction 
Process safety and risk assessment are often multidimensional and hence require the study 
of several potentially correlated random variables from different risk sources. 
Consequently, risk practitioners usually deal with complex process systems with multiple 
correlated variables rather than considering independent risk factors. Looking for 
relationships among variables is an essential part of process safety analysis to understand 
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the system, identify the cause(s) of process symptoms, predict abnormal conditions and 
protect systems from catastrophic events. There are some recent works extracting and 
analyzing interrelationships among random variables in the context of process facilities [1–
3]. However, development of a tool to simultaneously capture different aspects of 
variables’ interrelationships (including causality and dependency) in complex systems with 
high dimensionality is still a formidable challenge. 
In recent years, Bayesian Network (BN) analysis has been used in process safety analysis 
mainly through multivariate probabilistic analysis [2] and probability updating [4]. 
However, BN analysis has some restrictions from the multivariate analysis perspective, 
which are mainly lack of control of the marginal distribution of variables and inability to 
capture the non-linear dependence structure [2]. 
To address the limiting properties of BN analysis, Elidan [5] proposed the Copula Bayesian 
Network (CBN) that fuses the frameworks of the statistical copula and BNs. Copulas allow 
the modelling of complex real-valued distributions by separating the choice of the 
univariate marginal distributions and the dependence function that “couples” them into a 
coherent joint distribution [6]. In contrast to BN analysis that uses conditional probability 
distributions to define a joint density, in the CBN model a collection of local copula 
functions is used to capture the direct dependence among system variables [5].  
The objective of this work is to address the limitations of traditional BN analysis by 
adopting the concept of the CBN model for application in multivariate probabilistic 
analysis of abnormal conditions in process facilities. The contribution of this work is 
twofold. Firstly, by using the language of probabilistic graphical models, this work applies 
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copula functions to extend the BN applications in the context of process facilities’ safety 
analysis of higher dimensions. Secondly, a learning mechanism based on a combination of 
maximum likelihood evaluation and information theory is introduced to address the issue 
of structure learning for CBN models.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 8.2 a comparison of the 
complementing properties of BN analysis and copula functions is provided, followed by a 
discussion of the interesting synergy that can be achieved by combining copulas and BNs. 
The proposed CBN model for process safety analysis is provided in Section 8.3. The 
practical application of the proposed model is demonstrated using a case study in Section 
8.4, followed by some concluding remarks.  
 
8.2. Preliminaries  
8.2.1. Inter-Relationships of Process Variables 
Multivariate probabilistic process safety analysis requires identification of the inter-
relationships among process variables. Connectivity, causality, and correlation are three 
important attributes which are used to describe such inter-relationships [7]. The illustrative 
example in Figure 8.1, adopted from Yang et al. [7], is provided to facilitate better 
explanation of the physical interpretation and practical use of these different concepts. As 
shown in Figure 8.1, a liquid hydrocarbon feed stream is fed into a distillation column. 
Following the principle of fluid dynamics, the feed flow rate (F1) influences the liquid level 
in the column (L) and L influences the bottom product flow rate (F3). In terms of the 
information flow path, the signal line is connected to valve V2 to transmit the level signal 
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L to the control valve. This connectivity is shown in Figure 8.1(b) However, F3 also 
influences L, which is different from connectivity. In fact, valve V2 controls the flow rate 
F3 based on the signals transmitted from the level meter to the control valve. The same 
causality relationship also exists for the overhead flow rate (F2) and the column top 
pressure P (Figure 8.1.b). Thus, causality does not exist without connectivity.  
To describe the concept of correlation, consider the flow rate F1 which affects both flow 
rates F2 and F3. Intuitively, F2 and F3 are correlated, which can be shown by investigating 
the process data. However, there is no causality between F2 and F3, since by ruling out 
their common cause, F1, F2 and F3 are both independent.  
F1
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Figure 8.1. Distillation column example. (a) Schematic; (b) Connectivity; (c) Causality; adopted from 
Yang et al. [7] 
 
213 
From the illustration above it can be concluded that correlation is a necessary (not 
sufficient) condition for causality. Beside correlation, some additional conditions are 
required to imply a causal relationship, such as connectivity, responsiveness, and the 
direction of the relationship between two process variables [7]. Therefore, different tools 
are required to capture causality and dependency among variables.   
Process knowledge can be used to capture causality using common methods such as 
structural equation models (SEM), graphical models, and rule–based models [7]. However, 
as reliable process knowledge is not always available, it is also important to explore 
capturing causality from process data. Lag-based methods, such as Granger causality and 
transfer entropy, and conditional independence methods, such as BNs, are widely used 
approaches to capture causality from process data. Linear relationships among process 
variables and stationary data time series are restrictive assumptions of Granger causality 
and transfer entropy, respectively [7]. Application of BN analysis is of main interest in this 
work to capture causality due to its ability to represent intuitive cause-effect relationships 
among process variables, as well as several other modelling advantages as discussed in 
Section 8.2.2.  
To measure the dependency, the common approach in process facilities literature has been 
the application of correlation coefficients. The Pearson ρ for linear relationships and rank 
correlation coefficients (such as Spearman’s ρs and Kendall’s τ) for nonlinear relationships 
are the frequently used correlation coefficients [8]. However, given the complexity of 
relationships among process variables, dependence can be quantified in more sophisticated 
ways than merely through these numeric coefficients. Copula functions, sometimes 
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referred to as “dependency functions”, contain all of the dependence information among 
random variables [9]. Using copulas, the dependence pattern of the random variables and 
their individual behaviours (more precisely, their marginal probability distributions) can 
be studied separately.   
Beyond modelling dependency and causality, copulas and BNs are both widely used in the 
literature to provide a framework for modelling multivariate distributions. In the 
subsequent subsections, a brief review of advantages and shortcomings of both approaches 
is provided first. Then, the potential synergy from the integration of copulas and BNs to 
allow simultaneous modeling of stochastic and topological dependencies among process 
variables is discussed. 
 
8.2.2. Bayesian Networks (BNs) 
BN analysis offers a general framework for analyzing causal influences and constructing 
multivariate distributions. Basically, BNs are probabilistic networks which rely on Bayes’ 
theorem to draw inferences based on prior evidence [10]. A BN can be defined as a directed 
acyclic graph (DAG) associated with a joint probability distribution [11]. BNs’ main 
application in process safety analysis is as an inference engine for updating the prior 
occurrence probability of events given new information [12,13]. This advantage addresses 
one of the main shortcomings of the traditional fault tree, event tree, and bowtie safety 
analysis methods. However, despite the broad scope of applicability, the following 
shortcomings are identified for BN applications: 
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i. Deterministic point-based probability values are used in most BN applications, 
ignoring the uncertainty associated with probability estimations.  
ii. To tackle the above shortcoming, Gaussian distribution has been used as the 
marginal distribution in some applications. However, there is no doubt that the 
assumption of joint normality fails to yield suitable models in many applications. 
Aside from the case of the normal distribution, application of other probability 
distributions for marginal distributions is not practical due to the limitations of the 
BN structure [5].  
iii. Constructing conditional probability tables (CPTs) to describe the strength 
relationships quickly becomes very complex and difficult to compute as the number 
of parents and states increases [2].  
iv. Furthermore, representation of the dependence structure is simply limited to the 
definition of nodes’ relationships using CPTs. Therefore, BN models fail to model 
complex non-linear dependencies.   
There have been some recent developments to improve the practical application of BNs, 
such as the application of multinomial likelihood functions [14] and nonlinear Gaussian 
belief networks [15] to model non-linear interactions, and the application of object-oriented 
BN [16] and Noisy-OR technique [17] to simplify the analysis of complex networks. 
Although such developments have enhanced the practical implementation of the BNs, the 
limitations mentioned above still exist.  
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8.2.3. Copulas 
An alternate and markedly different approach for constructing multivariate distributions is 
the application of copula functions to link univariate marginal distributions. Let U = (Ui), 
i∈{1, ..., d} and d ∈ N be real random variables marginally uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. 
A copula function :[0,1] [0,1]
dC   is a joint distribution function: 
   
1 1 1
, ..., , ...,
d d d
C u u P U u U u    . 
where δ is the parameter of the copula function. The importance of copulas is rooted in 
Sklar’s theorem [18] that states any multivariate distribution can be represented as a copula 
function of its marginal [6]. Given a family X = (Xi), i∈{1, ..., d} and d ∈ N, of continuous 
random variables, this relationship can be stated in terms of probability density function 
(PDF) using the derivative chain rule: 
 
    
   
        1 1 1 1
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C F x F x
f f x c F x F x f x
F x F x  

 
 
 

  (8.1) 
where the copula density c is uniquely determined for continuous random variables [5]. 
For the proof of Equation (8.1) and other important copulas and their properties, see Nelsen 
[6]. 
In practice, copula constructions often lead to a significant improvement in density 
estimation. Accordingly, there has been a growing interest in application of copulas in the 
process industry [19], with applications ranging from multivariate loss modelling and loss 
aggregation for process facilities [1,20,21] to risk analysis of safety systems [13,22].  
A recent contribution to construct joint probability distributions using copulas is the 
“rolling pin method” proposed by Mohseni Ahooyi et al. [22] to accommodate random 
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variables with arbitrary (nonmonotonic or monotonic) relationships. However, only 
symmetrical copulas can be used in this method to approximate dependence structures. 
Moreover, correlation and copulas are unable to capture cause-effect relationships among 
random variables, and they also cannot make use of available knowledge about causal 
structures [11]. This is why the process of capturing conventional stochastic dependencies 
using copula functions is referred to as “reduced-form, black-box models, which do not 
provide insight into the directional dependencies or fundamental risk drivers” that govern 
industrial processes [11].  
Another ongoing challenge of the application of copula functions is the difficulty in their 
application for high-dimensional problems. The research contributions to overcome this 
challenge are either limited to a mixture of trees compositions [23], or rely on a recursive 
construction of conditional bivariate copulas (also known as vine copulas) [24,25]. 
However, these approaches are elaborate for high dimensions and their applications are 
limited to a relatively small number of variables [5].  
Table 8.1 summarizes recent attempts to develop multivariate copula-based graphical 
modelling approaches. Among these models, the CBN model proposed by Elidan [5] is 
selected in this work as it provides an innovative tool to decompose distributions associated 
with a DAG because: (i) it is flexible enough to use any higher variate copulas; (ii) it 
provides control of marginal distributions; (iii) its practical applications are relatively 
simple as it uses the same graphical structure as BN. The CBN model uses a copula 
decomposition of distributions associated with a DAG. In CBN analysis, the local copula 
density function together with marginal distributions can be used to parameterize a 
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conditional density required to build BNs. This offers great flexibility in modeling high-
dimensional continuous distribution while retaining copula advantages. The following 
section provides a methodology based on the CBN model for multivariate probabilistic 
safety analysis of process facilities. 
 
Table 8.1. Multivariate copula-based graphical modelling methods; adopted from Elidan [26] 
Model/References Structure Copula Variables 
Vines [24,25] Conditional dependence Any bivariate < 10 in practice 
Nonparametric BBN [27–29] BN plus vines Gaussian in practice 100s 
Tree-averaged [23,30] Mixture of trees Gaussian 10s 
Copula networks [5] BN Any 100s 
 
8.3. Methodology 
As shown in Figure 8.2, the proposed methodology for probabilistic analysis of abnormal 
operational conditions using CBN models consists of two main steps. Step 1 is an off-line 
process that identifies the network nodes and the CBN model structure. Step 2 is an on-line 
process of inference analysis that uses the developed CBN model to estimate the real-time 
probability of abnormal conditions using new evidence from the system. The details of 
each step are discussed in the following sections. 
As an example application, the estimated real-time probability values can be used to 
analyze warnings and conduct root-cause diagnosis of abnormal process conditions. These 
latter steps are shown with dashed lines in Figure 8.2 as they are not the main focus of this 
paper.  
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Step 1: CBN Model Development Step 2: Inference Analysis 
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algorithm to map BN into 
a CBN structure 
Is network topology 
known?
Application of 
score-based 
greedy search 
procedure to 
learn the network 
structure 
Estimation of univariate 
marginal distributions for 
network nodes
Estimation of local 
copula parameters using 
MLE method
Local copula model 
selection using AIC 
approach
Start
Inference in CBN Model 
to Update Event 
Probabilities
No
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Figure 8.2. Proposed methodology for development and application of the CBN model in safety 
analysis 
  
8.3.1. Step 1: CBN Model Development 
8.3.1.1. Step 1.1: Identification of Network Nodes  
The first step to develop the CBN model is to identify the network nodes, which represent 
system variables in the network. Table 8.2 defines four types of nodes that are used in 
construction of the CBN structure, along with a few examples.   
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Table 8.2. Node types for construction of a CBN; adopted from Ahmed et al. [31] 
Node Type 
Associated 
Process 
Attributes  Description  Examples 
Root  Root causes Root causes and/or process 
faults that influence the 
process deviations. 
External disturbances, equipment 
malfunctions, control system 
failures or human errors. 
Intermediate 
Type I  
Symptoms Deviation of process 
characteristics from their 
target values. 
Deviation of temperature and 
differential pressure of a 
distillation column from their 
operating limits. 
Intermediate 
Type II  
Scenarios Process operating conditions 
that influence an event. 
Failure of the control system and 
operator to detect and correct 
process symptoms.  
Leaf Events Undesirable abnormal 
process conditions.   
Product quality degradation, 
distillation column flooding, and 
reactor runaway. 
 
The Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) can be used to identify the potentially 
significant events. Then, the maximum credible accident scenario identification [32] may 
be used to envisage the potential scenarios leading to each identified abnormal event. 
Subsequently, the information from the HAZOP study is used to identify root causes of 
each event. Alternatively, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) can be used to 
identify possible root causes. Finally, the process variables, the deviation of which can 
result in the identified events, are selected [31]. Detailed description of these methods is 
not within the scope of this work.  
 
8.3.1.2. Step 1.2: Network Topology Development    
Like BN analysis, a CBN model takes advantage of a graphical structure to represent the 
causality among random variables. Additionally, CBN analysis uses copula functions to 
capture all of the dependence information among random variables. In general, the 
topology of a CBN structure remains the same as the topology of the corresponding BN 
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structure. Thus, the construction of the network structure depends on the causal 
relationships among variable nodes [7]. However, rather than the conditional probability 
tables in a BN model, local copulas are used in a CBN model to capture the dependence 
structure and strength of the relationship among nodes. Therefore, if the BN topology of a 
given system is known, the same graph structure can also be used for the corresponding 
CBN model. 
The mapping algorithm shown in Figure 8.3 can be used to map the existing BN model 
into a CBN model. As shown in Figure 8.3, the nodes structure remains the same in both 
BN and CBN. However, in contrast to the BN, the equivalent CBN model will have 
flexibility in terms of assigning marginal distributions to each node. Finally, local copulas 
are used to represent dependence structure among variables. 
Root Nodes
Intermediate 
Nodes
Leaf Nodes
Root Nodes
Intermediate 
Nodes
Leaf Nodes
Probability of 
Nodes
Conditional 
Probability 
Tables
Marginal 
Probability 
Density of Nodes
Local Copulas
Step 1
Step 2
 
Figure 8.3. Mapping BN to CBN 
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If the BN structure of a given system is unknown, a search process can be used to find the 
most useful network structure which can represent the given dataset. Different search 
algorithms have been proposed to rank the candidate network structures based on an 
estimated score, among which the greedy search algorithm is a common choice. Eban & 
Elidan [33] proposed a standard greedy search algorithm that can be used to apply local 
structure modifications (e.g., add/delete/reverse edge) based on a model selection score. 
They suggested using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) that, like other scores, 
balances the likelihood and the complexity of the model. For complex networks with a high 
number of variables, however, calculating the score for each of the numerous candidate 
structures is computationally demanding. Elidan [34] and Tenzer & Elidan [35] showed 
that the expected likelihood of an edge in the model is monotonic in the magnitude of 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient, dented by ρs, for two important copula families. They 
also showed numerically that this relationship holds for many other popular copulas. 
Motivated by this result, the empirical ρs can be used as a model selection measure to 
crudely yet efficiently pre-rank candidate structure modifications. Then, more precise, but 
costly, computation of the BIC score can be performed for only the most promising 
candidates [34].  
This work assumes that the causal relationship among network variables for a given system 
is already known, to keep the work focused on CBN model development. An interested 
reader may refer to Tenzer & Elidan [35] to learn more about the score-based network 
structure search procedure. Application of the proposed CBN methodology along with the 
search procedure described above ensures assessment of potential hidden correlations (as 
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measured via Spearman’s ρs) and causal relationships (as determined by identifying the 
potential parents) among variables. 
 
8.3.1.3. Step 1.3: CBN Model Development  
The CBN model proposed by Elidan [5] is used in this work to decompose a joint 
distribution associated with a DAG. Let G be a DAG with nodes corresponding to the set 
of random variables X = {X1,…, Xd}, and let  1,..., ii i ikpa pa pa  be the parents of Xi in G. 
Elidan [5] defined the CBN model as a triplet Đ = (G,ΘC,Θf) that represents  Xf x , with 
lower case letters denoting assignment to variables. G encodes the independencies (Xi ⊥ 
Ndi | pai), which are assumed to hold in  Xf x , where ⊥ denotes the independence 
relationship, and Ndi are nodes that are not descendants of Xi in G. ΘC is a set of local 
copula functions       1, ,..., ii i i ikC F x F Fpa pa  that is associated with the nodes of G 
that have at least one parent. In addition, Θf is the set of parameters representing the 
marginal densities fi(xi) (and distributions Fi(xi)). For compactness, in this work 
   
ii X i
f x f x  and    
ii X i
F x F x . Then, the joint density  xf  can be shown as: 
         ,
ic i ik i
i
f R F x F f xx pa      (8.2) 
where, if Xi has at least one parent in the graph G, the term      ,
ic i ik
R F x F pa  denotes 
the conditional copula density and is defined as: 
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When Xi has no parents in G,   1
ic
R   . The term      ,
ic i ik
R F x F pa  is always a valid 
conditional density, namely  i if x pa , and can be easily computed. In particular, when 
the copula density c(·) has an explicit form, so does  
ic
R  , since it involves derivatives of 
a lesser order [5]. 
Like the BN framework, the foundation of a CBN model is a local conditional density. 
However, in a CBN model the conditional densities are parametrized using copulas 
according to the following lemma: 
Lemma 1: Let  f x y , with y = {y1,…,yK}, be a conditional density function and let f(x) 
be the marginal density of X. Then there exists a copula density function 
      1, ,..., Kc F x F y F y  such that: 
          1, ,...,c Kf x R F x F y F y f xy .     (8.4) 
Thus, any copula density function c(x, y1, …, yK), together with f(x), can be used to 
parameterize a conditional density  f x y . See Elidan [5] for the proof. 
 
8.3.1.4. Step 1.4: Copula Selection and Parameter Learning 
The decomposable form of the joint density defined by the CBN model in Equation (8.2) 
facilitates relatively efficient copula estimation using standard approaches such as 
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maximum likelihood evaluation. However, from an estimation perspective, performing the 
decomposable estimation can be complicated, as the univariate marginals in a CBN model 
are usually shared across the entire model. The frequently used technique in the copula 
community to overcome this challenge is to first estimate the marginals and then learn the 
copula parameters [33]. Therefore, learning the structure of a CBN model involves three 
steps:  
(i) identification of marginal distributions;  
(ii) estimation of copula parameters; and  
(iii) selection of the best fitting copula.  
Appendix 8.A provides details of implementing this three-step learning process. Methods 
based on maximum likelihood evaluation and Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) are 
presented in Appendix 8.A to estimate copula parameters and rank the competing candidate 
copulas for a given CBN structure.   
 
8.3.2. Step 2: Inference Analysis 
The developed CBN model can be used to perform probabilistic inference for updating the 
prior occurrence probability of events given new information by adopting the BN inference 
analysis. Let E, S and A be a finite set of real-valued random variables denoting events, 
symptoms (evidence) and root cause nodes of a network, respectively. Using copula 
parameterization of the conditional density in Lemma 1, Equation (8.4), the CBN inference 
analysis can then be shown as: 
           1, ,...,j c j K jf E R F E F S F S f ES     (8.5) 
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where  jf E S  denotes the posterior probability of event Ej given the observation of 
certain symptoms;  jf E  is the prior distribution of event Ej; j counts the number of 
events; and  cR   denotes the conditional copula density and is defined in Equation (8.3). 
Hence, the updated and/or real-time probabilities of symptom nodes can be plugged into 
Equation (8.5) to obtain the updated event probabilities. The real-time probabilities of 
symptom nodes can be estimated based on the type of symptom. For instance, Bao et al. 
[36] proposed the application of a three-sigma rule to evaluate the deviation probability of 
monitored process variables using real-time process measurements. As an another 
example, Abimbola et al. [37] used physical reliability models of constant strength and 
exponentially distributed random stress to estimate the real-time failure probability of 
drilling equipment as a function of drilling depth. 
The updated event probability can be continuously compared to a threshold probability. 
Therefore, once the probability of the event occurrence exceeds the threshold, the event 
warning is annunciated to inform the operator about the unsafe condition. For cases in 
which the probability of the event occurrence exceeds the threshold, the copula 
parameterization of the conditional density using the developed CBN model can be used 
to conduct backward analysis to update the probability of root-cause nodes:  
           1, ,...,r c r K rf A R F A F S F S f AS      (8.6) 
where A denotes root-causes, r counts the number of root-causes and S denotes symptoms 
(evidence).  rf A S  indicates the occurrence probability of a particular root cause given 
the observation of certain evidence. The estimated probability values using Equation (8.6) 
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can be used to rank the contribution of identified root causes in the occurrence of the 
observed event. 
 
8.4. Case study: Managed Pressure Drilling 
8.4.1. Case Study Description 
To demonstrate the application of the proposed CBN model in complex real-life problems, 
both BN and CBN models are applied to an offshore managed pressure drilling (MPD) 
operation case study, adopted from a study by Abimbola et al. [38]. MPD is an adaptive 
drilling process used to precisely control the annular pressure profile throughout the 
wellbore. The overbalanced drilling technique used in the MPD avoids the flow of 
formation fluid into the wellbore [38]. In their study, Abimbola et al. [38] proposed a 
methodology based on the BN approach for safety and risk analysis of the MPD operation. 
The developed BN is analyzed to assess the safety critical elements of constant bottom-
hole pressure drilling techniques and their safe operating pressure regime. 
Figure 8.4 shows the event tree for the underbalanced drilling scenario. Insufficient mud 
weight, unexpected pore pressure and lost circulation, in conjunction with a failure of the 
MPD system in preventing the underbalance, are among the main causes of an 
underbalanced drilling scenario [38]. As shown in Figure 8.4, the unexpectedly high pore 
pressure (PP) beyond the bottom hole pressure (PBH) is considered as the initiating event 
for an underbalanced scenario. The event tree in Figure 8.4 also demonstrates four safety 
barriers which have been considered to prevent the consequences of the underbalanced 
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scenario. For simplicity, analyzing the fault tree associated with the causes of initiating an 
underbalanced drilling scenario is not included in the scope of this case study. 
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Figure 8.4. Event tree and safety barriers for underbalanced drilling scenario; adopted from 
Abimbola et al. [38] 
 
In this case study, first a BN is constructed for the underbalanced drilling scenario. Then, 
the developed BN is mapped into a CBN model. The developed CBN is then used to 
conduct inference analysis to update the probability of end events as new evidence from 
the drilling operation becomes available. Finally, the appealing features of the proposed 
CBN methodology to address the inherent shortcomings of the BN approach are discussed.  
 
8.4.2. BN Model Development   
Figure 8.5 shows separate BNs developed for each state of the consequence node of the 
event tree of the underbalanced drilling scenario (in Figure 8.4). The descriptions of 
different nodes in Figure 8.5 are provided in Tables 8.3 and 8.4. The developed BNs 
represent the relationships between potential consequences and safety barriers, the failure 
of which affect the probability of each consequence state. Considering each consequence 
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state (event) as a separate node allows consideration of each state as a continuous variable 
while developing the CBN model in the next section.   
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Figure 8.5. The BN models for the underbalanced drilling scenario; (a) wellbore collapse (EE1) and 
kick (EE2), (b) blowout (EE3), (c) fire/explosion (EE4) and major accident (EE5) 
 
As an example, the consequence state EE5 in Figure 8.5(c), denoting catastrophic fire and 
explosion, is selected to analyze the BN model. Given a family  5, ,V iIE SB EE , i = 
1,2,3,4, of variables associated to a DAG GBN in Figure 8.5(c), the joint distribution of V is 
developed using the BN model. Then, conditional probability tables (CPT) are assigned to 
the consequence nodes as well as to the safety barrier nodes. For instance, the CPT for the 
Wellbore Collapse (EE2) end event is embedded in Figure 8.5(a). The CPT for consequence 
state nodes acts like a logical AND-gate where values 1 and 0 represent occurrence or non-
occurrence of the associated event in the CPT. The CPT of the safety barrier nodes similarly 
takes 0 and 1 values to represent failure and success of each safety barrier node.  
The probability values in Table 8.3, sourced from Abimbola et al. [38], and the developed 
CPT tables are plugged into the  BN model using the GeNIe modeling environment 
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developed by the Decision Systems Laboratory of the University of Pittsburgh and 
available at http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/. The calculated values of probability of occurrence of 
each consequence state are shown in Table 8.4, which match the results in Abimbola et al. 
[38]. 
  
Table 8.3. Probability values for the initiating event and safety barriers failure on demand 
Node Description Probability 
IE Underbalanced condition (the initiating event) 9.75E-03 
SB1 MPD system failure 8.14E-02 
SB2 Blowout preventer (BOP) failure 7.00E-04 
SB3 Ignition prevention failure 1.07E-01 
SB4 External intervention (fire-fighting, 
evacuation, drilling of relief well, etc.) failure 
2.71E-02 
 
Table 8.4. Underbalanced scenario predictive frequency of occurrence 
End 
event Description 
Estimated 
probability 
EE0 Near balanced condition 9.90E-01 
EE1 Wellbore collapse 8.96E-03 
EE2 Kick 7.93E-04 
EE3 Blowout 4.96E-07 
EE4 Explosions, fire, major injury to some 
fatalities, minimal environmental pollution 
5.78E-08 
EE5 Catastrophe (fatalities, loss of rig, major 
environmental damage) 
1.61E-09 
 
8.4.3. CBN Model Development   
8.4.3.1. Problem Formulation  
In this section, the MPD case study is expanded into a more general case to highlight the 
strengths of the proposed CBN model compared to BN analysis. For this purpose, the 
probability of each network node is considered to follow the distributions in Table 8.5, 
rather than the deterministic point-based probability values used in Abimbola et al. [38]. 
The distribution parameters in Table 8.5 are selected in such a way that the mean of each 
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distribution equals the probability value of the associated node reported in Tables 8.3 and 
8.4. The probability distributions are selected from different families to show the flexibility 
of the CBN model. Exact estimation of marginal failure probability distributions is not 
within the scope of this work. For specific applications, methodologies discussed in 
Appendix 8.A.1 can be applied to estimate univariate marginals.  
It should be noted that in the CBN model, the continuous random numbers represent the 
probabilities of the failure, not the probabilities of the events. Therefore, different notation 
has been used in Table 8.5 to show each node where, for example, pSB1 shows the 
probability of failure of SB1. For simplicity, it is assumed that the causal structure of the 
original random variables IE, SB1, ..., SB4 and EE5 still holds for pIE, pSB1, …, pSB4 and pEE5. 
The validity of this assumption can be investigated using causality analysis techniques 
described in [7]. 
 
Table 8.5. Probability distributions for the MPD case study 
Node Description Probability distributions  
pIE Underbalanced condition Normal; μN = 9.75E-03*, σN = 0.01* 
pSB1 MPD system Weibull; βw = 1*, θw = 8.14E-02* 
pSB2 BOP Weibull; βw = 1, θw = 7.00E-04 
pSB3 Ignition prevention Normal; μN = 1.07E-02, σN = 0.04 
pSB4 External intervention  Lognormal; μLN = log(2.71E-02) *, σLN = 0.1* 
pEE1 Wellbore collapse Gamma; kg = 1*; αg = 8.96E-03* 
pEE2 Kick Gamma; kg = 1; αg = 7.93E-04 
pEE3 Blowout Gamma; kg = 1; αg = 4.96E-07 
pEE4 Fire and explosion Gamma; kg = 1; αg = 5.78E-08 
pEE5 Catastrophe Gamma; kg = 1; αg = 1.61E-09 
* μN and σN are mean and standard deviation of Normal distribution; μLN and σLN are mean 
and standard deviation of Lognormal distribution; βw and θw are shape and scale parameters 
of Weibull distribution; kg and αg are shape and scale parameters of Gamma distribution. 
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8.4.3.2. Training Dataset  
Having estimated the probability distributions, a training dataset is generated with a 
presumable dependence structure to facilitate the comparison of BN and CBN models. In 
real-life applications, data from process history and safety system performance can be used 
as the training dataset. However, to emphasize the generic power of the CBN model, a 
simulated training dataset is used in this case study. For simplicity, the entire training 
dataset is generated using the t-copula by following these two steps:  
i. Simulate a realization of multivariate random vector u  with marginals uniformly 
distributed on [0 1] from a t-copula. This simulation is conducted by construction 
of a multivariate t distribution, followed by its transformation using the 
corresponding t cumulative distribution function (CDF). The correlation coefficient 
values and the degree of freedom required to parametrize the t-copula are discussed 
below.  
ii. Transform back the simulated copula random numbers using the corresponding 
inverse of the cumulative distribution function of each node in Table 8.5.  
This two-step transformation creates dependent random numbers representing the network 
nodes with a presumable dependence structure that can be used to test the presented copula 
learning methodology. A sensitivity analysis is provided in Section 8.4.5 to investigate the 
effect of a changing copula family or copula parameter as well as the effect of noise on 
estimated probability values. 
Table 8.6 shows the correlation coefficient values which are used to parametrize each local 
t-copula. 5 degrees of freedom are considered for all t-copulas to allow for heavy-tailed 
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distributions. To facilitate visual representation of the dependence structure among nodes, 
Figure 8.6, that has scatter plots to demonstrate joint distribution of different node pairs, is 
also included. Only pEE5 is included in Figure 8.6 to simplify the figure. The plots on the 
diagonal of Figure 8.6 show the marginal distributions of each node and the lower-left 
panel shows the correlation coefficient values, taken from Table 8.6. The generated dataset 
is used in the next section to demonstrate the application of the presented copula learning 
methodology.  
 
Table 8.6. Upper-right panel: Correlation coefficient values used to generate the training dataset for 
the MPD case study. Lower-left panel: Estimated t-copula parameters (estimated values are shown in 
italic format) 
Nod
es 
Parents 
Nodes  
pIE pSB pSB2 pSB3 pSB4 pEE1 pEE2 pEE3 pEE4 pEE5 
pIE Not applicable 
(NA) 
1 0.75 0.28 0.30 0.15 0.68 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.52 
pSB1 pIE 0.750 1 0.53 0.50 0.21 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.48 
pSB2 pSB1 0.275 0.524 1 0.63 0.20 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.48 0.52 
pSB3 pSB2 0.299 0.496 0.627 1 0.47 0.50 0.60 0.58 0.50 0.75 
pSB4 pSB3 0.144 0.205 0.194 0.469 1 0.50 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.78 
pEE1 pIE, pSB1 0.678 0.546 0.517 0.499 0.494 1 0.62 0.50 0.50 0.65 
pEE2 pIE, pSB1 0.490 0.497 0.515 0.599 0.608 0.617 1 0.78 0.70 0.65 
pEE3 pIE, pSB1,pSB2 0.499 0.517 0.537 0.581 0.599 0.500 0.780 1 0.86 0.78 
pEE4 pIE, pSB1,…, pSB4 0.458 0.486 0.474 0.499 0.651 0.498 0.700 0.860 1 0.80 
pEE5 pIE, pSB1,…, pSB4 0.517 0.476 0.517 0.752 0.778 0.647 0.651 0.780 0.800 1 
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Figure 8.6. A part of the training dataset including marginal distributions (diagonal), joint 
distributions (upper right panel), and correlation coefficient values (lower left panel) for the MPD 
case study 
 
8.4.3.3. Copula Learning 
The copula learning methodologies presented in Appendix 8.A are used to select local 
copulas and associated parameters to capture the dependence structure among each 
network node and its parents. Table 8.6 shows the parents for each node along with the 
correlation coefficient values for each local t-copula (shown in the lower left of Table 8.6 
in italic format), estimated using the ML method with a sample size of 2,000. Comparing 
the original and the estimated ρ values in Table 8.6, one can see the efficiency and high 
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accuracy of the ML method in estimating the copula parameters, even for a relatively small 
sample size of 2,000.  
The next step is to select the local copulas. In principle, the CBN allows application of any 
family of local copulas in the model and even mixes different copula families without 
significant computational difficulty. The AIC approach is used to select each local copula 
and the results are shown in Table 8.7 for a sample size of 2,000. Other than the t-copula, 
the Clayton and Gumbel copulas from the Archimedean family are also selected as 
candidate copulas as they are able to represent dependency in distribution tails.  
From the calculated Akaike weights (shown in Table 8.7) using Equation (8.A5) in 
Appendix 8.A, it can be seen that, even for a relatively small sample size of 2,000, the AIC 
approach has been able to select the t-copula as the best approximating model since its 
Akaike weight is significantly greater than the others. The Akaike differences (Δi) can be 
used as a criterion to compare the level of empirical support for each model. However, 
when using the AIC approach, the candidate models with a value of Δi > 10 should not be 
considered as competing models [39]. The large value of the estimated Δi for Clayton and 
Gumbel copulas shows that, for this case study, they cannot even be considered as 
competing models compared to t-copula.  
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Table 8.7. Parameter estimations and Akaike weights for the MPD case study 
Node Parent Copula 
i
ˆ   i  AICi Δi wi 
pSB1 pIE t 0.74 431.50 -859.00 0.00 1.00 
  Clayton 1.60 315.68 -629.37 229.63 0.00 
  Gumbel 2.06 401.35 -800.69 58.30 0.00 
        
pSB2 pSB1 t 0.55 182.74 -361.49 0.00 1.00 
  Clayton 0.87 129.73 -257.46 104.02 0.00 
  Gumbel 1.54 168.25 -334.51 26.98 0.00 
        
pSB3 pSB2 t 0.64 302.71 -601.42 0.00 1.00 
  Clayton 1.10 219.72 -437.44 163.98 0.00 
  Gumbel 1.70 279.15 -556.31 45.11 0.00 
        
pSB4 pSB3 t 0.46 137.86 -271.73 0.00 1.00 
  Clayton 0.66 90.87 -179.73 91.99 0.00 
  Gumbel 1.41 121.01 -240.02 31.70 0.00 
 
8.4.4. Inference Analysis 
As an example, Figure 8.7 shows the graphical structure of the developed CBN model for 
catastrophe conditions (EE5) in the MPD case study, where Ci represents local copulas. 
The developed CBN helps to clearly establish both causality and correlation among 
network nodes, an important advancement compared to traditional graphical modelling 
approaches. In Figure 8.7, similar to the equivalent BN in Figure 8.5(c), the cause and 
effect relationships between network nodes are identified using connecting arrows. 
Moreover, the local copulas and related parameters in Figure 8.7 help to describe the 
structure, size and direction of dependency among network nodes.  
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Figure 8.7. The CBN model for the catastrophe conditions (EE5) in the MPD case study 
 
The developed CBN model is used to conduct inference analysis and revise the probability 
of different end states (pEEi) as the probability of underbalanced conditions (pIE) increases 
as a function of the drilling depth. Abimbola et al. [37] used the following physical 
reliability model of constant strength and exponentially distributed random stress to 
estimate the probability of failure of drilling equipment (pDE): 
   exp / 0.052DE Pp S E P ECD h          (8.7) 
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where Sσ is the rated strength of the drilling equipment in pounds per square inch (psi); 
E(PP) is the expected value of the measured pore pressure (stress) in psi; ECD is the 
Equivalent Circulating Density in pounds per gallon (ppg) comprising the mud hydrostatic 
pressure and the frictional pressure loss in the annulus; and h is the drilling vertical height 
in ft. Considering a salt water formation fluid for this case study, E(PP) can also be 
expressed as a function of h as E(PP ) = 0.465h [37]. Assuming that the failure of the 
drilling equipment causes the underbalanced conditions, Equation (8.7) is used in this work 
to estimate the real-time probability of the underbalanced conditions (pIE) as a function of 
h. Then, the proposed inference analysis methodology in Equation (8.5) is used to revise 
the probability of different end states (pEEi) using the developed CBN model.  
To demonstrate the application of the proposed inference analysis methodology using the 
CBN model, a case is considered where h = 16,900 ft and the drilling rate is 50 ft per hour. 
To account for the potential measurement variability, the pore pressure, stress, is 
considered to follow a Normal distribution with the mean value of 0.465
pP
h   and 
standard deviation of 108.25
pP
   psi. A gasified drilling fluid of density 3.5 ppg is 
considered in this case study. Figure 8.8 shows the PP time-plot of the drilling operation. 
Up to 11:32 AM, the PP increases steadily due to the increase in h. At 11:32 AM, it is 
assumed that the faulty conditions in the drilling equipment resulted in a 20% increase in 
PP
 . Other than the increase in PP as a function of h, an unexpected 100 psi increase in PP 
also occurs from 11:32 AM to 11:55 AM due to the faulty conditions, moving the operation 
closer to underbalanced drilling conditions. Accordingly, the probability of underbalanced 
conditions increases as a function of h, which can be estimated using Equation (8.7). At 
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11:55 AM, the second faulty conditions occurred, which resulted in an additional 20% 
increase in 
PP
  and an unexpected 200 psi increase in PP from 11:55 AM to 12:08 PM.   
 
 
Figure 8.8. Pore pressure time-plot 
 
Assuming that the PP measurements are intended to be used for warning generation, noise 
filtering is carried out for pressure measurements using the moving average filter in order 
to minimize false warnings [40]. The filtered measurements are shown in darker colour in 
Figure 8.8. The estimated probabilities of underbalanced conditions using Equation (8.7) 
are plugged into the developed CBN model as the evidence to conduct inference analysis 
using Equation (8.8). As an example, Figure 8.9 shows the estimated posterior probability 
of a blowout event given the change in PP over h and the consequent increase in the 
probability of underbalanced conditions. 
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Figure 8.9. Posterior blowout probability time-plot 
 
Similarly, Equation (8.9) can be used to conduct root cause analysis by revising the 
probability of identified root causes. For conciseness, the root cause analysis is excluded 
from the scope of this case study. As shown in this case study, using the proposed CBN 
methodology, noisy process measurements with any marginal distributions and complex 
non-linear dependence structure can be plugged into the model to revise the probability of 
the events on a real-time basis. By assigning a threshold value to the probabilities of 
different end events, the estimated probability time-plot in Figure 8.9 can be used for alarm 
analysis and annunciation. This provides a flexible framework for the event-based early 
warning system approach by assigning warnings to undesired events rather than assigning 
alarms to each individual monitored variable, resulting in reduction of the probability of 
alarm flooding. Further work on application of the proposed model for warning generation 
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and fault diagnosis and its integration with loss modelling to develop a risk-based event-
based early warning system are the subjects of ongoing research by the authors. 
 
8.4.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
To account for the cases when the copula selection approach chooses a wrong copula for a 
given dataset, an experiment is performed using t, Clayton and Gumbel copulas to estimate 
the posterior probability of blowout (EE2) to regenerate Figure 8.9 with different copulas. 
The correlation coefficient value of ρ = 0.49 between pIE and pEE2, selected from Table 8.6, 
is used to parametrize the t-copula. To parametrize the Clayton and Gumbel copulas, 
Kendall’s τ, estimated as  2 arcsin    [6], is used. As can be seen from Figure 8.10, 
the posterior blowout probabilities estimated from three different copulas are significantly 
different. In Figure 8.10, the posterior blowout probability time-plot estimated using t-
copula matches Figure 8.9. However, application of Clayton and Gumbel copulas have 
resulted in relatively significant overestimation and underestimation of the probability 
values, respectively, as change in the type of copula causes a potentially significant change 
in the dependence structure among network nodes. Although this may be concluded to be 
a shortcoming of the CBN approach, the sensitivity analysis investigations conducted in 
the rest of this section show that this is not a concern when using the proposed AIC copula 
selection methodology.          
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Figure 8.10. Posterior blowout probability time-plots using three copulas 
 
A sensitivity analysis is performed to investigate the performance of the proposed AIC 
copula selection methodology. Random noise from different sources for a given dataset 
can hinder identification of the true dependence structure and selection of the appropriate 
copula. Therefore, to make the case study more representative of real world problems, the 
sensitivity analysis investigates the effect of adding random noise to the simulated training 
dataset and its impact on copula selection and parameter estimation. As discussed in 
Section 8.4.3.2, the first step to generate the training dataset for this case study was to 
simulate multivariate random vector u  with marginals uniformly distributed on [0 1] from 
a t-copula. To conduct the sensitivity analysis, 11 experiments were performed by adding 
a Gaussian noise with mean zero and different standard deviations ranging from 0 to 1 to 
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the simulated copula random numbers. To investigate the effect of sample size, all the 
experiments were repeated for two sample sizes of 10,000 and 50,000. 
Figures 8.11 and 8.12 show the effect of adding noise on the performance of the copula 
selection and parameter estimation, respectively, for the local copula between pIE and pSB1. 
The graphs for the local copulas between other nodes are not included here as they resulted 
in the same conclusion. As shown in Figure 8.11, for the sample size of 10,000, the AIC 
approach has selected the t-copula as the best fitting approach for the values of noise 
standard deviation less than 0.5. This shows the robustness of using Akaike weights for 
copula selection as the value of 0.5 for the noise standard deviation represents a relatively 
significant noise in real world scenarios since both noise standard deviation and copula 
simulated random numbers have values between 0 and 1. For higher values of noise 
standard deviation, the Gumbel copula is selected as the best fitting copula, which is 
consistent with Table 8.7 where Gumbel has been identified as the second competing 
copula. As can be seen in Figure 8.11, the robustness of the copula selection method 
improves by increasing the sample size. These conclusions are also consistent with the 
observations by Burnham and Anderson [39] and Hashemi et al. [1] on the advantages of 
using Akaike weights for copula selection.  
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Figure 8.11. The effect of noise standard deviation on copula selection for the local copula for pIE and 
pSB1. The value of Akaike weight w = 1 represents the best fitting copula model 
 
Figure 8.12 shows the effect of adding noise to the simulated training dataset on parameter 
estimation using the maximum likelihood (ML) approach presented in Appendix 8.A.2. 
From Figure 8.12, it can be seen that, compared to copula selection, random noise can have 
a more negative impact on parameter estimation. Increasing the sample size has also not 
been as helpful as it was in the case for copula selection. Up to the noise standard deviation 
of 0.3, noise has had a minor impact on the estimated parameter for the t-copula, which is 
the true model for this case study. However, the performance of the parameter estimation 
has decreased relatively sharply for a noise standard deviation of more than 0.3. Although 
a noise standard deviation of 0.3 is still a considerable amount of noise, below which the 
methodology performance has been reasonably acceptable, another sensitivity analysis is 
conducted in the following paragraph to investigate the effect of error in parameter 
estimation in estimated probability values.    
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Figure 8.12. The effect of noise standard deviation on copula parameter estimation for the local 
copula for pIE and pSB1 
 
Figure 8.13 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis that investigates the effect of error 
in parameter estimation on estimated blowout probability values. As can be seen in Figure 
8.13, for the sample size 10,000, -50% and +50% errors in estimated parameters have 
resulted in about 8% and 13% error in probability estimation, respectively. The error in 
parameter estimation in the range of -30% to +25% has only produced an error in estimated 
probability in the range of -5% to +5%. Increasing the sample size has also resulted in 
better probability estimation. An additional conclusion from Figure 8.13 is that 
overestimation of the copula parameter is more dangerous than underestimation, as the 
former has resulted in overestimation of the probability values. 
Overall, once the true copula has been selected, which is shown to be of minor concern due 
to the robustness of the proposed AIC approach, the potential error in parameter estimation 
due to random noise is of lesser concern. Noise filtering, increased sample size and use of 
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reliable datasets are among the potential approaches to ensure a reliable parameter 
estimation.    
 
Figure 8.13. Effect of parameter estimation error on probability estimation 
 
8.4.6. Discussion and Further Work 
As demonstrated in this case study, the integration of copulas and BN provides safety 
practitioners with several advantages: (1) it offers control over the form of the univariate 
marginal distributions; (2) it allows mixing and matching local copulas to represent 
unknown complex dependence structures; (3) it can accommodate noisy process variables; 
(4) it can capture hidden relationships among process variables; (5) it features faster 
structure learning compared to BNs; (6) unlike BNs, CBN does not need discretization of 
continuous variables, resulting in a significant reduction of information loss and 
computational cost; and (7) it can capture both causality and dependency interrelationships 
among random variables.  
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These advantages make the CBN model highly flexible for different applications where 
BN analysis cannot be effectively applied, ranging from data-intensive problems like 
process fault diagnosis to data-scarce scenarios such as risk assessment of new installations 
or remote operations. The CBN model can be applied for different purposes such as alarm 
design, safety systems-related decision-making, and risk assessment of multivariate 
processes.  
Like any other modelling technique, the CBN approach presented in this work has some 
shortcomings, which open new areas of research to further develop its application in 
process industries. Firstly, the selection of local copulas and associated parameters may be 
seen as a significant computational burden. It was shown in this case study that the 
proposed ML method and AIC approach can identify the true dependence structure among 
variables without significant computational difficulty. However, the AIC attempts only to 
select the best model from the candidate models available; if a better model exists, but is 
not offered as a candidate, then the AIC cannot be expected to identify this new model. 
Therefore, when using the AIC approach, it is strongly recommended to choose all possible 
copula functions as candidate models. An alternate solution for selection of a copula from 
among a pre-defined set of copula candidates is the application of sample-based empirical 
copulas. Genest and Favre [41] believe that the empirical copula “is the most judicious 
representation of the copula C that one could hope for”, which, for a bivariate case, is 
formally defined by: 
 
1
1
, 1 ,
2 1 1
u vn
i i
n
i
r r
C u v u v
n n
 
   
  
 ,     , 0,1u v , 
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where  1   denotes the indicator function, n is the sample size, and uir  and 
v
ir  stand for the 
rank of each observation [41].  
Another potential challenge for application of copulas is that, when using any copula-based 
approach, the dependence structure is preserved under strictly increasing (monotonic) 
relationships among variables [2]. Generally, this is not a restrictive assumption when 
analysing a network of safety barriers and potential consequences as, intuitively, we do not 
expect the failure probability of safety barrier SBi to decrease when the failure probability 
of SBi-1 increases. However, when quantifying the strength of dependence between random 
variables with nonmonotonic relationships, the monotization transformation technique 
proposed by Mohseni Ahooyi et al. [2] can be integrated with the presented CBN model to 
overcome this shortcoming.  
The temporal sequence of events does not matter in the presented application of the CBN 
approach in this work. It is also assumed in this case study that the dependence structure 
among network nodes remains constant during the drilling operations and at different 
drilling depths. However, extending the CBN model into a dynamic model, which is an 
interesting topic for further study, facilitates the incorporation of shifting operating 
conditions and modes that may change the root nodes, fault scenarios and/or the 
dependence structure among network nodes. Development of the dynamic CBN to work in 
the temporal domain will also allow representation and reasoning of the dynamics of 
complex structured distributions. For a recent attempt to formulate Dynamic Copula 
Bayesian Network (DCBN) models, an interested reader can refer to Eban et al. [33].  
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8.5. Conclusions 
The concept of copula Bayesian networks (CBN) is applied for process safety analysis by 
integrating copulas and BN analysis. While copulas capture stochastic dependencies, BN 
analysis extracts the potential causality and the mutual dependency, also referred to as 
topological dependencies, among process variables. Thus, the multivariate process safety 
analysis tool, resulting from the combination of BN analysis and copula functions, provides 
an intuitively compelling framework for modeling causal relationships among (potentially) 
highly correlated variables with any level of dependence complexities. The CBN model 
uses a novel re-parameterization of the conditional densities using copulas. Consequently, 
the CBN model addresses several shortcomings of traditional BNs. Methods based on 
maximum likelihood evaluation and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) are used for 
learning the structure of the CBN model. 
The potential broad range of applications for the presented CBN model is demonstrated 
using a managed pressure drilling case study. The sensitivity analysis conducted for the 
case study showed that, despite the sensitivity of the model to the choice of copula, the 
presented AIC approach is capable of selecting the best fitting copula from among a list of 
candidate copulas, even for datasets with relatively significant random noise. The case 
study also highlighted the CBN model’s relatively low sensitivity to error in copula 
parameter estimation. In a future study, the model is to be combined with the multivariate 
operational loss modelling to develop a novel multivariate risk-based process safety 
analysis tool.  
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Appendix 8.A. CBN Structure Learning 
8.A.1. Estimating Univariate Marginals  
Selection of the marginal distributions is not constrained using the proposed CBN 
approach. Thus, any parametric or non-parametric distribution can be used to represent the 
marginal distribution of the network nodes. For example, the standard normal kernel-based 
density estimation can be used to provide an accurate and robust estimation of marginals 
based on the available data. The non-parametric marginal distributions provide an 
extremely accurate estimate of the univariate distribution, thus boosting the ability of the 
CBN model to capture the overall joint distribution [33].  
 
8.A.2. Parameter Estimation of Local Copulas 
The maximum likelihood (ML) evaluation method [1] is used here to estimate the copula 
parameters. Let δi be the local copula ratio  i
ic
R   parameter to be estimated. Given a 
complete training dataset D of M instances observed from the distribution  Xf x  in 
Equation (8.2) where all of the variables X are observed in each instance, the resulting log-
likelihood function can be represented by: 
      
1 1
log log i
i
M M
i i ci i
m m
f x m R m

 
        (8.A1) 
where  i
ic
R m

is a shorthand for the value that the copula ratio  i
ic
R   takes in the m’th 
instance. Then, the copula parameter δi is estimated using the ML estimator by maximizing 
the log-likelihood function of the local copula ratio: 
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 ˆ arg maxi i  .         (8.A2) 
The uniform marginals  F   required to estimate  i
ic
R
   in Equation (8.A1) can be 
estimated using rescaled versions of their empirical counterparts [41], as follows: 
   
1
1
1 , 1,...,
1
M
i im i
m
F x X x i d
n 
  

 .      (8.A3) 
Alternatively, the rank-based estimates can also be used to estimate the uniform marginal 
[1].  
 
8.A.3. Model Selection for Local Copulas 
Having estimated the parameters of the candidate copulas, another challenge is to 
discriminate among competing models. The copula selection method based on Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) [1] is used in this work as a formal approach to rank competing 
copulas for applications in process systems. The AIC approach, with a fundamental link to 
information theory, uses an empirical log-likelihood function to estimate the relative 
expected “information” lost, referred to as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance, when a 
candidate model is used to approximate the true (real) model [39]. Using the AIC approach, 
the model with the smallest estimated AIC value represents the best fitting model. 
The AIC of each copula model is estimated using the corresponding value of pseudo log-
likelihoods: 
 2 2iAIC P           (8.A4) 
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where P is the number of estimable parameters. It should be noted that the AIC is only 
comparative relative to other AIC values in the model set [39]. Therefore, the best model 
is determined by examining its relative distance from the ‘‘true’’ model through 
computation of the AIC differences, mina aAIC AIC   , over all candidate models. The 
smaller Δa is, the more likely it is that the adjusted model is the best model. Better 
interpretation could also be achieved with the Akaike weights [39]: 
 
 
1
exp 0.5
exp 0.5
a
a R
r
r
w

 

 
.       (8.A5) 
The weight wa is the evidence that model a is the best model, given the data and set of R 
candidate models. The wa depends on the entire set; therefore, if a model is added or 
dropped during a post analysis, the wa must be recomputed for all the models in the newly 
defined set. Therefore, it is important to consider all potentially applicable copulas when 
using the AIC method to rank copulas. 
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9. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.1. Summary 
The evolution of risk-based approaches and the main contributions in the area of dynamic 
risk assessment are investigated in this thesis. Comparing the strengths and limitations of 
different presented dynamic risk assessment methods, the current technological challenges 
to the development of an efficient and practical dynamic risk assessment approach are 
identified. Loss functions and Copula Bayesian Networks (CBN) are used to address the 
identified challenges for dynamic estimation of risk elements, which are system loss and 
probability of loss occurrence.  
Loss functions are used to design an operational risk-based warning system in this work. 
This is a paradigm shift that will benefit the process industry by continuously improving 
process safety through proactive loss minimization. Instead of relying on the safety level 
which has been designed during the system design stage, the utilization of the proposed 
approach integrates safety improvement into daily activities through loss minimization.  
This thesis also demonstrates the flexibility and strength of copula-based approaches in 
modelling dependence among random variables. Additionally, copulas are used to join 
univariate marginal loss functions and develop multivariate loss functions. The practical 
application of copula-based loss aggregation and the importance of considering the 
correlation and dependency in risk assessment of multivariate processes are highlighted 
using several case studies.  
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The concept of Copula Bayesian Networks (CBN) is introduced in this work for process 
safety analysis by integrating copulas and BN analysis. While copulas capture stochastic 
dependencies, BN analysis extracts the potential causality and the mutual dependency, also 
referred to as topological dependencies, among process variables. Thus, the multivariate 
process safety analysis tool resulting from the combination of BN analysis and copula 
functions provides an intuitively compelling framework for modeling causal relationships 
among (potentially) highly correlated variables with any level of dependence complexities. 
From an application point of view, the aforementioned methods have been effectively 
applied to model a wide range of complex accident scenarios, from different process 
systems to offshore drilling operations. 
 
9.2. Conclusions  
Considering the importance of making decisions based on real-time risk, there have been 
efforts to make risk assessment methods dynamically adaptable. Having a dynamic 
operational risk assessment tool provides a real-time metric to measure and monitor 
process safety and quality performance. This thesis provides a practical infrastructure to 
facilitate real-time evaluation of risk elements, which are loss and its probability. This 
outcome facilitates real-time estimation of risk and its application in risk-based safety 
management of process facilities. The specific conclusions of this thesis are as follows: 
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9.2.1. Application of Loss Functions in Process Safety 
Loss functions are the perception of process loss due to process variations. Inverted 
probability loss functions provide more flexibility to model system loss compared to the 
traditional quadratic loss function. However, choice of the exact form of loss function 
should be based on the process behaviour and availability of loss data. Use of loss functions 
helps to continuously update the operational loss according to the current state of the 
process. Instead of relying on the safety level considered at the design stage, the estimated 
loss profile, in conjunction with the loss probability, will enable operators to make 
informed decisions based on the real- time operational risk.  
 
9.2.2. Development of Multivariate Loss Functions in Process Safety 
In practical applications a typical process system possesses multiple key characteristics 
related to product quality and process safety. The proposed multivariate loss function 
approach using copulas allows for the selection of any type of inverted probability loss 
function for the marginal losses, irrespective of their dependence structure. The case study 
results show a significantly improved representation of the process loss behaviour when 
using the presented copula-based multivariate loss function methodology instead of the 
classical multivariate inverted normal loss function approach.  
 
9.2.3. Dependency in Multivariate Process Risk Assessment 
This thesis discusses the importance of considering dependency among frequencies and 
loss severities of risk factors. The findings from the case studies highlight the fact that 
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ignorance or simplification of dependence structures among risk factors, or improper 
estimation of dependence structures, could result in significant over- or under-estimation 
of the overall risk. Given the complexity of relationships among process variables, 
dependence can be quantified in more sophisticated ways than merely through numeric 
coefficients such as the Pearson and rank correlation coefficients. Copula functions, 
sometimes referred to as “dependency functions”, contain all of the dependence 
information among random variables. The case study results demonstrated the flexibility 
and strength of copula-based approaches in modelling the dependence among random 
variables. Using copulas, the dependence pattern of the random variables and their 
individual behaviours, and more precisely, their marginal probability distributions, can be 
studied separately.   
 
9.2.4. Estimation of Business Losses 
In this study, models are proposed to assess the business loss elements, including business 
interruption loss and reputational loss. Although these two elements are closely correlated, 
they are modeled separately in this work, as different approaches are required to model 
each factor. The business interruption loss occurs mainly due to a gap in production, 
whereas the reputational loss occurs primarily due to the organization’s damaged 
trustworthiness in the marketplace after a major incident, with media coverage, takes place. 
The case study results show that ignorance of reputational loss and business interruption 
loss elements can cause significant misestimation of the overall loss.  
 
259 
9.2.5. Development of Copula Bayesian Networks (CBN) 
This thesis shows that, despite its broad application in the literature, Bayesian analysis for 
dynamic probability estimation has several shortcomings such as lack of control over the 
form of marginal probability distributions and consideration of a simplified dependence 
structure. The concept of copula Bayesian networks (CBN) is proposed to address the 
shortcomings of traditional Bayesian analysis. The multivariate process safety analysis 
tool, resulting from the combination of BN analysis and copula functions, provides an 
intuitively compelling framework for modeling causal relationships among (potentially) 
highly correlated variables with any level of dependence complexities. 
The selection of local copulas and associated parameters may be seen as a significant 
computational burden for copula-based approaches. However, it was shown through 
different case studies that the proposed maximum likelihood (ML) method and Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) approach can identify the true dependence structure among 
variables without significant computational difficulty. Sensitivity analysis showed the 
robustness of the ML and AIC methods to process noise and sampling variability. 
Overall, this PhD thesis provides new methods, insights, definitions, and guidance that: 
 Improve the understanding of how to monitor and model more realistically the 
process risk elements, which are loss and its probability;   
 lead to improved risk-informed decision-making at early stages of system failure; 
 improve safety and productivity in process operations through dynamic risk 
evaluation; and 
 assist in making zero-accident culture a reality.  
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9.3. Recommendations 
The present work attempts to introduce new concepts and also overcome the limitations of 
existing techniques in the field of dynamic risk analysis and safety assessment of process 
industries. This study, however, can be extended further as suggested below to address the 
main limitations of the work, as identified in the following sections. 
 
9.3.1. Development of Empirical Copulas  
It was shown that the proposed ML method and AIC approach can identify the true 
dependence structure among variables without significant computational difficulty. 
However, the AIC attempts only to select the best model from the candidate models 
available; if a better model exists, but is not offered as a candidate, then the AIC cannot be 
expected to identify this new model. Therefore, when using the AIC approach, it is strongly 
recommended to choose all possible copula functions as candidate models. An alternate 
solution for selection of a copula from among a pre-defined set of copula candidates is the 
application of sample-based empirical copulas, which can be a subject for further study. 
 
9.3.2. Development of Dynamic Copula Bayesian Network (DCBN) Models 
In application of CBN models, it is assumed that the dependence structure among network 
nodes remains constant over time. Extending the CBN model to become a dynamic model 
is an interesting topic for further study to facilitate the incorporation of shifting operating 
conditions and modes that may change the root nodes, fault scenarios and/or the 
dependence structure among network nodes. The development of the dynamic CBN to 
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work in the temporal domain will also allow representation and reasoning of the dynamics 
of complex structured distributions. This will also address the shortcoming of CBN models 
to allow for feedback events, which consistently exist in process variables.  
 
9.3.3. Development of Data Gathering Methodologies  
Most of the proposed approaches in this study demand a high amount of quality data which 
are often difficult to obtain, particularly for remote operations such as offshore and marine 
facilities. Choosing appropriate data that best represent the conditions in a given process 
system is challenging. To tackle this challenge, potential sources of information and data 
include: 
 Expert experience and knowledge  
 Data and information shared across industries that have operations in similar 
environments 
The development of advanced data acquisition systems for quantitative risk assessment, as 
well as development of methodologies for recording and analyzing process-related near 
misses and unsafe conditions, could be subjects for further studies to systematically gather 
and share information. 
 
9.3.4. Integration of Dynamic Multivariate Loss and Probability Estimation Methods 
The development of dynamic multivariate loss and probability estimation methods is 
studied separately in this work to enable the elaboration of details of each methodology. 
The development of a dynamic multivariate risk assessment method can be a subject to 
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further develop this research by integration of the proposed dynamic multivariate loss and 
probability estimation methods.  
 
9.3.5. Development of Commercial Tools  
MATLAB® codes are used in this thesis for the development and implementation of the 
proposed models. However, there is a need to develop a commercial and user-friendly 
software tool for implementation of dynamic multivariate risk analysis. The developed 
software tool should be compatible with current data acquisition and control systems in the 
oil and gas industry to facilitate its application for real-time risk control and its application 
for activation of process control and safety devices.  
 
9.3.6. Development of Dynamic Risk Management Tool 
It has been shown in numerous studies that several major losses in the oil and gas industry 
might have been prevented if a dynamic risk approach like the one presented in this work 
was integrated into the management framework. However, the implementation of a 
dynamic risk assessment approach could be a complex, resource-demanding process. 
Therefore, as suggested by Paltrinieri et al.8, “a strong safety culture for monitoring and 
recording process performances and incidents is needed, and a robust decision-making 
process should be introduced”. The integration of proposed loss and probability assessment 
techniques with management systems, along with a strong safety culture promoting 
                                                          
8 Paltrinieri, N., Khan, F., Cozzani, V., 2014. Coupling of advanced techniques for dynamic risk 
management. J. Risk Res. 9877, 1–21. doi:10.1080/13669877.2014.919515. 
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continuous improvement, are important subjects for future study. The resulting dynamic 
risk management tool would assist managers and decision-makers in making an adequate 
and timely investment in safety measures.  
 
9.3.7. Conducting an Approximate Uncertainty Modeling 
Probability distributions are used in this work to model multiple uncertainties. Uncertainty 
associated with the selection of proper probability distributions and the estimation of 
probability distribution parameters can significantly impact the accuracy of risk 
assessment. Uncertainty analysis investigations have been conducted in different parts of 
this thesis to address this challenge. However, a more formal uncertainty modelling study 
by separating the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties is recommended to ensure 
consideration of all sources of uncertainty when applying the proposed methods in this 
thesis. A recent study by Bedford et al.9 can be used as a guideline to approximate 
uncertainty modeling in risk analysis.  
 
9.3.8. Practical Application in Process Safety Monitoring  
Figure 9.1 shows a simple schematic illustration of how the proposed Dynamic Risk 
Assessment (DRA) methods can be incorporated into the process safety monitoring system 
and compares it with the traditional approach. In the traditional safety system design, 
variable deviations from their predefined threshold limits are monitored to activate control 
                                                          
9 Bedford, T., Daneshkhah, A., Wilson, K.J., 2016. Approximate Uncertainty Modeling in Risk Analysis 
with Vine Copulas. Risk Anal. 36, 792–815. doi:10.1111/risa.12471 
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systems, alarms, and emergency shutdown devices (ESD). However, compared to this 
conventional single variable-based safety system design approach, the application of the 
proposed DRA methods ensures continuous updating of the events risk based on new 
evidence from: (i) monitoring of multiple correlated process variables; (ii) failure and 
incident histories; and (iii) process and operational changes. Therefore, safety and control 
limits can be set on the basis of the estimated risk. Moreover, the estimated risk can be 
used to categorize warnings into alerts and alarms to avoid problems such as alarm 
flooding. 
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Figure 9.1. Schematic of a tank system (a) Traditional safety and control system design; (b) 
Incorporation of the proposed Dynamic Risk Assessment methods in process safety monitoring10 
                                                          
10 Khan, F., Hashemi, S.J., Paltrinieri, N., Amyotte, P., Cozzani, V., Reniers, G., 2016. Dynamic risk 
management: a contemporary approach to process safety management. Curr. Opin. Chem. Eng. 14, 9–17. 
doi:10.1016/j.coche.2016.07.006 
